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Every citizen is entitled to resort to all the courts of the country, and to
invoke the protection which all the laws or all those courts may afford
him. A man may not barter away his life or his freedom, or his substan-
tial rights. 1
INTRODUCTION
N OTHING is quite as pleasing as a legal doctrine that makes good,
common sense. In a complex litigation system, the idea that people
should be able to agree to where they will sue each other is one such
satisfying proposition. Indeed, so enticing is the notion that people ought
to be able to agree to the terms of any litigation, that federal courts have
eagerly embraced the idea.2
The ability of prospective litigants to choose in advance both the court
that will hear the case and the law that will govern the dispute now en-
joys widespread approval in federal courts.' This was not always so. In-
1. Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874).
2. One survey indicates that since 1980 the enforceability of forum-selection clauses
has been the topic of litigation in 211 federal cases and 50 state cases. See Note, Forum
Selection Clauses in Light of the Erie Doctrine and Federal Common Law: Stewart Or-
ganization v. Ricoh Corporation, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 1090, 1091 n.9 (1988).
3. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629-
30 (1985); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985); Insurance
Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703-04 (1982);
Diaz Contracting, Inc. v. Nanco Contracting Corp., 817 F.2d 1047, 1052 (3d Cir. 1987);
National Iranian Oil Co. v. Ashland Oil Inc., 817 F.2d 326, 332 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 329 (1987); Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1069-70 (11th
Cir. 1987) (en banc) (per curiam), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988); Luce v. Edelstein, 802
F.2d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 1986); Sun World Lines, Ltd. v. March Shipping Corp., 801 F.2d
1066, 1067-68 (8th Cir. 1986); General Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc.,
783 F.2d 352, 359 (3d Cir. 1986); Andrews v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 771 F.2d 184,
187-88 (7th Cir. 1985); Pelleport Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres, Inc., 741
F.2d 273, 280 (9th Cir. 1984); AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Inv. Partnership, 740 F.2d
148, 156 (2d Cir. 1984); LFC Lessors, Inc. v. Pacific Sewer Maintenance Corp., 739 F.2d
4, 7 (lst Cir. 1984); Lien Ho Hsing Steel Enter. Co. v. Weihtag, 738 F.2d 1455, 1458 (9th
Cir. 1984); Snyder v. Smith, 736 F.2d 409, 419 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037
(1984); Nascone v. Spudnuts, Inc., 735 F.2d 763, 774 (3d Cir. 1984); Coastal Steel Corp.
v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d 190, 202 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 938
(1983); Mercury Coal & Coke, Inc. v. Mannesmann Pipe & Steel Corp., 696 F.2d 315,
317 (4th Cir. 1982); Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys. of Am., 683 F.2d 718, 721 (2d Cir.
1982); Polar Shipping Ltd. v. Oriental Shipping Corp., 680 F.2d 627, 631 (9th Cir. 1982);
Crown Beverage Co. v. Cerveceria Moctezuma, S.A., 663 F.2d 886, 888 (9th Cir. 1981);
Janko v. Outboard Marine Corp., 605 F. Supp. 51, 52 (W.D. Okla. 1985); Furry v. First
Nat'l Monetary Corp., 602 F. Supp. 6, 8 (W.D. Okla. 1984); LFC Lessors, Inc. v. Pear-
son, 585 F. Supp. 1362, 1364 (D. Mass. 1984); Visicorp v. Software Arts, Inc., 575 F.
Supp. 1528, 1532 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Intermountain Sys. v. Edsall Constr. Co., 575 F.
Supp. 1195, 1198 (D. Colo. 1983) (mem.); Richardson Greenshields Sees., Inc. v. Metz,
566 F. Supp. 131, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); C. Pappas Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 565 F.
Supp. 1015, 1017 (D. Mass. 1983); Northeast Theatre Corp. v. Edie & Ely Landau, Inc.,
563 F. Supp. 833, 834 (D. Mass. 1983); Gordonsville Indus., Inc. v. American Artos
Corp., 549 F. Supp. 200, 205 (W.D. Va. 1982); Richardson Eng'g Co. v. IBM, 554 F.
Supp. 467, 470 (D. Vt. 1981), aff'd, 697 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1982); Anastasi Bros. Corp. v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F. Supp. 862, 863-64 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Kline v.
Kawai Am. Corp., 498 F. Supp. 868, 871 (D. Minn. 1980); Zima Corp. v. M.V. Roman
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deed, the current doctrine of consensual adjudicatory procedure
represents a wholesale abandonment of a 100-year taboo against party
autonomy in procedural matters.4 The federal courts have been unusu-
ally quick to cast aside well-established jurisdictional tenets, as well as
the arcane niceties of conflicts principles, and to import contract princi-
ples into the jurisdictional arena.
The doctrine of consensual adjudicatory procedure is now well en-
trenched in federal practice and is widely heralded as a form of salutary
progressivism.5 The doctrine is lauded for enhancing the values of pre-
dictability, certainty, security, stability and simplicity.6 With court ap-
proval, party autonomy regarding crucial procedural determinations
flourishes in an increasingly wider range of commercial and non-com-
mercial settings.7 Some courts verge on the self-congratulatory when
Pazinski, 493 F. Supp. 268, 276-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Dick Proctor Imports, Inc. v.
Sumitomo Corp. of Am., 486 F. Supp. 815, 818-19 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
The validity and enforceability of forum-selection clauses is a frequently litigated issue
in federal court and there are dozens of reported cases. For extensive citation to pre-1980
cases, see Annotation, Validity of Contractual Provision Limiting Place or Court in Which
Action May Be Brought, 31 A.L.R. 4th 404 (1984); see also Gruson, Forum-Selection
Clauses in International and Interstate Commercial Agreements, 1982 U. Ill. L. Rev. 133
(1982) [hereinafter Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses]. This Article discusses the nature
and effect of forum-selection and choice-of-law provisions in federal procedure only; there
is, however, a parallel body of state law decisions. See generally Gruson, Governing-Law
Clauses in International and Interstate Loan Agreements-New York's Approach, 1982 U.
Ill. L. Rev. 207, 208 (1982) [hereinafter Gruson, Governing-Law Clauses] (New York law
often stipulated as governing law in international commercial transactions); Annotation,
supra, at 409-45 and cases cited therein (state cases).
4. See Insurance Co. of New York v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874)
("agreements in advance to oust the courts of the jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal
and void"); Nute v. Hamilton Mutual Ins. Co., 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 174, 179-85 (1856) (no
legal effect to parties' agreement as to where lawsuit should be brought). For discussions
of the historical antipathy to consensual adjudicatory procedure, see Farquharson, Choice
of Forum Clauses-A Brief Survey ofAnglo-American Law, 8 Int'l Law. 83, 87-98 (1974);
Gilbert, Choice of Forum Clauses in International and Interstate Contracts, 65 Ky. L.J. 1,
11-20 (1976).
5. See, e.g., Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note 3, at 133; Gruson, Gov-
erning-Law Clauses, supra note 3, at 207; Reese, The Supreme Court Supports Enforce-
ment of Choice of Forum Clauses, 7 Int'l Law. 530, 535 (1973).
6. See Reese, supra note 5, at 535. Another perspective of the doctrine of consensual
adjudicatory procedure is that it entails a waiver of litigation rights. For a description of
the beneficial values of waiver in the litigation context, see Rubin, Toward a General
Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 478, 488-89 (1981) (values of cost minimization,
time efficiency, bargaining chips in contract negotiation, and flexibility).
7. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987) (arbi-
tration clause in securities action); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (arbitration clause in antitrust action); Scherk v. Alberto-Cul-
ver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (arbitration clause in securities action); Boyd v. Grand
Trunk W. R.R., 338 U.S. 263 (1949) (employment contract in FELA action); Conklin &
Garrett, Ltd. v. M/V Finnrose, 826 F.2d 1441 (5th Cir. 1987) (bill of lading); Patten Sec.
Corp. v. Diamond Greyhound & Genetics, Inc., 819 F.2d 400 (3d Cir. 1987) (securities
underwriting agreement); Diaz Contracting, Inc. v. Nanco Contracting Corp., 817 F.2d
1047 (3d Cir. 1987) (bankruptcy proceedings); National Iranian Oil Co. v. Ashland Oil
Inc., 817 F.2d 326 (5th Cir.) (arbitration agreement), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 329 (1987);
Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1986) (securities fraud action); Jackam v. Hospi-
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confronted with a forum-selection clause:8 not only is the court able to
tal Corp. of Am. Mideast, 800 F.2d 1577 (11th Cir. 1986) (employment contract); Bry-
ant Elec. Co. v. City of Fredericksburg, 762 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1985) (municipal
contract bidding); AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Inv. Partnership, 740 F.2d 148 (2d
Cir. 1984) (securities fraud action); Lien Ho Hsing Steel Enter. Co. v. Weihtag, 738 F.2d
1455 (9th Cir. 1984) (insurance policy); Colonial Leasing Co. v. Pugh Bros. Garage, 735
F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1984) (boilerplate contract); Livolsi v. Ram Constr. Co., 728 F.2d 600
(3d Cir. 1984) (ERISA consent order); Zimmerman v. Continental Airlines, 712 F.2d 55
(3d Cir. 1983) (bankruptcy proceedings), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1038 (1984); Dracos v.
Hellenic Lines Ltd., 705 F.2d 1392 (4th Cir. 1983) (employment contract), cert denied,
474 U.S. 945 (1985); Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys. of Am., 683 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1982)
(antitrust action); Polar Shipping Ltd. v. Oriental Shipping Corp., 680 F.2d 627 (9th Cir.
1982) (admiralty action); Crown Beverage Co. v. Cerveceria Moctezuma, 663 F.2d 886
(9th Cir. 1981) (distributorship agreement); Union Ins. Soc'y of Canton, Ltd. v. S.S.
Elikon, 642 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1981) (bill of lading); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith Inc. v. Lecopulos, 553 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1977) (brokers' commodities agreement);
Aaacon Auto Transport, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 537 F.2d 648 (2d Cir.
1976) (arbitration agreement), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977); Tai Kien Indus. Co. v.
M/V Hamburg, 528 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1976) (towage contract); Republic Int'l Corp. v.
Amco Eng'rs, Inc., 516 F.2d 161 (9th Cir. 1975) (construction contract); Fireman's Fund
Am. Ins. Cos. v. Puerto Rican Forwarding Co., 492 F.2d 1294 (1st Cir. 1974) (bill of
lading); Furbee v. Vantage Press, Inc., 464 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (book publishing
contract); Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967) (bill of lading);
Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1958) (bill of lading),
cert. dismissed, 359 U.S. 180 (1959); Win. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish Am. Line Ltd.,
224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.) (bill of lading), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955).
The underlying agreements and actions have been similarly varied at the district court
level. See Richardson Greenshields Secs., Inc. v. Metz, 566 F. Supp. 131 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (commodities trading agreement); Gordonsville Indus., Inc. v. American Artos
Corp., 549 F. Supp. 200 (W.D. Va. 1982) (private international contract); Colonial Leas-
ing Co. v. Best, 552 F. Supp. 605 (D. Or. 1982) (equipment lease agreement); Anastasi
Bros. Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F. Supp. 862 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (con-
struction contract); Lulling v. Barnaby's Family Inns, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Wis.
1980) (franchise agreement); First Nat'l Monetary Corp. v. Chesney, 514 F. Supp. 649
(E.D. Mich. 1980) (brokerage agreement); Zima Corp. v. M.V. Roman Pazinski, 493 F.
Supp. 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (bill of lading); Dick Proctor Imports, Inc. v. Sumitomo
Corp. of Am., 486 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Mo. 1980) (franchise agreement); International
Ass'n of Bridge Workers Local 348 v. Koski Constr. Co., 474 F. Supp. 370 (W.D. Pa.
1979) (mem.) (collective bargaining agreement); Full-Sight Contact Lens Corp. v. Soft
Lenses, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (distributorship agreement); Cruise v. Cas-
tleton, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (harness-racing association by-laws); First
Nat'l City Bank v. Nanz, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (mem.) (loan agree-
ment); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 401 F. Supp. 927 (D.
Mass. 1975) (construction subcontracts); Gaskin v. Stumm Handel GmbH, 390 F. Supp.
361 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (employment contract); Brown v. Gingiss Int'l, Inc., 360 F. Supp.
1042 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (franchise agreement); Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 326 F.
Supp. 121 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (patent licensing agreement); National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v.
Sanders, 271 F. Supp. 756 (E.D.N.Y. 1967) (equipment lease); Takemura & Co. v. S.S.
Tsuneshima Maru, 197 F. Supp. 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (bill of lading).
8. See, ag., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 629
(1985) (lauding enhanced values of international comity, sensitivity to international com-
mercial system, and predictability); Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 1986)
(forum-selection clauses not disfavored in law); Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys. of Am.,
683 F.2d 718, 721 (2d Cir. 1982) ("'general hostility' towards forum-selection clauses is
today simply a vestigial remainder of an outmoded doctrine"); Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Lecopulos, 553 F.2d 842, 844 (2d Cir. 1977) ("forum selection
clauses have come to be recognized as useful devices").
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
carry out the wishes of the parties, but the court also effectively demurs
active participation in a breach of contract. 9 Another benefit, not inci-
dental, is that the enforcing court successfully accomplishes its own goal
of docket-clearing. The sum of litigation is neither reduced nor simpli-
fied; it is simply shifted someplace else.
Precisely because the doctrine is so basically appealing and universally
accepted, it is anathema to suggest that the doctrine of consensual proce-
dure is problematic. And yet, as is true of many simple ideas, the sim-
plicity masks or ignores complex issues. This deceptive little doctrine
has taken root and continues to flourish without much thoughtful discus-
sion or close analytical scrutiny. The central problem, however, is not
one of inadequate doctrinal development-although this is a serious defi-
ciency. The central problem is that substantial litigation rights are sacri-
ficed to enhance purely prudential considerations. Contract principles
now effectively usurp long-standing jurisdictional and conflict-of-laws
rules, but courts and commentators have devoted scant attention to the
deleterious effects of this quiet revolution.
A. Issues of Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure
Consensual adjudicatory procedure denotes the ability of potential or
prospective litigants to choose, in advance of any litigation, the court that
will hear the dispute and the law that will govern the substantive merits
of the litigation.10 It is essentially a doctrine of procedural choices by
consent of the parties. These choices and this consent are typically mani-
fested in "forum-selection clauses" and "choice-of-law clauses" con-
tained in an agreement between the parties.11 Although these
agreements affect basic procedural rights, their interpretation is nonethe-
less irretrievably based in contract law.
The thesis of this Article is that the supremacy of contract law over
long-established jurisdictional doctrines has significantly eroded certain
9. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628 ("[h]aving made the bargain to arbi-
trate, the party should be held to it"); Luce, 802 F.2d at 57 ("what would be unreasona-
ble and unjust would be to allow one of the [parties] to disregard [the agreement]"
(quoting AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Inv. Partnership, 740 F.2d 148, 156 (2d Cir.
1984)); see also Gilbert, supra note 4, at 20-21.
10. See J. Friedenthal, M. Kane & A. Miller, Civil Procedure § 3.5, at 104 (1985).
11. This Article is limited to a discussion of consensual designation of the litigation
forum and governing law. A more comprehensive view of consensual adjudicatory proce-
dure would entail examination of consent and waiver of various litigation rights through-
out the adjudicatory process. Thus, it is possible to effect consensual waiver of defenses,
objections or causes of action and waiver of the right to an adjudication, through cogno-
vit clauses, arbitration agreements, consent judgments and settlements. In civil law,
"[v]irtually any adjudication-related right can be waived." Rubin, supra note 6, at 521.
This Article focuses specifically on forum access and governing law because of the due
process concerns implicated in these aspects of adjudicatory procedure. The general cri-
tique developed from these two fundamental litigation elements is equally applicable to
analogous waivable rights. For a comprehensive survey of Waiver possibilities in civil
litigation, see id. at 512-28.
296 [Vol. 57
1988] CONSENSUAL ADJUDICATORY PROCEDURE 297
fundamental litigation rights. This is particularly egregious insofar as
various mechanisms for securing consensual adjudicatory procedure are
becoming pervasive throughout a wide array of party relationships."2
Not only has the overlay of contract law confounded jurisdictional prin-
ciples, but the doctrine of consensual adjudicatory procedure is predi-
cated on an analytical confusion of the concepts of jurisdiction, venue,
forum non conveniens and choice-of-law.
The pervasive authority of contract principles in the procedural arena
also has obfuscated a wide variety of troubling issues with regard to these
forum and choice-of-law clauses. For example, it is unclear whether fo-
rum-selection clauses are matters of jurisdiction or venue, and whether
this conceptual distinction makes an analytical difference for courts con-
struing the validity of such clauses.13 For instance, should such clauses
be construed according to procedural rules or contract principles?14 As-
suming that such clauses are valid, there is confusion over the appropri-
ate remedy for the party seeking enforcement of the clause; choices
include dismissal, stay of jurisdiction, transfer or remand.' 5 And a final
cause for confusion is the relationship of the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens to forum-selection clauses. 16
12. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
13. Thus, one commentator has suggested:
This conceptual difference [between jurisdiction and venue] has not influenced
the analysis of jurisdiction clauses, and the federal courts deal with the enforce-
ability of forum-selection clauses in the same manner whether the choice is be-
tween two federal district courts or between a federal court and a foreign court.
Characterization of the issue as one of "venue," however, probably has influ-
enced the decision of some courts to apply federal rather than state law to the
question whether forum-selection clauses are enforceable.
Gruson, Forum Selection Clauses, supra note 3, at 157-58 (footnotes omitted); see also
Farquharson, supra note 4, at 95-99 (forum non conveniens and jurisdiction approaches);
Gilbert, supra note 4, at 10-11 (distinction between jurisdictional and forum non con-
veniens analysis); id. at 42 (effects of venue on forum-selection clauses); Gruson, Forum
Selection Clauses, supra note 3, at 140 (forum-selection clause cannot oust a court of
jurisdiction); id. at 142-43 (forum-selection clause reasonableness determined by factors
similar or identical to forum non conveniens determinants); Reese, supra note 5, at 534
(ouster of jurisdiction concept rejected). For a discussion of the case law construction of
the characterization problem, see infra Part II A.
14. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988) (forum-selection
clauses governed by matters of federal venue procedure on transfer motion under 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982)); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (forum-
selection clause validity determined by traditional contractual principles). See generally
Gilbert, supra note 4 passim (same); Rubin, supra note 6 passim (contract law interpreta-
tion of civil waivers and due process implications). For a discussion of the effects of
contractual interpretation of forum-selection clauses, see infra Part VI.
15. See Gruson, Forum Selection Clauses, supra note 3, at 137. For a discussion of
the case law involving these various possible remedies, see infra Part II B.
16. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. The common law doctrine of forum
non conveniens has to a large extent been superseded by federal transfer provisions. See
28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406 (1982 & Supp. 1988). Nonetheless, forum non conveniens anal-
ysis predicated on the Supreme Court's articulation of the doctrine in Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), still enjoys continued vitality in federal court decisions,
including numerous forum-selection clause cases. See 15 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal
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Contractual drafting methods also present a problem. At the broadest
theoretical level, is there a significant difference between prorogation and
derogation clauses 17 and between mandatory and permissive clauses?18
Practice and Procedure § 3828, at 278 (2d ed. 1986). For a discussion of forum-selection
clause cases implicating forum non conveniens analysis, see infra Part II B.
17. Under a derogation clause, the parties have chosen not to allow action in a juris-
diction, while under a prorogation clause the parties grant or accept a given jurisdiction.
See Aballi, Comparative Developments in the Law of Choice of Forum, 1 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L.
& Pol. 178, 179 (1968); Farquharson, supra note 4, at 86; Gilbert, supra note 4, at 5-6;
Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note 3, at 136 & n.7; Lenhoff, The Parties' Choice
of Forum: "'Prorogation Agreements," 15 Rutgers L. Rev. 414, 415-19 (1961); Perillo,
Selected Forum Agreements in Western Europe, 13 Am. J. Comp. L. 162, 162 (1964)
(presented at Proceedings of the 1964 Annual Meeting of the American Foreign Law
Association); Schwind, Derogation Clauses in Latin American Law, 13 Am. J. Comp. L.
157, 167 (1964) (presented at Proceedings of the 1964 Annual Meeting of the American
Foreign Law Association). For a discussion of the prorogation and derogation frame-
work for construing federal forum-selection clauses, see infra Part III C.
18. Forum-selection and governing law clauses are usually construed according to
traditional contract principles of language construction. See Louisiana Ice Cream Dis-
trib., Inc. v. Carvel Corp., 821 F.2d 1031, 1033 (5th Cir. 1987) (ambiguous forum-selec-
tion clause); Patten Sec. Corp. v. Diamond Greyhound & Genetics, Inc., 819 F.2d 400,
407 (3d Cir. 1987) (ambiguous combined forum and choice-of-law clause); Hunt Wesson
Foods, Inc. v. Supreme Oil Co., 817 F.2d 75, 77-78 (9th Cir. 1987) (permissive, not
mandatory provision); Jackam v. Hospital Corp. of Am. Mideast Ltd., 800 F.2d 1577,
1581-82 (11th Cir. 1986) (same); Citro Florida, Inc. v. Citrovale, S.A., 760 F.2d 1231,
1232 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (Brazilian forum-selection clause deemed ambiguous);
Proyeefin de Venezuela, S.A. v. Banco Indus. de Venezuela, 760 F.2d 390, 395-96 (2d
Cir. 1985) (two conflicting forum selection provisions); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Is-
lamic Republic of Iran, 758 F.2d 341, 346-47 (8th Cir.) (distinguishing mandatory lan-
guage and construing "should" as ambiguous), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985); LFC
Lessors, Inc. v. Pacific Sewer Maintenance Corp., 739 F.2d 4, 7-8 (1st Cir. 1984) (ambig-
uous clause); Yam Indus. Inc. v. Krupp Int'l, Inc., 736 F.2d 125, 129 (4th Cir. 1984)
(two documents with ambiguous and inconsistent provisions); Rockwell Int'l Sys. v. Ci-
tibank, N.A., 719 F.2d 583, 587 (2d Cir. 1983) (mandatory forum-selection clause);
Zapata Marine Serv. v. O/Y Finnlines, Ltd., 571 F.2d 208, 209 (5th Cir. 1978) (per
curiam) (contract principles utilized to construe ambiguous clause against drafter); Furry
v. First Nat'l Monetary Corp., 602 F. Supp. 6, 8-9 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (permissive versus
mandatory language); Intermountain Sys. v. Edsall Constr. Co., 575 F. Supp. 1195, 1198
(D. Colo. 1983) (mem.) (mandatory, not permissive clause); Richardson Greenshields
Secs., Inc. v. Metz, 566 F. Supp. 131, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (clause held not ambiguous);
Gordonsville Indus., Inc. v. American Artos Corp., 549 F. Supp. 200, 206 (W.D. Va.
1982) (same); City of New York v. Pullman Inc., 477 F. Supp. 438, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(contract principles used to construe ambiguous clause against drafter); Randolph Eng'g
Co. v. Fredenhagen Kommandit-Gesellschaft, 476 F. Supp. 1355, 1359-60 (W.D. Pa.
1979) (mem.) (ambiguous forum-selection clause not enforced); International Ass'n of
Bridge Workers Local 348 v. Koski Constr. Co., 474 F. Supp. 370, 372 (W.D. Pa. 1979)
(mem.) (forum-selection clause not mandatory); Taylor v. Titan Midwest Constr. Corp.,
474 F. Supp. 145, 148 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (mandatory versus permissive language prob-
lem); First Nat'l City Bank v. Nanz, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 184, 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (mem.)
(ambiguous clause not mandatory); A. C. Miller Concrete Prods. Corp. v. Quikset Vault
Sales Corp., 309 F. Supp. 1094, 1095 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (ambiguous clause upheld); United
States v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 38 F.R.D. 418, 420 (N.D. Cal. 1965) (ambiguous
clause cannot oust jurisdiction); see also Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note 3,
at 134 & n.3. The abundance of litigation surrounding the basic language construction of
forum-selection and choice-of-law provisions should serve as a warning to attorneys
drafting such clauses. Certainly, the amount of litigation concerning fundamental lan-
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In addition, are claims not narrowly covered by the contract clause also
subject to the forum and choice-of-law provisions, or must the lawsuit be
fragmented? 19
Moreover, these clauses raise complex federalism issues. Initially,
there is the fundamental question whether the Supreme Court has cre-
ated a new federal common law of consensual adjudicatory procedure,
governed by federal common law contract rules.2" Beyond this basic
point are an array of vexatious Erie21 problems. Adding further compli-
guage interpretation calls into serious doubt whether these devices actually enhance the
values of certainty, predictability, security, stability, simplicity and cost minimization.
For a discussion of the application of general contract principles to determine clause
validity, see infra Part VI B.
19. See Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Frazier-Parrott Commodities, Inc., 806 F.2d 848(8th Cir. 1986) (multiple claims additional reason for non-enforcement of forum-selection
clause); Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1986) (clause enforced in multiple claims
lawsuit); Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 779 F.2d 643 (multiple claims not grounds
for unenforceability of clause), vacated, 785 F.2d 896 (11th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 810 F.2d
1066 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (per curiam), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988); AVC Neder-
land B.V. v. Atrium Inv. Partnership, 740 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1984) (discussion of fraud
claim in relation to clause); Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys. of Am., 683 F.2d 718 (2d Cir.
1982) (antitrust claim construed within intent of contract clause); Crown Beverage Co. v.
Cerveceria Moctezuma, 663 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1981) (in multiple claims case involving
antitrust allegations, Sherman Act claims adjudicated but pendent contract claims dis-
missed); Copperweld Steel Co. v. Demag-Mannesmann-Bohler, 578 F.2d 953 (3d Cir.
1978) (multiple claims; clause not enforced); Hoffman v. Burroughs Corp., 571 F. Supp.
545 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (combined legal claims; analysis of "related to contract" language);
Hoes of America, Inc. v. Hoes, 493 F. Supp. 1205 (C.D. Ill. 1979) (multiple claims,
multiple remedies; clause enforceable); Kline v. Kawai Am. Corp., 498 F. Supp. 868 (D.
Minn. 1980) (multiple claims; analysis of "arise out of" language); Kolendo v. Jerell,
Inc., 489 F. Supp. 983 (S.D. W. Va. 1980) (mem.) (multiple claims, multiple remedies;
clause not enforced); City of New York v. Pullman, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (multiple claims; ambiguous provision enforced); Full-Sight Contact Lens Corp. v.
Soft Lenses, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (antitrust and tort claims encom-
passed by enforceable contract clause); Cruise v. Castleton, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 564
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (tort claims encompassed by contract clause).
20. See Juenger, Supreme Court Validation of Forum-Selection Clauses, 19 Wayne L.
Rev. 49, 59-60 (1972) (expansive view of The Bremen as applicable to all forum-clause
cases); Maier, The Three Faces of Zapata: Maritime Law, Federal Common Law, Federal
Courts Law, 6 Vand. J. of Transnat'l L. 387 (1973) (arguing that The Bremen rule may be
limited to maritime and international commercial cases); cf. Reese, supra note 5, at 537("The Supreme Court's decision in the Zapata case is not of constitutional dimension and
hence does not have binding force in areas governed by state law."). For further discus-
sion of the federal common law implications of The Bremen, see the discussion infra
Parts I A, VI A-B.
21. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). One question concerns whether fo-
rum-selection clauses are enforceable in federal court when underlying state law consid-
ers them violative of public policy. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2239(1988) (enforcing forum-selection clause even though against state law policy). For an
extensive discussion of Ricoh, see infra Part III; see also Note, supra note 2 (Ricoh case
commentary).
In addition, are forum-selection clauses substantive or procedural for Erie purposes?
Although the Supreme Court definitively answered that such clauses are procedural when
the issue arises on a 28 U.S.C. § 1404 transfer motion, an extensive Erie debate exists
among the circuits. See Patten Sec. Corp. v. Diamond Greyhound & Genetics, Inc., 819
F.2d 400 (3d Cir. 1987) (forum-clause determined by federal law); Diaz Contracting, Inc.
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cation, are choice-of-law clauses substantive for Erie purposes under
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., while choice of forum
clauses are procedural under Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. ?22
In contracts with concomitant choice-of-law and forum-selection clauses,
should the choice-of-law provision be interpreted first so as to supply the
rules of construction for the forum-selection clause?23  Furthermore,
what is the relationship of these clauses, and to what extent do they func-
v. Nanco Contracting Corp., 817 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1987) (applying New York state
law); Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Frazier-Parrott Commodities, Inc., 806 F.2d 848 (8th Cir.
1986) (applying Missouri state law; policy forbids enforcement); Sun World Lines, Ltd. v.
March Shipping Corp., 801 F.2d 1066 (8th Cir. 1986) (applying federal common law in
admiralty case); General Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d 352
(3d Cir. 1986) (applying state standards not federal common law); Bryant Elec. Co. v.
City of Fredericksburg, 762 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1985) (applying Virginia law, which
follows The Bremen); Nascone v. Spudnuts, Inc., 735 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1984) (illustrative
of bizarre Erie argument); Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d
190 (3d Cir.) (applying Bremen federal common law), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983);
Visicorp v. Software Arts, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1528 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (applying federal
venue law); Hoffman v. Burroughs Corp., 571 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (applying
federal common law); C. Pappas Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 565 F. Supp. 1015 (D.
Mass. 1983) (applying federal law); Northeast Theatre Corp. v. Edie & Ely Landau, 563
F. Supp. 833 (D. Mass. 1983) (applying federal venue law); Richardson Eng'g Co. v.
IBM, 554 F. Supp. 467 (D. Vt. 1981) (Vermont would follow The Bremen), aff'd, 697
F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1982); Kolendo v. Jerell, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 983 (S.D. W. Va. 1980)
(mem.) (applying West Virginia law); Kline v. Kawai Am. Corp., 498 F. Supp. 868 (D.
Minn. 1980) (applying federal common law); Dick Proctor Imports, Inc. v. Sumitomo
Corp. of Am., 486 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Mo. 1980) (applying federal venue law); Wellmore
Coal Corp. v. Gates Learet Corp., 475 F. Supp. 1140 (W.D. Va. 1979) (no need to
choose when state and federal law the same); Taylor v. Titan Midwest Constr. Corp., 474
F. Supp. 145 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (federal law controls); Cruise v. Castleton, Inc., 449 F.
Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (same outcome under federal law or New York state law);
Leasewell, Ltd. v. Jake Shelton Ford, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 1011 (S.D. W. Va. 1976) (mem.)
(applying West Virginia conflicts rules to determine validity of forum-selection clause);
Davis v. Pro Basketball, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (state law determines
clause enforceability); Matthiessen v. National Trailer Convoy, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 1132
(D. Minn. 1968) (Erie issue raised but not resolved); Geiger v. Keilani, 270 F. Supp. 761
(E.D. Mich. 1967) (no resolution of Erie issue; suggests treatise could be written on the
problem).
22. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988) (forum selection is
venue matter; procedural analysis applies); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313
U.S. 487 (1941) (federal courts must apply the conflict-of-laws rules of the states in which
they sit to promote uniform application of state substantive law).
23. See, e.g., Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys. of Am., 683 F.2d 718, 722 (2d Cir. 1982)
(court declines to apply Texas choice-of-law to defeat clause); Carefree Vacations, Inc. v.
Brunner, 615 F. Supp. 211, 214-15 (W.D. Tenn. 1985) (confused interpretation of choice-
of-law provision and Tennessee conflicts law); D'Antuono v. CCH Computax Sys., 570 F.
Supp. 708, 712 (D.R.I. 1983) (confused analysis of choice-of-law provision to determine
enforceability of forum-selection clause); Hoes of Am., Inc. v. Hoes, 493 F. Supp. 1205,
1207-08 (C.D. Ill. 1979) (German law applied to construe choice-of-forum provision);
Wellmore Coal Corp. v. Gates Learijet Corp., 475 F. Supp. 1140, 1144 (W.D. Va. 1979)
(applied Virginia conflicts rules to look to Arizona law for contract enforceability);
Leasewell, Ltd. v. Jake Shelton Ford, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 1011, 1014 (S.D. W. Va. 1976)
(mem.) (applied West Virginia conflicts rules to determine validity of forum-selection
clause).
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tion independently?24
Federal procedural rules raise other troubling questions. For instance,
the effect of federal enforcement of a choice-of-forum clause with a con-
sequent transfer is uncertain. Does it make a difference that the transfer
is accomplished under transfer provisions25 or pursuant to the doctrine
of forum non conveniens?26
Similarly, what happens when a defendant removes the case from state
court to federal court, but the plaintiff requests a remand to enforce a
forum-selection clause?27 Finally, the lower federal courts' construction
of forum and choice-of-law clauses is in disarray, lacking a unified ana-
lytical approach.28
24. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Burroughs Corp., 571 F. Supp. 545, 550-51 (N.D. Tex. 1982)
(discussion of applicable law under choice-of-law provision); Colonial Leasing Co. v.
Best, 552 F. Supp. 605, 607 (D. Or. 1982) (analysis confused jurisdiction and conflict-of-
law); Taylor v. Titan Midwest Constr. Corp., 474 F. Supp. 145, 147 nn. 1-2 (N.D. Tex.
1979) (convoluted Erie/conflicts analysis); see also Felix, Diversity Jurisdiction and
Choice of Law: Of Strangers Bearing Stale Products Liability Claims, 25 S.C.L. Rev. 199,
207-13 (1973); Gilbert, supra note 4, at 43-66; Gruson, Governing-Law Clauses, supra
note 3, at 222-25; Reese, supra note 5, at 537; Note, Conflict of Laws: "Party Autonomy"
in Contracts, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 553, at 554-55 (1957).
25. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 1406(a) (1982). For a discussion of the implications of
transfer as a possible remedy, see the discussion infra Parts II A-B.
26. See supra notes 13, 16 and accompanying text. For the effect of a venue transfer
on governing law, see 15 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 16, § 3846, at 363-68. In a 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a) action, governing law is generally determined by the rule of Van Dusen
v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964). Van Dusen requires that the transferee court apply the
law of the transferor court, including its conflict-of-laws rules, "[b]ut if venue was im-
proper or personal jurisdiction was lacking in the transferor court, the transferee court
will apply the law that would have been applied if the action had been commenced in the
transferee court." 15 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 16, § 3846, at 364-66. Obvi-
ously, these rules have interesting implications for forum-selection cases, where the trans-
feror court frequently makes no personal jurisdiction determination in enforcing the
clause.
27. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1449 (1982 & Supp. 1988), as amended by H.R. Conf. Rep.
No. 4087, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (section 1447(d) specifies particular grounds for
remand). For a discussion of forum-selection clauses in the removal-remand situation
and of pertinent cases, see infra Part IV (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1441).
28. For a discussion of the growing list of post-Bremen enforceability factors, see
infra Part VI. See generally Gilbert, supra note 4, at 32-42 (court should enforce forum
selection clauses if fair and reasonable according to four factors of reasonableness);
Gruson, Forum Selection Clauses, supra note 3, at 163-85 (two-pronged test under which
plaintiff may avoid contractual forum provision).
At the appellate level, the federal courts have applied three different standards with
regard to enforceability of these clauses. The three standards of review are: clearly erro-
neous, abuse of discretion and de novo review. See Diaz Contracting, Inc. v. Nanco
Contracting Corp., 817 F.2d 1047, 1055 (3d Cir. 1987) (clearly erroneous); Sun World
Lines, Ltd. v. March Shipping Corp., 801 F.2d 1066, 1068 n.3 (8th Cir. 1986) (abuse of
discretion); Pelleport Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres, Inc., 741 F.2d 273, 280
n.4 (9th Cir. 1984) (abuse of discretion); Zimmerman v. Continental Airlines, 712 F.2d
55, 60 (3d Cir. 1983) (abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1038 (1984); Mercury
Coal & Coke, Inc. v. Mannesmann Pipe & Steel Corp., 696 F.2d 315, 318 (4th Cir. 1982)
(implicit de novo review); Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys. of Am., 683 F.2d 718, 721 (2d
Cir. 1982) (same); In re Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 588 F.2d 93, 95 (5th Cir. 1979) (de
novo review); Copperweld Steel Co. v. Demag-Mannesmann-Bohler, 578 F.2d 953, 966
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As the discussion below demonstrates, the federal courts have not
clearly thought through all the implications of consensual procedure. A
more cautious approach is needed to justify the deleterious consequences
of party autonomy on jurisdiction and choice of law.
B. Neat Solutions and Untidy Problems
In the rush to embrace a doctrine of consensual adjudicatory proce-
dure, the federal courts have eagerly chosen the simple, neat solution.
Unfortunately, the problems involved in consensual arrangements are
not so tidy, and the courts have created a hodgepodge of principles and
rationales to justify the doctrine.
Neither the Supreme Court nor the lower federal courts have done an
admirable job of delineating a coherent and justifiable theory of consen-
sual adjudicatory procedure. Due process requirements that normally
inform jurisdictional analysis have evaporated in favor of expediency.
Courts permit contract principles to replace carefully crafted jurisdic-
tional rules. Essentially, the courts have evaded troubling questions: can
parties contract away fundamental attributes of sovereignty or due pro-
cess protection? If the Supreme Court has been unwilling to permit first
amendment concerns to inform jurisdictional analysis, 9 why should con-
tract principles effectively trump jurisdictional law? If the Supreme
Court has repeatedly asserted that choice-of-law issues should not guide
jurisdiction or venue analysis,30 why should the choice-of-law tail wag
the jurisdictional dog31 when contract clauses are present?
Additionally, the standards governing consensual adjudicatory proce-
dure, derived from The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.32 and subse-
quent federal court cases, obviate realistic inquiry into boilerplate
contractual arrangements. The Bremen and its progeny effectively super-
sede conventional standards for jurisdiction, venue, transfer and forum
non conveniens, imposing variegated standards for forum selection not
(3d Cir. 1978) (clearly erroneous); Furbee v. Vantage Press, Inc., 464 F.2d 835, 837 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (abuse of discretion).
29. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) ("We also reject the suggestion that
First Amendment concerns enter into the jurisdictional analysis. The infusion of such
considerations would needlessly complicate an already imprecise inquiry."); Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780 n.12 (1984) ("[W]e reject categorically the
suggestion that invisible radiations from the First Amendment may defeat jurisdiction
otherwise proper under the Due Process Clause.").
30. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821 (1985) ("The issue of
personal jurisdiction over plaintiffs in a class action is entirely distinct from the question
of the constitutional limitations on choice of law.... ."); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454
U.S. 235, 247 (1981) (possibility of change in substantive law under conflicts rules should
not be given conclusive or substantial weight in forum non conveniens inquiry); Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958) ("The issue is personal jurisdiction, not choice of
law.").
31. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 682 F.2d 33, 36 (1st Cir. 1982) ("[TIhe New
Hampshire tail is too small to wag so large an out-of-state dog."), rev'd, 465 U.S. 770
(1984).
32. 407 U.S. 1 (1972). See discussion infra Part I.
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contemplated by those rules or doctrines. Indeed, the imposition of con-
tract principles on forum selection rules has, in many instances, stood
jurisdictional principles on their head: traditional deference to the plain-
tiff's choice of forum must yield to the defendant's invocation of contract
law, while conversely a defendant must yield due process protections
when the plaintiff seeks enforcement of a forum-selection provision. 33
Even more troubling is the cavalier manner in which courts gloss over
the implications of consensual adjudicatory procedure for fundamental
concepts of sovereignty and liberty interests. The right to choose a fo-
rum is perhaps the most fundamental and essential litigation right, since
it carries with it choice-of-law determinants. The notion of forum access,
regulated by subject matter jurisdiction, is a fundamental governmental
attribute intricately tied to the power and authority of the state.34 More-
over, forum selection with regard to personal jurisdiction entails well-
established due process concerns involving traditional notions of substan-
tial justice and fair play.35
Notwithstanding these serious theoretical underpinnings to the con-
cepts of jurisdiction and venue, prevailing doctrine in civil litigation is
that waiver of these fundamental rights can be accomplished through
qualitatively different contract standards. Criminal procedure, in con-
trast, has devoted substantial attention to the idea that fundamental liti-
gation rights cannot be forfeited in the absence of a knowing and
voluntary waiver.36 Yet civil procedure contemplates no similar stan-
dard, and contract law in many instances effectively supersedes the
state's authority as well as individual due process concerns. Perhaps this
would be palatable if the doctrine were theoretically well-developed, but
unfortunately it represents little more than a pastiche of black letter con-
tract rules leavened by a large measure of judicial expediency.37
The doctrine of consensual adjudicatory procedure needs, at mini-
mum, a far better justification than the federal courts typically offer in
their rote recitations of The Bremen principles. 38 Courts ousted of juris-
diction and litigants forced to sue or to be sued elsewhere deserve some-
33. See infra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
34. See J. Friedenthal, M. Kane & A. Miller, supra note 10, § 2.1, at 10.
35. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); 4 C. Wright
& A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1063, at 225 (2d ed. 1987).
36. See Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief For More Careful Analysis, 55
Tex. L. Rev. 193 (1977); Rubin, supra note 6, at 480-83, 491-512; Spritzer, Criminal
Waiver, Procedural Default and the Burger Court, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 473 (1978); Tigar,
The Supreme Court 1969 Term Foreword: Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the
Citadel, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1970); Westen, Away From Waiver: A Rationale for the
Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1214 (1977);
Comment, Criminal Waiver: The Requirements of Personal Participation, Competence
and Legitimate State Interest, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 1262 (1966); Comment, Guilty Plea Waiv-
ers and the Right to Compulsory Process, 27 UCLA L. Rev. 1303 (1980). For a discussion
of waiver in relation to civil law forum-selection clauses, see infra Parts VI C, VII B.
37. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text; infra Part I A.
38. See infra notes 49-54 and accompanying text (discussing The Bremen).
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thing more than a set of boilerplate contract presumptions. Arguably, a
potential litigant should not waive his due process rights merely by sign-
ing a contract containing a forum-selection clause. The due process re-
quirements that inform choice-of-law analysis therefore should not be
similarly yielded. Thus, the construction and enforceability of contracts
should not be elevated over the requirements of state long-arm statutes
and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Beyond a better theoretical justification, the doctrine of consensual ad-
judicatory procedure also requires a conceptual clarity informed by due
process requirements that permits parties to select any forum or law with
which the transaction has a normal connection.39 Conversely, parties
should not be free to select a forum or law by contriving contacts with an
otherwise non-interested jurisdiction so as to validate the choice-of-law
or forum.' Finally, a comprehensive standard for waiver in civil litiga-
tion is worth delineating to ensure an informed waiver of litigation rights.
C. Defining and Critiquing the Doctrine
The doctrine of consensual adjudicatory procedure, a relatively new
doctrine in civil litigation, is so widely accepted that it has largely es-
caped critical scrutiny. This Article outlines briefly the origins of the
theory and its rapid development and acceptance in jurisdictional ca-
nons. It then critiques the weaknesses engendered by this rush to uncriti-
cal judgment and legitimacy.
Part I canvasses The Bremen doctrine and the subsequent federal cases
that elaborate a theory of consensual adjudicatory procedure. The thesis
is that the doctrine, as articulated by the Supreme Court, is largely
pieced together by dicta and good intentions. The basic premise of The
Bremen-the efficacy of contractual jurisdiction in the international
trade context 4l-has never been seriously questioned in relation to its
domestic application. The Bremen and its progeny, so to speak, have
lived the unexamined life.
39. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (1987) ("when a transaction bears a reasonable rela-
tion to this state and also to another state or nation the parties may agree that the law
either of this state or of such other state or nation shall govern their rights and duties");
see also Woods-Tucker Leasing Corp. v. Hutcheson-Ingram Dev. Co., 642 F.2d 744, 754
(5th Cir. 1981) (affirming application of U.C.C. § 1-105 reasonable relation test to choice-
of-law provision); Carefree Vacations, Inc. v. Brunner, 615 F. Supp. 211, 215 (W.D.
Tenn. 1985) (no substantial relationship to Texas; forum/choice-of-law clauses
unenforceable).
40. Under U.C.C. interpretation, this is known as the "contrivance principle." See
Woods-Tucker Leasing Corp., 642 F.2d at 750-53 (discussion and application of contri-
vance principle); see also Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403, 408
(1927) ("parties must act in good faith, and ... the form of the transaction must not
'disguise its real character' "). See generally Nordstrom & Ramerman, The Uniform
Commercial Code and the Choice of Law, 1969 Duke L.J. 623, 628 ("parties' choice
should be upheld unless the transaction lacks a normal connection with the state whose
law was selected") (emphasis in original).
41. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972).
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Part II explores the serious characterization problems engendered by
the doctrine of consensual adjudicatory procedure. The purpose is to
demonstrate that the federal courts, in their eagerness to embrace this
simple doctrine, have failed to develop a clear and appropriate method
for its implementation. The courts discuss consensual procedure in a
hodgepodge of concepts including jurisdiction, venue and forum non
conveniens. Moreover, the courts are in confusion concerning the appro-
priate remedy for legitimate claims: dismissal, transfer, remand or stay
of proceedings. Finally, courts scarcely mention fundamental theoretical
issues implicit in the characterization of provisions, such as whether par-
ticular clauses are prorogation or derogation clauses.
Part III reflects on the various problems of federalism ensnared in the
doctrine. Although the Supreme Court last term in Stewart Organiza-
tion, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.42 definitively resolved the basic Erie dilemma
concerning the substantive or procedural nature of forum-selection
clauses,4" this decision carried on the unthinking tradition of Supreme
Court pronouncements on this subject. Ricoh may prove most significant
for the issues it left unanswered and the problems engendered in its wake.
Part IV continues with federalism issues by examining consensual ad-
judicatory procedure with regard to removal and remand. This Part
shows how federal removal and remand principles sorely fray the theo-
retical fabric of consensual procedure, highlighting the frailties of that
doctrine. In this context, consensual adjudicatory procedure most
squarely presents derogation and ouster of jurisdiction antithetical to ar-
ticle III of the Constitution, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
their accompanying statutory provisions.
Part V explores the puzzling issues presented by concomitant choice-
of-law provisions. These issues arise when courts cannot decide whether
choice-of-law precedes jurisdictional analysis. The courts thus fall into
ever darker abysses of conflicts analysis in order to determine enforce-
ability of the clauses.
Part VI summarizes the consequences of elevating contract rules over
jurisdictional principles. This section demonstrates how courts rotely ap-
ply black letter contract principles with insufficient attention to counter-
vailing jurisdictional principles. It discusses the serious ramifications of
contract presumptions on litigation rights, as well as the vapid notion of
consent and waiver in the civil litigation arena.
Finally, Part VII surveys possible modifications or doctrinal improve-
ments for a theory of consensual adjudicatory procedure, calling for a
more principled notion of consensual litigation not purchased at the ex-
pense of litigants' rights. This section appeals for decisions that do not
sacrifice important litigation values on the high altar of judicial expedi-
ency. It pleads for better-reasoned opinions that offer more to a con-
42. 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988). For an extensive discussion of Ricoh, see infra Part III.
43. See infra notes 139-44.
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tracting party than the meaningless theory that the law presumes
knowledge of a contractual provision.
I. THE BREMEN: JURISDICTIONAL PRINCIPLES AFLOAT IN
INTERNATIONAL WATERS
The doctrine of consensual adjudicatory procedure at the Supreme
Court level has at best been cobbled together with baling wire and tape.
In the major cases in which the Court has considered a problem of con-
sensual procedure," it has never clearly and affirmatively stated that
such a doctrine of consensual jurisdiction applies in federal courts sitting
on purely domestic federal cases.45 Indeed, in its most recent opportu-
nity to clarify this point, the Court chose to sidestep The Bremen issue
altogether and rely on venue law.46 Two Justices, displeased with that
tactic but not with the result, decried that "[c]ourts should announce and
encourage rules that support private parties who negotiate such
clauses."'4 Yet the Supreme Court has declined to do so when given the
chance.
Rather, the Supreme Court's doctrine of jurisdiction by consent con-
sists of little more than conclusory pronouncements and dicta elevated
into received dogma. This is quite remarkable because the theory em-
bodies a complete reversal of long-standing repugnance to consensual ju-
risdiction.48 If nothing else, certainly this traditional doctrine deserved a
better, if not more explicit, demise.
44. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988); Shearson/Ameri-
can Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987) (arbitration case); Mitsubishi Mo-
tors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (arbitration case);
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (franchise agreement); Insurance
Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982) (waiver of
objection to personal jurisdiction as discovery sanction); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (international towage contract); National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v.
Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964) (farm equipment lease); Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp.,
349 U.S. 85 (1955) (contractual limitation against all liability for negligent towage by
owner); Boyd v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., 338 U.S. 263 (1949) (venue-limiting provision).
45. But see Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note 3, at 149:
Federal courts have universally agreed that the teaching of Bremen is not lim-
ited to admiralty cases nor to cases involving the selection of a foreign forum
but applies to all forum-selection clauses even if they select a domestic forum
and even if they arise in a suit between parties of different states.
46. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2239, 2243-45 (1988).
47. Id. at 2250 (Kennedy and O'Connor, JJ., concurring).
48. "In 1950 it was said of the few cases that enforced a forum clause, 'they stand
alone, separate and apart, branded with the malodorous antipathy of a bastard child at a
family reunion of bluebloods.'" Public Water Supply Dist. No. 1 v. American Ins. Co.,
471 F. Supp. 1071, 1072 n.1 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (quoting Zapata Off-Shore Co. v. M/S
Bremen, 428 F.2d 888, 900 n.12 (5th Cir. 1970) (Wisdom, J., dissenting)). The Western
District of Missouri embraced the new doctrine of The Bremen and enforced a forum-
selection provision in a performance and payment bond. See id.; see also Gruson, Forum-
Selection Clauses, supra note 3, at 138-47 (discussing pre-Bremen decisions); authorities
cited supra note 4.
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A. The Bremen and National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent
The current doctrine of consensual adjudicatory procedure enforced
throughout the federal court system is based on Supreme Court pro-
nouncements in The Bremen.49 In its most often cited proposition, the
Court opined that forum-selection clauses "are prima facie valid and
should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to
be 'unreasonable' under the circumstances."' The rationales supporting
this sweeping conclusion, however, leave nagging doubts about the appli-
cability of this new rule to purely domestic federal cases.
The Court's major doctrinal support was somewhat dubious. In
reaching its conclusion, the Bremen Court suggested that forum-selection
clauses were "merely the other side of the proposition,"5 " recognized in
National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 2 that "in federal courts a
party may validly consent to be sued in a jurisdiction where he cannot be
found for service of process through contractual designation of an 'agent'
for receipt of process in that jurisdiction."53 The Bremen Court cited
with approval the black letter rule posited in Szukhent that "it is settled
.. . that parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the
jurisdiction of a given court, to permit notice to be served by the oppos-
ing party, or even to waive notice altogether."54
Szukhent is an inappropriate case on which to construct an entire doe-
49. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); see Collins, Choice of
Forum and the Exercise of Judicial Discretion-The Resolution of an Anglo-American
Conflict, 22 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 332 (1973); Collins, Forum Selection and an Anglo-Amer-
ican Conflict-The Sad Case of The Chaparral, 20 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 550, 556-57
(1971); Delaume, Choice of Forum Clauses and the American Forum Patriae; Something
Happened on the Way to the Forum: Zapata and Silver, 4 J. Mar. L. & Com. 295 (1973);
Farquharson, supra note 4, at 97-98; Gilbert, supra note 4, at 24-28; Gruson, Forum-
Selection Clauses, supra note 3, at 147-49; Juenger, supra note 20, at 49-50; Maier, The
Three Faces of Zapata: Maritime Law, Federal Common Law, Federal Courts Law, 6
Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 387, 396-98 (1973); Nadelmann, Choice-of-Court Clauses in the
United States: The Road to Zapata, 21 Am. J. Comp. L. 124, 134 (1973); Reese, supra
note 5, at 532-33; Note, The Enforcement of Forum Selection Provisions in International
Commercial Agreements: M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1972), 11
Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 449, 450 (1972); Note, Choice of Forum, 14 Harv. Int'l L.J. 145,
149-53 (1973); Comment, Admiralty-International Commercial Transactions-Choice of
Forum Clauses Presumed Valid, 6 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 369, 381-83 (1973).
50. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10; see Conklin & Garrett, Ltd. v. M/V Finnrose, 826
F.2d 1441, 1442 (5th Cir. 1987) (forum-selection clauses prima facie valid); Diaz Con-
tracting, Inc. v. Nanco Contracting Corp., 817 F.2d 1047, 1050-52 (3d Cir. 1987) (same);
Colonial Leasing Co. v. Pugh Bros. Garage, 735 F.2d 380, 382 (9th Cir. 1984) (same);
Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d 190, 202 (3d Cir.) (forum-
selection clauses presumptively valid), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983). But see Kolendo
v. Jerell, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 983, 985 (S.D. W. Va. 1980) (mem.) ("Nevertheless, it must
not be assumed that prima facie validity means, in all but the most unconscionable cases,
certain enforcement.").
51. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10.
52. 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
53. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10-11 (Justice Burger's construction of Szukhent
holding).
54. Id. at 11 (quoting Szukhent, 375 U.S. at 315-16).
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trine of consensual adjudicatory procedure. The cases cited in support of
its black letter pronouncement dealt largely with anomalous interna-
tional waiver situations.55 At the time, prevailing Supreme Court prece-
dent 6 and lower federal court opinions5 7 still embodied traditional
55. The Court cited Cerro de Pasco Copper Corp. v. Knut Knutsen, O.A.S., 187 F.2d
990 (2d Cir. 1951) (bill of lading specifying Norwegian law) and Mittenthal v. Mascagni,
183 Mass. 19, 66 N.E. 425 (1903) (contract between Italian citizens partly to be per-
formed in United States and partly to be performed in Italy, specifying Italian law). See
The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10 n.10. Yet the Court also referred to Daley v. People's Build-
ing, Loan & Savings Association, 178 Mass. 13, 15, 59 N.E. 452, 452 (1901) (forum
designation condition of contract). See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10 n.10.
Bergman persuasively argues that Judge Learned Hand's statement in Krenger v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 174 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 866 (1949), con-
cering no absolute taboo against forum clauses, was based on a misapprehension of the
Restatement of Contracts § 558 (1932). See Bergman, Contractual Restrictions on the
Forum, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 438, 440-47 (1960). Bergman found it ironic that the source of
confusion supporting forum clauses was based in Judge Hand's concurring opinion, not-
ing that "[i]t is somewhat difficult to understand how that which was so well settled in
1930 could become unsettled in the space of nineteen years." Bergman, supra, at 440.
56. See, e.g., Dixilyn Drilling Corp. v. Crescent Towing & Salvage Co., 372 U.S. 697,
698 (1963) (tugboat owner may not validly contract against negligence liability); Bisso v.
Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85, 90-91 (1955) (towboat owner may not contract
against negligence liability); Boyd v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., 338 U.S. 263, 266 (1949)
(venue limiting agreement void as conflicting with Federal Employers' Liability Act);
Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874) ("agreements in advance to
oust courts of the jurisdiction conferred by law [were] illegal and void").
57. See Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200, 203 (2d Cir. 1967) (forum-
selection clause in bill of lading invalid under Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA));
Carbon Black Export v. S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 300-01 (5th Cir. 1958) (forum-
selection clause in bill of lading not enforced under COGSA), cert. dismissed, 359 U.S.
180 (1959); Matthiessen v. National Trailer Convoy, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 1132, 1134-35 (D.
Minn. 1968) (forum-selection clause not enforced; third-party complaint); Hawaii Credit
Card Corp. v. Continental Credit Card Corp., 290 F. Supp. 848, 851 (D. Haw. 1968)
(forum-selection clause not enforced); United States v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 38
F.R.D. 418, 419-20 (N.D. Cal. 1965) (forum-selection clause not enforceable; in conflict
with Miller Act).
A number of federal courts, however, adopted the "modern trend" towards enforce-
ability signalled by the Second Circuit in Win. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish American
Line Ltd., 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955). See, e.g., Furbee v.
Vantage Press, Inc., 464 F.2d 835, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (provision enforced); Central
Contracting Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 367 F.2d 341, 344 (3d Cir. 1966) (forum-
selection clause enforced as not unreasonable); Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 326 F.
Supp. 121, 124-26 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (forum-selection clause upheld; exhaustive survey of
existing law and movement towards modern trend); A.C. Miller Concrete Prods. Corp. v.
Quickset Vault Sales Corp., 309 F. Supp. 1094, 1095 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (forum clause up-
held); National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Sanders, 271 F. Supp. 756, 761-62 (E.D.N.Y.
1967) (forum clauses enforceable if not unreasonable or offensive to public policy); Geiger
v. Keilani, 270 F. Supp. 761, 766 (E.D. Mich. 1967) (forum-selection clause enforceable
under Muller reasonableness test); Takemura & Co. v. S.S. Tsuneshima Maru, 197 F.
Supp. 909, 911-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (forum-selection clause enforceable, using forum non
conveniens analysis). See generally Bergman, supra note 55, at 438-47 (historical analy-
sis of validity of choice of forum clauses); Farquharson, supra note 4, at 93-97 (discussing
development of American conflicts rules); Gilbert, supra note 4, at 11-20 (historical
sketch of pre-1972 problem of choice of forum provisions); Gruson, Forum-Selection
Clauses, supra note 3, at 138-47 (extensive citation to pre-Bremen case law); Reese, supra
note 5, at 536-37 (same).
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abhorrence of consensual jurisdiction. That a conclusive rule of jurisdic-
tion by contractual agreement should appear by fiat in Szukhent was sur-
prising, indeed.
Moreover, the Szukhent Court's statement with regard to consensual
jurisdiction was little more than dictum because, after all, Szukhent con-
cerned statutory construction of agency requirements under Rule 4 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." It is certainly debatable whether ser-
vice of process requirements and Rule 4 are jurisdictional in nature.59 At
a minimum, the ability of a party to waive notice requirements should
not bootstrap a theory of consensual jurisdiction. Unless the bases for
jurisdiction are congruent with the bases of service requirements-and
they are not-then waiver and consent theories should not sweep so
broadly as to encompass both concepts.
The Bremen Court's second rationale noted that enforcement of fo-
rum-selection clauses was an "approach... substantially that followed in
other common-law countries including England."6 Additionally, adop-
tion of this approach "accord[ed] with ancient concepts of freedom of
contract."61 The Court, however, neglected to mention some other tell-
ing aspects of comparative law. While many common law countries gen-
erally approve of forum-selection clauses, 62 many countries still reject
them.63 Moreover, most nations have well-articulated theoretical justifi-
cations for embracing or repudiating consensual procedure, in contrast to
58. The Court stated: "The only question now before us is whether the person upon
whom the summons and complaint was served was 'an agent authorized by appointment'
to receive the same, so as to subject the respondents to the jurisdiction of the federal court
in New York." Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 313. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d). The Court also
noted that "[n]o questions of subject matter jurisdiction or of venue are presented."
Szukhent, 375 U.S. at 313 n.2.
59. See 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 35, § 1063, at 225 (citing FrC v. Compa-
gnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1312 n.61 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Libby
v. United States, 657 F. Supp. 1251, 1252-53 (M.D. Fla. 1987); Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Studiengesellschaft Kohle, 392 F. Supp. 1152, 1154 (D. Del. 1975)).
60. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 11 (1972).
61. Id.
62. For a discussion of the validity of forum-selection clauses, see the papers
presented at the Proceedings of the 1964 Annual Meeting of the American Foreign Law
Association: Cowen & Mendes Da Costa, The Contractual Forum: Situation in England
and the British Commonwealth, 13 Am. J. Comp. L. 179 (1964); Eek, The Contractual
Forum: Scandinavia, 13 Am. J. Comp. L. 173 (1964); Perillo, supra note 17; Reese, The
Contractual Forum: Situation in the United States, 13 Am. J. Comp. L. 187 (1964);
Schwind, Derogation Clauses in Latin-American Law, 13 Am. J. Comp. L. 167 (1964); see
also Farquharson, supra note 4, at 86; Gilbert, supra note 4, at 20-21.
63. Although Farquharson's list suggests broad acceptance of such provisions, Pro-
fessor Perillo notes that Austria, France, Germany and Switzerland's acceptance of such
clauses are laden with qualifications and depend on whether the clauses are prorogation
or derogation provisions. Further, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal have se-
vere limitations or outright prohibitions on certain clauses; certainly the validity and en-
forceability issues are not free from doubt. See Perillo, supra note 17, at 163-65. Schwind
describes a generally unfavorable trend in Latin America based on resurgent nationalism.
See Schwind, supra note 62, at 167-73.
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the United States."
When the Court suggested that the doctrine accorded with "ancient
concepts of freedom of contract,"65 it neglected to note that this particu-
lar perspective derived from the continental civil law tradition that em-
phasizes party autonomy to a degree alien to the American common law
and statutory system. 6 Only after centuries did England abandon its
repudiation of forum-selection clauses and self-consciously adopt the
civil law approach; but it did so on the principled basis that the courts
should not be a party to breach of contract.67 The Bremen Court thus
appropriated the rule without the reason. What it failed to recognize was
that rather than adopting British common law it was engrafting a foreign
legal principle onto dissimilar domestic stock.
The Court's third rationale for embracing the doctrine pointed out
that it was the view "advanced by noted scholars and that adopted by the
Restatement of the Conflict of Laws." 68  Small wonder-the scholars
cited, Professors Reese and Ehrenzweig, had a vested intellectual interest
as reporters for the Second Restatement and the Model Choice of Forum
Act, respectively.69 Professor Reese baldly asserted that "[ilt is perfectly
clear that consent is an effective basis of jurisdiction in the United
States,"70 citing, of course, Szukhent.71
With some modesty Professor Reese conceded that there were only
three recognized situations where a defendant's consent provided a basis
for jurisdiction: cognovit clauses, arbitration clauses and the appoint-
ment of an agent for the service of process.72 Having surveyed this ter-
64. See authorities cited supra note 62. The well-developed doctrine of consensual
theory in most other countries is predicated on a distinction between prorogation and
derogation clauses. See Perillo, supra note 17, at 165. Also, Great Britain embraces the
concept that forum-selection clauses are generally valid and enforceable so as to avoid
making the state a party to a breach of contract. See Cowen & Mendes Da Costa, supra
note 62, at 182-83; Gilbert, supra note 4, at 20.
65. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 11 (1972).
66. See generally Farquharson, supra note 4, at 84-87 (tracing history of "autonomy
of the will" to sixteenth century French jurists); Gilbert, supra note 4, at 20 ("in an
international contract one party may expect a choice of forum to be enforced or not as a
matter of course").
67. See Farquharson, supra note 4, at 84-87; Gilbert, supra note 3, at 20-24. See
generally Cowen & Mendes Da Costa, supra note 62, at 179 (historical discussion of
forum-selection clauses in England).
68. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 11 (1972).
69. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 80 (1971); Reese, The Contrac-
tual Forum, supra note 62; Reese, A Proposed Uniform Choice of Forum Act, 5 Colum J.
Transnat'l L. 193 (1966).
70. Reese, A Proposed Uniform Choice of Forum Act, supra note 69, at 194.
71. See id. at 194 n.2; see also Reese, supra note 5, at 534 n. 14 (citing Szukhent).
72. See Reese, A Proposed Uniform Choice of Forum Act, supra note 69, at 195. Cog-
novit clauses or "confession of judgment" provisions are particularly invidious and
maligned devices regarded as consumer abuse. Although the Supreme Court validated
their limited usage in D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972), that case is
idiosyncratic on its unusual facts. See Rubin, supra note 6, at 517-18. Arbitration
clauses, of course, provide the closest analogy of forum-selection provisions, but also have
a long history of court antipathy to enforcement. See id. at 519-21. Arguably, arbitration
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rain, Professor Reese further noted that "[tlhere are only a few other
situations where to date jurisdiction has been exercised over a defendant
by reason of his consent"-again citing Szuhkent.
73
Despite this meager collection of authorities, Professor Reese argued
that "[t]he reasons given by American courts for denying effect to such
agreements are not convincing"'  and that "[m]ore probably judicial
aversion to arbitration and to choice of forum provisions has a common
origin, which is presently obscure."75 Professor Ehrenzweig focused on
similar themes, mounting a frontal assault on the "non-ouster" rule of
jurisdiction and conventional arguments against prorogation
agreements.76
The scholarly attack consisted of two major criticisms: first, that
traditional abhorrence of consensual jurisdiction rested on dubious his-
torical assumptions, and second, that it relied on conclusory proposi-
tions.77 The first criticism did little more than demonstrate the dangers
of selective historical research; neither Professor Reese nor Professor
Ehrenzweig gave due credit to contrary authority rejecting prorogation
agreements. 78 The second criticism failed to address valid and serious
reservations about such consensual arrangements, 79 ironically engender-
ing a reversal of the doctrine predicated on a different set of conclusory
assertions.80
clauses represent an even greater yielding of litigation rights because not only is a judicial
forum waived, but also the adjudicatory procedure is yielded. See Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974). For a discussion of recent Supreme Court arbitra-
tion clause cases, see infra Part II B(1).
73. Reese, A Proposed Uniform Choice of Forum Act, supra note 69, at 195.
74. Id. at 196.
75. Id. at 197.
76. Professor Ehrenzweig argues: "The [non-ouster rule], however, which is contrary
to the law of other countries, seems doubtful in light of an analysis of its history and
current case law." A. Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Law § 41, at 148 (1962) (citations omit-
ted). The conventional arguments against prorogation agreements were: laws fixing
venue on considerations of convenience and expediency; that the remedy for improper
venue should rest in law, not in contract; that parties may not legislate; and that such
provisions were against public policy. See id. at 148-49.
77. See id. § 41; Lenhoff, supra note 17, at 430-32; Reese, The Contractual Forum,
supra note 62, at 187-89; Reese, A Proposed Uniform Choice of Forum Act, supra note 69,
at 196-97.
78. See supra notes 57, 63 (illustrating disagreement among courts concerning en-
forceability of choice-of-forum agreements).
79. See supra note 76. Professor Reese characterized the reasons for denying effect to
consensual forum clauses as "not convincing":
(1) that the parties cannot by their agreement oust a court of jurisdiction, (2)
that to allow the parties to change the rules relating to the place where suit may
be brought would "disturb the symmetry of the law" and lead to inconvenience
and (3) that choice of forum provisions are against public policy.
Reese, A Proposed Uniform Choice of Forum Act, supra note 69, at 196 (citing Reese,
supra note 62, at 188).
80. Professor Reese objected to denying effectiveness to consensual clauses:
The last of these reasons merely states a conclusion without any attempt at
explanation. The second-that to permit the parties to enter an effective agree-
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The linchpin of The Bremen's approval of forum-selection clauses,
however, lay in policy considerations rather than doctrinal support. The
fact that The Bremen involved an international towage contract was cru-
cial to the Court's adoption of consensual jurisdiction, because this ap-
proach "reflect[ed] an appreciation of the expanding horizons of
American contractors who seek business in all parts of the world."81 The
Court extolled the virtues of the neutral forum to adjudicate interna-
tional commercial disputes, characterizing the non-ouster rule as "some-
thing of a provincial attitude regarding the fairness of other tribunals."82
The primary values of prorogation clauses were certainty and conven-
ience: "The elimination of all such uncertainties by agreeing in advance
on a forum acceptable to both parties is an indispensable element in in-
ternational trade, commerce, and contracting."83
ment with respect to the place of suit would disturb the symmetry of the law-
is without merit since there are no rules, other than those concerned with juris-
diction, which determine whether suit should be brought in one state rather
than in another. As to the first reason, it is true that the parties cannot by their
agreement oust a court of jurisdiction. But a court need not always exercise
such jurisdiction as it may possess.
Id. at 196-97; see also Ehrenzweig, supra note 69, § 41, at 149 ("the statement that proro-
gation agreements are against public policy, is the conclusion to be proved rather than
proof for the conclusion") (citation omitted).
It is with some irony, then, that the stricture against public policy violations has been
imported into the post-Bremen reasonableness test. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Burroughs
Corp., 571 F. Supp. 545, 549 (N.D. Tex. 1982); D'Antuono v. CCH Computax Sys., 570
F. Supp. 708, 712 (D.R.I. 1983); Cutter v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 510 F. Supp. 905, 907-08
(E.D. Wis. 1981). See generally Gilbert, supra note 4, at 39-40 (conflicts with public
policy trump the interest or disinterest of the forum); Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses,
supra note 3, at 170-73 (forum-selection clause not enforced if its application contravenes
forum's public policy although parties and transactions are all connected to forum).
Professor Reese's second objection, that "there are no rules, other than those con-
cerned with jurisdiction," is equally revealing. Post-Bremen dogma posits conclusorily
that forum selection clauses are mainly venue-conferring. This perspective obviates the
impact on jurisdictional principles that enforcement of the clauses effects. For a discus-
sion of characterization problems, see infra Part II A. As to the non-ouster rule, current
theory merely substitutes the obverse proposition, without acknowledgement of the ab-
stention-like nature of such refusal to exercise jurisdiction. See infra notes 209-13, 407-09
and accompanying text.
81. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 11 (1972).
82. Id. at 12.
83. Id. at 13-14. It is interesting to note that although the parties to the towage
contract stipulated litigation of disputes in The High Court of Justice in London, they did
not stipulate choice-of-law. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court was more than willing to
infer this as well, finding that, "while the contract here did not specifically provide that
the substantive law of England should be applied, it is the general rule in English courts
that the parties are assumed, absent contrary indication, to have designated the forum
with the view that it should apply its own law." Id. at 13 n.15. This assumption has
received some criticism. See Gilbert, supra note 4, at 62 ("It is fairly clear, then, that if in
the Zapata situation the chosen forum applied a law of a state which had neither signifi-
cant factual contacts with the transaction nor an interest in having its law applied on the
matter in issue, due process would be denied."). But see Gruson, Forum-Selection
Clauses, supra note 3, at 190-91 (governing law may be reasonably inferred from forum
clause, except if violative of public policy). For a discussion of the choice-of-law implica-
tions for forum-clauses, see infra Part V.
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The international commercial setting for The Bremen84 clearly
presented the strongest policy basis for abandoning traditional repudia-
tion of prorogation agreements. Moreover, as a case based in admiralty
jurisdiction, the Court could fashion a federal common law rule for mari-
time commercial cases. 5 Whether the Supreme Court could speak more
broadly to domestic federal cases is troublesome; the Court took pains to
note that "[w]e are not here dealing with an agreement between two
Americans to resolve their essentially local disputes in a remote alien
forum."86 In such an instance, the Court suggested, "the serious incon-
venience of the contractual forum to one or both of the parties might
carry greater weight in determining the reasonableness of the forum
clause.""7
Notwithstanding this cautionary note, federal courts routinely and un-
critically import The Bremen's rule on forum-selection clauses into the
full range of domestic cases.88 It is rare that a federal court even ques-
tions The Bremen's applicability to domestic cases based in federal ques-
tion or diversity jurisdiction. 9
84. The case involved a contract between a Houston-based American corporation and
a German corporation for towing a drilling rig from Louisiana to a point near Italy in the
Adriatic Sea. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 2 (1972).
85. The Supreme Court has traditionally applied or created federal common law in
admiralty and maritime cases. See Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 738-39
(1961); Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 380-81 (1959);
Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1917). The Court also has felt free to
develop federal common law with regard to legal problems touching on international
relations. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421-27 (1964). See
generally J. Friedenthal, M. Kane & A. Miller, supra note 10, § 4.7 (summarizing devel-
opment and application of federal common law); 19 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 4514 (1982) (analyzing justifications, scope and principal con-
text of post-Erie common law); Edwards, The Erie Doctrine in Foreign Affairs Cases, 42
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 674 (1967) (discussing alternative grounds for federalizing foreign affair
cases without violating Erie); Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of The Federal Courts:
Sabbatino, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 805 (1964) (contending that the Sabbatino court asserted
independent power beyond the Act of State doctrine to make supreme law involving for-
eign relations).
86. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 17 (1972).
87. Id.
88. The cases in which The Bremen is routinely applied to domestic situations are too
numerous to cite. See supra note 3. For specific instances where the court mentions or
discusses application to domestic cases, see Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d
1066 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (per curiam), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988); Bryant Elec.
Co. v. City of Fredericksburg, 762 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1985); Pelleport Investors, Inc. v.
Budco Quality Theatres, Inc., 741 F.2d 273 (9th Cir. 1984); Bense v. Interstate Battery
Sys. of Am., 683 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 588 F.2d 93
(5th Cir. 1979); Republic Int'l Corp. v. Amco Eng'rs, Inc., 516 F.2d 161 (9th Cir. 1975);
Kline v. Kawai Am. Corp., 498 F. Supp. 868 (D. Minn. 1980); Hoes of Am., Inc. v. Hoes,
493 F. Supp. 1205 (C.D. Ill. 1979); Wellmore Coal Corp. v. Gates Learjet Corp., 475 F.
Supp. 1140 (W.D. Va. 1979); Taylor v. Titan Midwest Constr. Corp., 474 F. Supp. 145
(N.D. Tex. 1979); Public Water Supply Dist. No. I v. American Ins. Co., 471 F. Supp.
1071 (W.D. Mo. 1979); Cruise v. Castleton, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
89. See Andrews v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 771 F.2d 184, 187 (7th Cir. 1985)
(attempting to distinguish The Bremen); Visicorp v. Software Arts, Inc., 575 F. Supp.
1528, 1532 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (discussion of limiting The Bremen to international law
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Yet there are good reasons to question the applicability of The Bremen
doctrine in domestic federal cases. The kinds of uncertainties and insecu-
rities that exist in the international legal setting are not manifestly pres-
ent in the American federal system. Because of the lack of an Austinian
sovereign to enforce rules and impose sanctions, the continued vitality of
international law in large measure depends on consensual relationships. 90
Indeed, consent to jurisdiction is and must be the keystone of interna-
tional dispute resolution, a proposition recognized by the jurisdictional
provisions of the International Court of Justice.91 In addition, interna-
tional law is not concerned with American notions of due process with
regard to the exercise of jurisdiction; on the contrary, civil law notions of
party autonomy logically dominate the international legal scene.92 In
short, the question should be asked whether jurisdictional principles ap-
propriate for autonomous nation-states provide a sound analogy for
American domestic states within a federal system.93 The analogy works
only where prudential values are elevated over those ignored in the inter-
national arena: individual liberty interests defined by American notions
of traditional justice and fair play.
Moreover, while it is clear that the Supreme Court may fashion a fed-
eral common law rule for international maritime cases, it is much less
clear that it has the authority to do so in the domestic commercial con-
text. What is the justification for the Court setting forth essentially a
federal domestic common law rule of contractual jurisdiction, unless it is
reverting to Swift v. Tyson 94 rule-making power? Can a federal common
context); First Nat'l City Bank v. Nanz, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 184, 186-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(mem.) (distinguishing The Bremen; conceding that it can be applied to domestic cases).
90. See generally 0. Lissitzyn, International Law Today and Tomorrow 3-7, 8-11, 30-
45 (1965) (discussing development and implementation of international law and impor-
tance of consent to continued existence of international law).
91. As Lissitzyn notes:
Reference of disputes to international tribunals, however, is still rare. In princi-
ple, the power of the International Court of Justice to decide a dispute between
two states rests on the consent of both parties, although such consent may be
given in general terms before the dispute has arisen by acceptance of the com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the Court under the so-called "optional clause" in Arti-
cle 36 of the Court's Statute or by a provision in another treaty. Similarly,
resort to arbitration depends on the consent of the parties.
Id. at 33.
92. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
93. According to Lissitzyn, "Contemporary international law, of course, is not nearly
as adequate or effective as the national legal systems of well-organized states." 0. Lis-
sitzyn, supra note 90, at 109. He nonetheless remains sanguine about the role of public
international law: "But its role in world affairs, although not as important as the role of
national law in most states, is far from negligible." Id.
94. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938)). For a general discussion of the Swift v. Tyson era of federal common law
rulemaking, see generally J. Friedenthal, M. Kane & A. Miller, supra note 10, § 4.1
(summarizing the effect of Swift v. Tyson on the Rules of Decision Act); 1 C. Wright & A.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4502 (1982) (discussing early history of federal
case law); Field, Source of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 Harv. L. Rev.
883 (1986) (challenging the traditional definition of "state law").
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law rule created for international commercial cases blithely be appropri-
ated for private domestic contract disputes?9"
As a major doctrinal reversal, The Bremen is not a stellar illustration
of a tight analytical argument. It is a major Supreme Court decision that
relies on slim precedential support, fuzzy historical analysis, and selec-
tive comparative law. At best, it embodies a well-intentioned common
sense rule in light of expanding international commercial relations. At
its worst, it created a prima facie rule of dubious application in domestic
federal cases, substituting one set of conclusory propositions for another.
B. In the Wake of The Bremen: Steaming into Domestic Waters
In the two decades following The Bremen's complete reversal of
course, the doctrine of consensual adjudicatory procedure drifted in two
directions, reappearing in a half-dozen Supreme Court cases. 96 By inad-
vertent symmetry, three cases involved arbitration agreements (two in
international trade settings),97 while three tangentially implicated con-
sensual jurisdiction in' domestic commercial contexts.9 s Taken together,
these cases subtly altered the doctrinal development of consensual proce-
dure and expanded it beyond the international context. Nonetheless, The
Bremen remains the lodestar for lower federal courts construing forum-
selection clauses. 99 Further, there has been scant illumination of the
choice-of-law issues present in these contractual forum arrangements. °°
1. The Arbitration Trilogy
The Supreme Court thrice has reaffirmed the notion that arbitration
clauses incorporated in contractual agreements are enforceable in dero-
gation of a party's right to litigate a securities or antitrust action in fed-
eral court. l0 The Court views arbitration clauses as "specialized kind[s]
of forum-selection clause[s]" and holds that even exclusive federal court
95. See infra Part III A-C.
96. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988); Shearson/Ameri-
can Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462 (1985); Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
U.S. 694 (1982); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
97. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987) (arbi-
tration agreement; purely domestic dispute); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (arbitration agreement; international context);
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (same).
98. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988) (forum clause; do-
mestic diversity lawsuit); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (choice-
of-law provision; state long-arm jurisdiction challenge); Insurance Corp. of Ireland v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982) (waiver of objection to personaljurisdiction as discovery sanction).
99. See supra notes 3, 88 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 83; infra Part V (discussion of choice-of-law complications).
101. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987); Mit-
subishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
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jurisdiction under the Securities and Exchange Act is waivable. 1°2
Although the major prop for this conclusion is the United States Arbitra-
tion Act,1"3 which "revers[ed] centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements,"'" it is equally clear that the dynamics of international
commerce greatly influenced the Court's thinking. The arbitration cases
echo and reinforce the same policy considerations articulated in The
Bremen. Thus, three years after The Bremen, the Court in Scherk v. Al-
berto-Culver Co.'l 5 again emphasized the prudential values of certitude,
order and predictability served by arbitration clauses:
Such uncertainty will almost inevitably exist with respect to any con-
tract touching two or more countries, each with its own substantive
laws and conflict-of-laws rules. A contractual provision specifying in
advance the forum in which disputes shall be litigated and the law to
be applied is, therefore, an almost indispensable precondition to
achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any inter-
national business transaction.' 0 6
The virtue of the neutral forum also was sounded in Scherk: "Further-
more, such a provision obviates the danger that a dispute under the
agreement might be submitted to a forum hostile to the interests of one of
the parties or unfamiliar with the problem area involved." 107 Finally, the
Court warned against corrosive nationalism, noting that "[a] parochial
refusal by the courts of one country to enforce an international arbitra-
tion agreement would not only frustrate these purposes, but would invite
unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying... to secure tactical litiga-
tion advantages."'' 0 8
The Court in Scherk viewed the arbitration clause as essentially a fo-
rum-selection clause with a minor difference, because the arbitration
clause "posits not only the situs of suit but also the procedure to be used
in resolving the dispute."'0 9 The Court reiterated this point in Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.," ° suggesting that in the
102. See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519; see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 630.
103. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208 (1982).
104. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 510; see also McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2337; Mitsubishi Motors
Corp., 473 U.S. at 625 n.14.
105. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
106. Id. at 516.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 516-17.
109. Id. at 519. This conclusion followed the Court's discussion and analysis of the
principles enunciated in The Bremen. See id. at 518. Similar to The Bremen, the Scherk
Court noted that "[u]nder some circumstances, the designation of arbitration in a certain
place might also be viewed as implicitly selecting the law of that place to apply to that
transaction." Id. at 519 n.13; see supra note 83.
110. 473 U.S. 614 (1985). The petitioner in Mitsubishi was a joint venture between
Japanese and Swiss corporations to manufacture and distribute Chrysler automobiles
outside the United States. The respondent Soler was a Puerto Rican corporation that
entered into a sales and distribution agreement with Mitsubishi. The agreement con-
tained an arbitration clause subjecting all disputes arising out of the agreement to arbitra-
tion before the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association. When Mitsubishi sued for
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enforcement of an arbitration clause the party did not forego the substan-
tive rights afforded by the antitrust statutes, but "only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."11
Concerns of international comity and international commercial activ-
ity also motivated the Court in Mitsubishi."2 However, the Court went
well beyond The Bremen's reasoning in upholding the sanctity of con-
tractual agreements that directly clash with statutorily-conferred federal
court jurisdiction:
We must assume that if Congress intended the substantive protection
afforded by a given statute to include protection against waiver of the
right to a judicial forum, that intention will be deducible from text or
legislative history. Having made the bargain to arbitrate, the party
should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to
preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at
issue.
1 13
The Court achieved the ultimate extension of this waiver theory in
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon," 4 the third case in the
arbitration-clause trilogy. In McMahon, an action brought under Rule
lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act,"' the Court abandoned any reli-
ance on the international trade setting, largely because McMahon
presented a purely domestic federal dispute. 16 Instead, the Court inter-
preted Scherk, Mitsubishi and Wilko v. Swan".. to collectively stand for
two propositions: first, that the right to a judicial forum can be waived
only where arbitration is adequate to protect substantive rights; and sec-
ond, the party opposing enforcement of an arbitration clause carries the
compelled arbitration under the clause, Soler counterclaimed with causes of action under
the Sherman Act. See id. at 616-22.
111. Id. at 628.
112. The Court in Mitsubishi stated:
As in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), we conclude that con-
cerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transna-
tional tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial
system for predictability in the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the
parties' agreement, even assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in
a domestic context.
Id. at 629 (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 628 (citation omitted).
114. 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987). McMahon and other customers of Shearson/American
Express, Inc. brought suit in federal court against Shearson and its representatives who
handled their accounts, alleging violations of § 10(b) and Rule lob-5 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982) and the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
Shearson/American Express moved to stay the court proceedings and compel arbitration
under § 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act. See McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2334.
115. See McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2334.
116. See id. at 2339.
117. 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (holding that claims arising under Securities Exchange
Act of 1933 are not subject to compulsory arbitration under arbitration agreement).
Wilko was distinguished as not controlling on the facts in McMahon. See McMahon, 107
S. Ct. at 2337-43.
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burden of demonstrating that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of
judicial remedies for statutory rights.1 18
The arbitration trilogy seems, at first blush, merely to reaffirm the ba-
sic Bremen proposition that a contractual forum provision is enforceable
unless proven inadequate by the party opposing the forum. 19 Yet the
dissenting Justices recognized the slippery-slope reasoning in the Court's
opinions. In Scherk, the dissenters noted that the Court invoked the "in-
ternational contract talisman" 120 to approve a contractual forum in pref-
erence to a statutory one. This talismanic invocation disregarded both
congressional statutory jurisdiction and The Bremen Court's own injunc-
tion that "[a] contractual choice-of-forum clause should be held unen-
forceable if enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the
forum in which suit is brought, whether declared by statute or by judicial
decision." 121 Thus, "the international aura" which the Scherk majority
conferred on the case was "ominous," because "[t]he loss of the proper
judicial forum carries with it the loss of substantial rights." '122
This telling critique also eluded the Mitsubishi majority, prompting a
distressed Justice Stevens to note that Scherk was wholly inapplicable to
an antitrust lawsuit whose merits were controlled entirely by American
law.23 In his dissent, Justice Stevens correctly linked the loss of forum
to the loss of substantive rights:
The Court's repeated incantation of the high ideals of "international
arbitration" creates the impression that this case involves the fate of an
institution designed to implement a formula for world peace. But just
as it is improper to subordinate the public interest in enforcement of
antitrust policy to the private interest in resolving commercial dis-
putes, so is it equally unwise to allow a vision of world unity to distort
the importance of the selection of the proper forum for resolving this
dispute. 124
Needless to say, the Court completely capitulated to the notion of con-
sensual procedure in McMahon, where it made no attempt at all to cloak
its conclusions in the mantle of international comity and trade. The dis-
118. See McMahon, 107 S. Ct. at 2339.
119. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1972).
120. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 529 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
121. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15. The dissenters in Scherk, citing to this proposition
in The Bremen, argued:
That is inescapably the case here, as § 29 of the Securities Exchange Act and
Wilko v. Swan make clear. Neither § 29, nor the Convention on international
arbitration, nor The Bremen justifies abandonment of a national public policy
that securities claims be heard by a judicial forum simply because some interna-
tional elements are involved in a contract.
Scherk, 417 U.S. at 531 n.10 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
122. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 532, 533; see also id. at 532 n.11 (dissent suggesting that
choice-of-law implications would render Alberto-Culver's victory Pyrrhic).
123. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 660-
65 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 665 (citation omitted).
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senters could only protest that "the Scherk decision turned on the special
nature of agreements to arbitrate in the international commercial con-
text,"' 25 and again decry the loss of the ability to litigate in a judicial
forum substantive rights for alleged abuses in the securities industry.'26
Thus, the arbitration cases are, as Justice Stevens suggested, ominous.
Building on The Bremen, these cases removed the broad doctrine of con-
sensual procedure from its original international context and approved it
in domestic federal cases as well. More importantly, these cases signaled
the Supreme Court's willingness to yield statutory jurisdiction and con-
comitant substantive rights when faced with a contractual provision. In-
credibly, the Court accomplished this major doctrinal shift with little
justification beyond The Bremen's good intentions and laudatory legal
conclusions.
2. Further Supreme Court Imprimatur to Consensual Jurisdiction
The arbitration cases, standing alone, probably are a sufficient source
from which one can derive a doctrine of domestic consensual adjudica-
tory procedure, but three additional post-Bremen cases give the doctrine
its fullest meaning.127 None, however, squarely states that federal courts
are required to yield jurisdiction to a forum-selection clause or to abdi-
cate conflicts analysis in the presence of a choice-of-law provision. The
reluctance of the Supreme Court to impose this requirement is somewhat
mysterious.
The first of these three post-Bremen cases further articulates the notion
of waiver of jurisdiction. In Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinee,121 the Court expounded that personal jurisdiction
was an individual liberty interest and therefore a waivable right. 129 Rely-
ing on that old standby, Szukhent, 30 and a collection of arbitration
125. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2352 (1987)(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original).
126. "The Court thus approves the abandonment of the judiciary's role in the resolu-
tion of claims under the Exchange Act and leaves such claims to the arbitral forum of the
securities industry at a time when the industry's abuses towards investors are more appar-
ent than ever." Id. at 2346 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
also id. at 2355 (investor forced to resolve claims in securities-controlled forum).
127. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988); Burger King Corp.
v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Baux-
ites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
128. 456 U.S. 694 (1982). The Compagnie des Bauxites, a Delaware corporation with
its principal place of business in Guinea, sued various insurance companies to recover on
a business interruption policy. The suit was brought in a federal district court in Penn-
sylvania, based on diversity jurisdiction. The defendants raised a defense of lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction and the plaintiff attempted to use discovery to ascertain jurisdictional
facts. The defendants failed to comply with multiple discovery requests and the district
court, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A), imposed the sanction of assuming personal
jurisdiction. See id. at 695-700.
129. See id. at 702-03.
130. National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964). See discussion
supra Part I A.
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cases, the Court reaffirmed the received dogma that "[a] variety of legal
arrangements have been taken to represent express or implied consent to
the personal jurisdiction of the court." '131 Insurance Corp. of Ireland is
significant for two reasons: first, it suggested the alarming possibility of
implied consent to a court's jurisdiction-previously largely unmen-
tioned; and second, it firmly rooted the doctrines of consent and waiver
in the concept of personal jurisdiction-largely to be ignored in ensuing
cases. 132
The second post-Bremen case presented the Court with an interesting
problem in consensual jurisdiction. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 33 a
case turning on standard minimum contacts jurisprudence,13 4 focused on
whether a franchise agreement with a Florida corporation could supply
an adequate basis for the exercise of Florida long-arm jurisdiction.135
The interesting wrinkle, however, was that the contract contained a
choice-of-law provision, but no forum-selection clause. Based on this
anomaly, the Court reached two fascinating conclusions. First, the ma-
jority suggested that even though the language of the choice-of-law pro-
vision did not require all suits concerning the agreement to be brought in
Florida, it should have "reasonably... suggested to [the defendant] that
by negative implication such suits could be filed there."'136 More impor-
tantly, the Court suggested that a contractual choice-of-law provision
was a relevant contact in the calculus of personal jurisdiction:
Nothing in our cases, however, suggests that a choice-of-law provision
should be ignored in considering whether a defendant has "purpose-
fully invoked the benefits and protections of a State's laws" for juris-
dictional purposes. Although such a provision standing alone would
be insufficient to confer jurisdiction ... it reinforced [the defendant's]
deliberate affiliation with the forum State and the reasonable foresee-
ability of possible litigation there.
137
131. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 703.
132. The doctrine of implied consent had its heyday in non-resident motorist statutes.
See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (use of state highway by non-resident is
equivalent to appointment of registrar as agent for service of process). But see Wuchter v.
Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928) (challenging notion of implied consent to state assertion of
jurisdiction). For a discussion of the confused handling of the concept of personal juris-
diction in forum-selection cases, see infra Part II A.
133. 471 U.S. 462 (1985). Rudzewicz and a partner, both Michigan residents, entered
into a twenty-year franchise agreement with Burger King to operate a franchise in Michi-
gan. Burger King was a Florida corporation with its principal offices in Miami. When
Rudzewicz fell behind in payments, Burger King sued in federal district court in Florida
alleging breach of franchise obligations. See id. at 463-71.
134. The Court stated that "[t]he question presented is whether this exercise of long-
arm jurisdiction offended 'traditional conception[s] of fair play and substantial justice'
embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 464 (citing
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)). For the Court's mini-
mum-contacts analysis, see Burger King, 471 U.S. at 471-87.
135. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478-87.
136. Id. at 482 n.24.
137. Id. at 482 (emphasis in original).
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By throwing consensual choice-of-law back into the jurisdictional
stew, 138 the Court expanded the boundaries of express and implied juris-
dictional consent.
The most recent domestic case, Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh
Corp., 1 represents the greatest disappointment for the doctrinal devel-
opment of consensual adjudicatory procedure. There the Court faced an
unadulterated forum-selection and choice-of-law issue raised in a diver-
sity jurisdiction context.1" The Court of Appeals viewed the case as a
Bremen problem and applied The Bremen standards to the facts.' Yet
the Supreme Court rejected this approach and chose instead the narrow-
est possible legal construction of the problem. Rather than make sweep-
ing pronouncements about the enforceability of such clauses, the Court
sheepishly evaded the issues:
Although we agree with the Court of Appeals that the Bremen case
may prove "instructive" in resolving the parties' dispute... we disa-
gree with the court's articulation of the relevant inquiry as "whether
the forum selection clause in this case is unenforceable under the stan-
dards set forth in The Bremen."
142
The Court viewed Ricoh as a review of abuse of discretion on a transfer
motion.143 In so doing the Court uncritically -cast the problem in venue
terms, circumventing jurisdictional analysis altogether.'" Although
Ricoh neatly and definitively solved the Erie problem inherent in diver-
sity cases, the opinion added nothing to the analytical development of a
theory of consensual adjudicatory procedure.
138. There is some debate whether Burger King elevated choice-of-law to a "contact"
for minimum-contacts analysis. Compare Peterson, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law Revis-
ited, 59 U. Colo. L. Rev. 37, 38-40 (1988) (choice-of-law clause important in considering
whether defendant purposefully invoked benefits and protections of chosen forum) with
Rosenberg, Foreword to the Colorado Symposium, 59 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1988) (Burger
King choice of law clause was used as objective evidence of where the defendant expected
to be sued, and not as a step toward homogenizing the jurisdiction and choice-of-law
inquiries). Traditional principles separate the jurisdictional inquiry from the choice-of-
law determination. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
139. 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988). For a complete discussion of the factual setting of Ricoh,
see infra Part III A.
140. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1067 (11th Cir. 1987) (en
banc) (per curiam), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988); 785 F.2d 896 (granting petition for
rehearing en banc), vacating 779 F.2d 643 (1 1th Cir. 1986).
141. See Stewart Org., Inc., 810 F.2d at 1074-75. For a discussion of The Bremen
standards, see supra Part I A.
142. Stewart Org., Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2239, 2243 (1988) (citations omitted).
143. The Court phrased the initial issue as "whether § 1404(a) itself controls respon-
dent's request to give effect to the parties' contractual choice of venue and transfer this
case to a Manhattan court." Id.
144. The Court squarely stated: "We hold that federal law, specifically 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a), governs the District Court's decision whether to give effect to the parties' fo-
rum-selection clause and transfer this case to a court in Manhattan." Id. at 2245. For a
discussion of the Court's legal analysis of the Erie question, see infra Parts III B-C.
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II. CHARACTERIZATION PROBLEMS: CONSENSUAL PROCEDURE IN
CHAOTIC CONFUSION
One can marshal a compelling doctrine of consensual adjudicatory
procedure by stringing together an array of disparate Supreme Court
cases. Certainly, there is enough language to stock a good-sized canon of
consensual jurisdiction. The doctrinal weaknesses of this theory are
manifest, however, in lower court explications of the canon. As this sec-
tion will show, the federal cases reveal gross analytical confusion stem-
ming largely from characterization problems.
The lower federal courts have encountered three major characteriza-
tion difficulties in construing forum-selection clauses. First, the courts
have not amicably come to terms with whether forum-selection clauses
are a matter of jurisdiction, venue, transfer or forum non conveniens.1 45
Second, the courts rather randomly apply an array of possible reme-
dies '146-a confusion arising from the failure to solve the first problem.
Third, the courts have paid virtually no attention to the civil law distinc-
tion between prorogation and derogation clauses,147 which has directly
contributed to the prevalence of the first two problems. The reluctance
to struggle with the theoretical has induced courts to embrace the prag-
matic and permitted contract principles to triumph over fundamental ad-
judicatory rights, such as choice of forum and choice of law.
A. Jurisdiction, Venue or Forum Non Conveniens?
The Supreme Court cases offer vague guidance on the characterization
issue. The Bremen did not squarely address the issue whether forum-
selection clauses are a matter of jurisdiction or venue, but the Court flatly
rejected the long-standing non-ouster restriction on jurisdiction. 48 In
Insurance Corp. of Ireland, the Court discussed at length the theoretical
distinctions between subject matter and personal jurisdiction with regard
to consent.149 The Supreme Court's recent pronouncement in Ricoh im-
plied that forum-selection clauses are a matter of venue, certainly at least
for Erie purposes.1 50 Yet in an earlier Ricoh opinion, one judge pointed
out that the concepts of jurisdiction and venue are distinct, although
state decisions tend to conflate the concepts: 51 "Subject matter jurisdic-
tion refers to the institutional power of a court to adjudicate a case;
145. See infra Part II A.
146. See infra Part II B.
147. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
148. The Bremen Court stated, "The argument that such clauses are improper because
they tend to 'oust' a court of jurisdiction is hardly more than a vestigial legal fiction."
The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972). Although the Court rejected
the non-ouster rule, it nonetheless recognized (in so doing) that a jurisdictional issue was
imminent in forum-selection clause cases. See id.
149. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
701-05 (1982).
150. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
151. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 779 F.2d 643, 647 n.7, vacated, 785 F.2d
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venue dictates which among several courts having jurisdiction is appro-
priate as most convenient. A court must be seized of both jurisdiction
and venue if properly to hear a case." 152 Moreover, the reasoning contin-
ues, subject matter cannot contractually be conferred, while venue may
be so determined." 3
Virtually none of the lower court forum-selection cases characterizes
the issue as a jurisdictional problem. A few cases deem the provisions as
pertaining to jurisdiction, without distinguishing between personal or
subject matter jurisdiction.1 -4 Some cases pay lip-service to the discred-
ited principle that jurisdiction of the courts cannot with certainty be
ousted by private agreement in advance.1 5  Other cases, following The
Bremen, circumvent the jurisdictional issue by noting that jurisdiction
exists to determine whether to decline it; hence, jurisdiction is not ousted
by enforcement of a contract provision.15 6 In a few instances courts have




154. See, eg., Andrews v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 771 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 1985)
("consent to jurisdiction" clause); AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Inv. Partnership, 740
F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1984) (good subject matter jurisdiction but case dismissed because of
forum-selection clause); Colonial Leasing Co. v. Pugh Bros. Garage, 735 F.2d 380 (9th
Cir. 1984) (dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction); Livolsi v. Ram Constr. Co., 728
F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1984) (exclusive federal jurisdiction by consent not permissible);
Dracos v. Hellenic Lines Ltd., 705 F.2d 1392 (1983) (no federal subject matter jurisdic-
tion over maritime claim where decedent's employment contract had choice-of-forum
clause specifying Greece), aff'd on reh'g en banc, 762 F.2d 348 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 945 (1985); Mercury Coal & Coke, Inc. v. Mannesmann Pipe & Steel Corp., 696
F.2d 315 (4th Cir. 1982) (clause discussed as jurisdictional); Polar Shipping Ltd. v. Orien-
tal Shipping Corp., 680 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982) (forum provision upheld but district
court could retain jurisdiction to obtain security by maritime attachment); Copperweld
Steel Co. v. Demag-Mannesmann-Bohler, 578 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1978) (forum-selection
clause framed as jurisdictional issue); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v.
Lecopulos, 553 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1977) (motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction incor-
rectly granted); Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Cos. v. Puerto Rican Forwarding Co., 492
F.2d 1294 (1st Cir. 1974) (case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction); Wellmore Coal Corp.
v. Gates Learjet Corp., 475 F. Supp. 1140 (W.D. Va. 1979) (motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction); Sanko Steamship Co. v. Newfoundland Refining Co., 411 F. Supp.
285 (S.D.N.Y.) (admiralty in rem jurisdiction; forum clause enforced), aff'd, 538 F.2d
313 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 858 (1976); A.C. Miller Concrete Prods. Corp. v.
Quikset Vault Sales Corp., 309 F. Supp. 1094 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (combination jurisdiction-
venue clause); Matthiessen v. National Trailer Convoy, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 1132 (D.
Minn. 1968) (motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction denied).
155. See Central Contracting Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 367 F.2d 341, 344 (3d
Cir. 1966); Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 300-01 (5th Cir.
1958), cert. dismissed, 359 U.S. 180 (1959); Wm. H. Muller & Co., Inc. v. Swedish Am.
Line, Ltd., 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955); Brown v. Gingiss
Int'l Inc., 360 F. Supp. 1042, 1047 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Hawaii Credit Card Corp. v. Conti-
nental Credit Card Corp., 290 F. Supp. 848, 851 (D. Haw. 1968); Geiger v. Keilani, 270
F. Supp. 761, 764 (E.D. Mich. 1967); United States v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 38
F.R.D. 418, 420 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
156. See, e.g., LFC Lessors, Inc. v. Pacific Sewer Maintenance Corp., 739 F.2d 4, 6
(1st Cir. 1984); Wm. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish Am. Line, Ltd., 224 F.2d 806, 808 (2d
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recognized that ambiguously worded clauses may confer or derogate ex-
clusive jurisdiction; 157 but at least one court has concluded that "where
the federal courts retain no power to vacate the determination of the
state courts, such destruction of exclusive federal jurisdiction, even by
consent, is not permissible."' 8
Discussions of the implications of forum-selection clauses for personal
jurisdiction are equally rare and sometimes collapsed with venue notions.
A litigant who challenged a provision as ambiguous and unenforceable
because it referred only to venue and not to jurisdiction was told: "A
waiver of objection to venue would be meaningless, however, if it did not
also contemplate a concomitant waiver of objection to personal jurisdic-
tion."159 This sentiment has been generalized in the principle that
although "the contract refers to venue only and not also to personal ju-
risdiction [that] is of no moment."'" At least one court has recom-
mended forum-selection clauses as a prophylactic device to avoid the
consequences of state long-arm in personam jurisdiction. 61
A Seventh Circuit case, Andrews v. Heinold Commodities, Inc.,' 62 illus-
trates the confusion of personal jurisdiction and venue. In Andrews, the
district court dismissed the suit when the defendant invoked a forum-
selection clause.16' The appellate court framed the issue as the "more
subtle one of whether the forum selection clause functioned to deprive
the district court of personal jurisdiction, or of venue only." ' 6  The
court astutely noted that The Bremen did not address this precise issue
Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955); see also Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie
des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 706 (1982) ("By submitting to the jurisdiction of
the court for the limited purpose of challenging jurisdiction, the defendant agrees to abide
by that court's determination on the issue of jurisdiction." (citing Baldwin v. Traveling
Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525 (1931)).
157. See Hunt Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Supreme Oil Co., 817 F.2d 75, 78 (9th Cir. 1987)
(ambiguous clause does not confer exclusive and mandatory jurisdiction); LFC Lessors,
Inc. v. Pacific Sewer Maintenance Corp., 739 F.2d 4, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1984) (ambiguous
clause did not oust jurisdiction of Massachusetts state courts).
158. Livolsi v. Ram Constr. Co., 728 F.2d 600, 603 (3d Cir. 1984); cf Polar Shipping
Ltd. v. Oriental Shipping Corp., 680 F.2d 627, 633 (9th Cir. 1982) (court yields jurisdic-
tion to selected forum but may maintain jurisdiction to ensure plaintiff has adequate rem-
edy through security attachment).
159. Richardson Greenshields Sees., Inc. v. Metz, 566 F. Supp. 131, 133 (S.D.N.Y.
1983); see Intermountain Sys. v. Edsall Constr. Co., 575 F. Supp. 1195, 1198 (D. Colo.
1983) (mem.) (same proposition).
160. Intermountain Sys., 575 F. Supp. at 1198. For the analogous proposition with
regard to arbitration clauses, see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v.
Lecopulos, 553 F.2d 842, 844 (2d Cir. 1977) (arbitration clause constitutes consent to
personal jurisdiction of New York Court in suit to compel arbitration).
161. See In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 234 n.24 (6th
Cir. 1972).
162. 771 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 1985). This was a suit brought under § 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 and § 4(b) of the Commodity Exchange Act for losses exceed-
ing $38,000 in the handling of an account by the commodities brokerage house. See id. at
185-86.
163. See id. at 185-86.
164. Id. at 187.
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whether transfer pursuant to a choice-of-forum clause was due to lack of
personal jurisdiction or lack of venue alone. 165 The court answered that
the district court had dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction,
rather than venue, clarifying this position as follows:
[The defendant] argues that the Indiana court's determining it lacked
jurisdiction because of the contract clause means that the court actu-
ally possessed jurisdiction but declined to exercise it, and that this re-
fusal to exercise its jurisdiction cannot constitute a dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction .... We do not agree .... That the lack of personal
jurisdiction also nullifies the venue that had lain in the Indiana court is
irrelevant, because that is the consequence of any finding of no per-
sonal jurisdiction.1 66
A sizable number of cases characterize forum-selection clauses as
"venue selection clauses," 161 providing expanded relief options for the
party seeking enforcement. Under this construction forum-selection
clauses are a part of procedural venue law, 168 a view the Supreme Court
endorses. 169 Again, questions of personal jurisdiction recede when forum
provisions are deemed venue devices. Thus, in Wellmore Coal Corp. v.
Gates Learjet Corp.,170 the district court suggested that whether personal
jurisdiction had been properly asserted over the defendant "must be held
in abeyance pending a determination of the validity and enforceability of
the forum selection clause."' 71 In the court's view it was not necessary
to have personal jurisdiction in order to transfer the case. 172
Conversely, the failure to raise a venue defense with a forum-selection
clause challenge need not prove fatal. 173 In one Seventh Circuit case,
174
165. Id.
166. Id. at 188; cf. McRae v. J.D./M.D., Inc., 511 So. 2d 540, 543 (Fla. 1987) (forum-
selection clause not enforceable where defendant lacked minimum contacts with Florida).
167. See, e.g., Boyd v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., 338 U.S. 263, 264 (1949); Sun World
Lines, Ltd. v. March Shipping Corp., 801 F.2d 1066, 1069 (8th Cir. 1986); Snyder v.
Smith, 736 F.2d 409, 419 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984); In re Fireman's
Fund Ins. Cos., 588 F.2d 93, 95 (5th Cir. 1979); Richardson Eng'g Co. v. IBM, 554 F.
Supp. 467, 469 (D. Vt. 1981), aff'd, 697 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1982); Anastasi Bros. Corp. v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F. Supp. 862, 863-64 (E.D. Pa. 1981); St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 401 F. Supp. 927, 929-30 (D. Mass. 1975);
Davis v. Pro Basketball, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 1, 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Brown v. Gingiss Int'l,
Inc., 360 F. Supp. 1042, 1044 (E.D. Wis. 1973); National Equip. Rental v. Sanders, 271
F. Supp. 756, 761 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
168. See, e.g., Sun World Lines, Ltd. v. March Shipping Corp., 801 F.2d 1066, 1069
(8th Cir. 1986); Visicorp. v. Software Arts, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1528, 1533 (N.D. Cal.
1983); Northeast Theatre Corp. v. Edie & Ely Landau, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 833, 834-35 (D.
Mass. 1983).
169. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988). For a discussion of
the venue characterization under Erie principles, see infra Part III B-C.
170. 475 F. Supp. 1140 (W.D. Va. 1979).
171. Id. at 1142.
172. See id. (citing Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463 (1962)).
173. See Snyder v. Smith, 736 F.2d 409, 418-19 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037
(1984).
174. University Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Unimarc Ltd., 699 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1983).
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a hapless defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds of improper service
and lack of jurisdiction, but failed to raise the forum-selection clause as a
ground for improper venue. The plaintiff contended that the venue de-
fense was therefore waived pursuant to Rule 12 consolidation require-
ments.1 75 The court stated that it "need not decide whether a forum
selection clause constitutes 'venue' within the meaning of rule 12," be-
cause that defense had been sufficiently raised by the Rule 12 motion
generally. 176 Glossing over technical differences between jurisdiction and
venue, the court observed that the fact that the defendant had not labeled
its defense as venue did not matter: "The Federal Rules are to be con-
strued liberally so that erroneous nomenclature in a motion does not
bind a party at his peril." '177
Finally, some courts have viewed forum-selection enforcement as a fo-
rum non conveniens problem. 178 Under this view, forum-selection provi-
sions are a species of venue law with the appropriate forum ultimately to
be determined by resort to the same factors that govern forum non con-
veniens analysis.1 79 On the other hand, some courts disagree whether
The Bremen factors are coextensive with forum non conveniens princi-
ples. 1 0 One theory is that forum non conveniens analysis may determine
the reasonableness of the selected forum, which is a prerequisite of The
Bremen enforceability. 1 ' Other cases view a forum non conveniens in-
quiry as one separate from the validity of the clause. 82
What the characterization problem boils down to is three possible ap-
proaches. First, if the clause is viewed as jurisdictional, then the court
175. See Snyder, 736 F.2d at 414; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g)-(h).
176. Snyder, 736 F.2d at 419.
177. Id.
178. See, e.g., Union Ins. Soc'y of Canton, Ltd. v. S.S. Elikon, 642 F.2d 721, 725-26
(4th.Cir. 1981) (alternative forum non conveniens argument); Carbon Black Export, Inc.
v. S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 301 (5th Cir. 1958) (analogy to forum non conveniens
theory), cert. dismissed, 359 U.S. 180 (1959); Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Broetje, 545 F. Supp.
362, 369-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (forum non conveniens analysis); see also Gruson, Forum-
Selection Clauses, supra note 3, at 142 & n.28 ("The factors applied by the courts to
determine the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a forum-selection clause are similar
to or identical with the factors used by courts in deciding the issue of forum non
conveniens.").
179. Snyder v. Smith, 736 F.2d 409, 419 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984).
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, when venue is proper in the first instance,
the court having jurisdiction may refuse to entertain the action when it can more appro-
priately be brought in an alternative forum. Convenience and efficiency are the factors to
be weighed in the determination. See J. Friedenthal, M. Kane & A. Miller, supra note 10,
§ 2.7, at 88-90; see also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
180. See Union Ins. Soe'y of Canton, Ltd. v. S.S. Elikon, 642 F.2d 721, 725 (4th Cir.
1981); see also Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note 3, at 142 n.28 (collecting
cases).
181. See Takemura & Co. v. S.S. Tsuneshima Maru, 197 F. Supp. 909, 912 (S.D.N.Y.
1961); see also Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note 3, at 142 n.28.
182. See Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Broetje, 545 F. Supp. 362, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Heit-
ner v. Zim Israel Navigation Co., 152 F. Supp. 3, 3-4 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); see also Gruson,
Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note 3, at 142.
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always has jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction. If the clause is charac-
terized in terms of venue, then an objection to the clause would have to
be specific. Finally, if characterized in terms of forum non conveniens, as
discussed above, the courts have greater discretion in their construction.
B. Enforcement of Forum-Selection Clauses: How Does the Litigant
Plead Reliep?
Not surprisingly, given the courts' analytical confusion with regard to
forum-selection clauses, there is also much confusion concerning appro-
priate relief. Attorneys seeking enforcement of a forum provision typi-
cally invoke an array of procedural remedies and defenses in the hope
that one is appropriate to the court's view of the case. This makes for
interesting lawyering and bad law.
Although the courts have generally eschewed characterizing forum-
selection clauses as jurisdictional, attorneys nonetheless have moved to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure for lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction."' 3 Indeed, only
in rare instances have parties seeking enforcement of a forum clause pre-
vailed under the jurisdictional defenses."8 4 Rather than order an outright
dismissal, other courts have chosen to stay their proceedings." Some
creative attorneys challenge forum-selection clauses by invoking the Rule
12(b)(6) failure to state a claim defense.1 16 Other litigants seek dismissal
or remand as the remedy in removal situations.18 '
183. See, e.g., Bryant Elec. Co. v. City of Fredericksburg, 762 F.2d 1192, 1192 (4th
Cir. 1985) (Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); LFC
Lessors, Inc. v. Pacific Sewer Maintenance Corp., 739 F.2d 4, 7 (lst Cir. 1984) (motion
under Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(3), but court says motion should be under 12(b)(6)); Polar
Shipping Ltd. v. Oriental Shipping Corp., 680 F.2d 627, 630 (9th Cir. 1982) (Rule 12(b)
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v.
Lecopulos, 553 F.2d 842, 843 (2d Cir. 1977) (motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
incorrectly granted); Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Cos. v. Puerto Rican Forwarding Co., 492
F.2d 1294, 1295 (1st Cir. 1974) (case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction); Richardson
Greenshields Secs., Inc. v. Metz, 566 F. Supp. 131, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (motion to dis-
miss for lack of personal jurisdiction denied); International Ass'n of Bridge Workers Lo-
cal 348 v. Koski Constr. Co., 474 F. Supp. 370, 371 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (mem.) (Rule
12(b)(1) dismissal sought); Matthiessen v. National Trailer Convoy, Inc., 294 F. Supp.
1132, 1134-35 (D. Minn. 1968) (motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction denied).
184. See Bryant Elec. Co. v. City of Fredericksburg, 762 F.2d 1192, 1196 (4th Cir.
1985). But see International Ass'n of Bridge Workers Local 348 v. Koski Constr. Co.,
474 F. Supp. 370, 372 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (mem.) (challenge under Rule 12(b)(1); held that
"Bremen makes clear that the issues before the court involve matters of contract law and
do not necessarily imply any unlawful action by the parties to restrict federal
jurisdiction.").
185. See Hoes of Am., Inc. v. Hoes, 493 F. Supp. 1205 (C.D. Ill. 1979) (court stays
own proceedings to determine whether German court procedures adequate to protect
interests of parties).
186. See, e.g., LFC Lessors, Inc. v. Pacific Sewer Maintenance Corp., 739 F.2d 4, 7
(1st Cir. 1984); Central Contracting Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 367 F.2d 341, 343 (3d
Cir. 1966).
187. See Hunt Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Supreme Oil Co., 817 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1987)
(remand for further proceedings); Transure, Inc. v. Marsh & McLennan, Inc., 766 F.2d
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57
The single greatest source of relief, however, is sought under Rule
12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with reliance on related
venue statutes. 18  Although dismissal for improper venue is requested,
attorneys often alternatively seek transfer to the selected forum.
Whether forum-selection clauses should be enforced pursuant to section
1404(a) or section 1406(a) of 28 U.S.C. is a matter of some controversy
among federal courts." 9 So confusing is this issue that at least one court
1297, 1299 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (request for remand based on forum-selection clause de-
nied); Pelleport Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres, Inc., 741 F.2d 273 (9th Cir.
1984) (removed case remanded to state court); Intermountain Sys. v. Edsall Constr. Co.,
575 F. Supp. 1195 (D. Colo. 1983) (mem.) (removed case remanded to state court); Pub-
lic Water Supply Dist. No. 1 v. American Ins. Co., 471 F. Supp. 1071 (W.D. Mo. 1979)
(removed case remanded to state court). But see Cutter v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 510 F.
Supp. 905 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (motion for transfer or Rule 12(b)(3) dismissal after removal
to federal court); First Nat'l City Bank v. Nanz, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(mem.) (forum-selection clause construed against drafter to permit removal of case to
federal court); Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 326 F. Supp. 121 (N.D. Cal. 1971)
(motion to dismiss or transfer after removal in multidistrict litigation). For a discussion
of the treatment of forum-selection clauses in the removal-remand posture, see infra Part
IV.
188. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) is the defense of improper venue. The related statutory
provisions are 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1982 & Supp. 1988) (change of venue) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1406 (1982) (cure or waiver of defects). See Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys. of Am.,
683 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1982) (forum-selection clause enforced through Rule 12(b)(3) dis-
missal); In re Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 588 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1979) (forum-selection
clause enforced through § 1404(a) transfer); Plum Tree, Inc. v. Stockment, 488 F.2d 754
(3d Cir. 1973) (on petition for writ of mandamus, order transferring action vacatcd);
D'Antuono v. CCH Computax Sys., 570 F. Supp. 708 (D.R.I. 1983) (section 1406 found
to control forum-selection clause, but court dismisses rather than transfers); Leasing
Serv. Corp. v. Broetje, 545 F. Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (forum-selection clause
designating New York found to be unreasonable; action transferred to Eastern District of
Washington); Cutter v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 510 F. Supp. 905 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (motion to
transfer or dismiss); Kline v. Kawai Am. Corp., 498 F. Supp. 868 (D. Minn. 1980) (fo-
rum selection clause unreasonable; action transferred to California); Randolph Eng'g Co.
v. Fredenhagen Kommandit-Gesellschaft, 476 F. Supp. 1355 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (mem.)
(motions to dismiss and transfer denied); Wellmore Coal Corp. v. Gates Learjet Corp.,
475 F. Supp. 1140 (W.D. Va. 1979) (motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, transfer
under § 1406); Taylor v. Titan Midwest Constr. Corp., 474 F. Supp. 145 (N.D. Tex.
1979) (forum-clause enforced; case transferred to designated forum of Missouri); Full-
Sight Contact Lens Corp. v. Soft Lenses, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (section
1404 or § 1406 transfer sought); Brown v. Gingiss Int'l, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D.
Wis. 1973) (motion to transfer granted); Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 326 F. Supp.
121 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (motion to transfer); National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Sanders, 271
F. Supp. 756 (E.D.N.Y. 1967) (transfer requested); Geiger v. Keilani, 270 F. Supp. 761
(E.D. Mich. 1967) (Rule 12 motion treated similarly to § 1404 motion); United States v.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 38 F.R.D. 418 (N.D. Cal. 1965) (motion to dismiss and
transfer under § 1404 or § 1406 denied).
189. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 1406(9) (1982 & Supp. 1988); see, e.g., D'Antuono v.
CCH Computax Sys., 570 F. Supp. 708 (D.R.I. 1983) (extensive discussion whether
§ 1404 or § 1406 applies); Kline v. Kawai Am. Corp., 498 F. Supp. 868 (D. Minn. 1980)
(transfer without ruling on venue); Wellmore Coal Corp. v. Gates Learet Corp., 475 F.
Supp. 1140 (W.D. Va. 1979) (section 1406 transfer); Geiger v. Keilani, 270 F. Supp. 761
(E.D. Mich. 1967) (Rule 12 motion, treated similarly to § 1404(a) motion for transfer);
see also Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note 3, at 137 (articulating the dispute).
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granted a transfer without referring to either statute,19 while another
court granted a transfer simultaneously under both sections19 without
committing to a finding of improper venue.12
This confusion of possible relief is not a trivial problem, as the court in
Hoffman v. Burroughs Corp. 193 correctly noted:
The statutory selection may be more than academic. The statutory
basis for transfer in a diversity of citizenship case may determine what
the applicable law is, including whether the choice of law rules of the
state of the transferee court or the transferor court apply.... That is,
at least in this circuit, the choice of law rules of the transferor court's
state would apply in a section 1404(a) transfer, while the choice of law
rules of the transferee court's state would apply in a section 1406(a)
transfer for improper venue (as long as the transfer is not because of
lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendants). 194
Thus, the court's choice of remedies has a significant effect on the choice-
of-law determination, even without the additional complicating element
of a choice-of-law provision. 195 Finally, some removal cases view re-
mand as appropriate relief in a forum-selection clause challenge, 196 while
other courts resort to a venue transfer under statutory provisions or the
doctrine of forum non conveniens.
19 7
C. Forum-Selection Clauses as Matters of Prorogation and Derogation
The civil law system has long viewed the problem of forum-selection
clauses as a matter of either prorogation or derogation.198 That is, the
prorogation effect of a forum provision is to consent or give jurisdiction
to a particular court that the parties have agreed to in advance. This is
190. See Taylor v. Titan Midwest Constr. Corp., 474 F. Supp. 145, 148-49 (N.D. Tex.
1979).
191. See Kline v. Kawai Am. Corp., 498 F. Supp. 868, 873 n.5 (D. Minn. 1980).
192. See id.
193. 571 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (motion to transfer case to California pursuant
to forum-selection clause contained in license agreements).
194. Id. at 550-51. The court held that transfer was more appropriate under § 1406(a):
"[T]he nature of a motion to enforce a forum selection clause is that venue is wrong in the
first instance,... and a plaintiff should not be allowed to gain an advantage by bringing
suit in the wrong court." Id. at 551; accord D'Antuono v. CCH Computax Sys., 570 F.
Supp. 708, 710 (D.R.I. 1983); Cutter v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 510 F. Supp. 905, 909 (E.D.
Wis. 1981); Full-Sight Contact Lens Corp. v. Soft Lenses, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 71, 74
(S.D.N.Y. 1978). But see In re Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 588 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1979)
(affirming district court's transfer under § 1404(a)); Plum Tree, Inc. v. Stockment, 488
F.2d 754, 756-57 (3d Cir. 1973) (court assumes § 1404(a) governs); Leasing Serv. Corp. v.
Broetje, 545 F. Supp. 362, 369-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (section 1404(a) controls). See gener-
ally J. Friedenthal, M. Kane, & A. Miller, supra note 10, § 2.17, at 87 (discussing forum
non conveniens and transfer); 15 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 16, § 3847, at 235
(discussing standard used to consider transfer).
195. For a discussion of the further complications raised by concurrent governing law
provisions, see infra Part V.
196. See cases cited supra note 187.
197. See cases cited supra note 187.
198. See supra note 17.
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the positive or affirmative effect of a forum-selection clause. Conversely,
the derogation effect of a forum provision is to deprive a particular juris-
diction-holding court of the ability to hear a case, because the parties
chose not to utilize that forum.1 99
American courts do not construe forum-selection clauses theoretically
as prorogation or derogation mechanisms and the civil law terms are
rarely invoked as analytical referents. 2° Consequently, most federal
courts willingly embrace the notion that prorogation agreements present
no problem; it is "the generally accepted rule ... that a court which is
otherwise competent may exercise personal jurisdiction bestowed upon it
by the parties' consent before or after the cause of action accrues." 0'
Because of this uncritical acceptance of the prorogation effect of fo-
rum-selection clauses, courts systematically evade discussion of the due
process dimensions to both personal jurisdiction and choice-of-law deter-
minations.2 °2 Since the court's choice of an appropriate remedy for en-
forcement of a clause may carry with it a choice-of-law rule, the
prorogation effect of such clauses tends to be more weighted than per-
haps contemplated by the parties. Nonetheless, courts universally ap-
prove the prorogation nature of forum-selection clauses without sufficient
regard to the due process concerns implicated in in personam jurisdiction
and choice-of-law, or the public policy determinations inherent in venue
and removal statutes.
A much more serious problem is presented by the negative or deroga-
tion effect of forum provisions. Professor Reese correctly framed this
issue by noting that the essential question with regard to forum-selection
clauses is whether a court "will refuse to entertain a suit brought in viola-
tion of the clause even though they have personal jurisdiction over the
199. See Gilbert, supra note 4, at 5-7; Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note 3,
at 136; Reese, supra note 62, at 187.
200. Although The Bremen does address the concept of court ouster through enforce-
ment of a forum-selection clause, see The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9-
12 (1972), the Court does not discuss the civil law concept of derogation, or the proroga-
tion effect of such clauses. Lower federal court opinions are similarly devoid of this con-
ceptual framework and terminology.
201. Gilbert, supra note 4, at 6 (citing National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375
U.S. 311 (1964) (prior consent); Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938) (consent rendered
after cause of action accrues)).
202. As a mechanism of consensual assent, prorogation agreements are therefore the
flip-side of waiver. It is generally acknowledged that personal jurisdiction is a waivable
right. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694, 702-03 (1982). See generally J. Friedenthal, M. Kane & A. Miller, supra note 10,
§ 3.5, at 104; id. § 3.25, at 181 (discussing jurisdiction based on consent and challenges to
jurisdiction). This uncritical acceptance of waiver of personal jurisdiction ignores due
process notions tied to that right. Cf. Rubin, supra note 6, at 512-28 (discussing unequal
bargaining power, need to openly discuss waiver and need for waiving party to obtain
advantage). Although the received doctrine is that personal jurisdictional requirements
are waivable by consent, the argument here (in agreement with Rubin) is that this should
not be so in the absence of a principled theory of waiver in civil law. These same argu-
ments apply equally to choice-of-law clauses, insofar as choice-of-law is grounded in due
process requirements. For further discussion of this thesis, see infra Part VII.
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defendant."2 3 In essence, then, the derogation effect of such clauses is a
refusal to exercise rightful jurisdiction.
Traditionally, courts viewed derogation as a problem of ouster. Under
the long-standing rule, a court with proper jurisdiction could not be
ousted of its jurisdiction by consent of the parties.2" The non-ouster rule
was effectively and definitively buried by the Supreme Court in The
Bremen, where the Court endorsed the view that forum-selection clauses
did not, after all, oust courts of jurisdiction. Rather, courts construing
such clauses already had jurisdiction; they were merely exercising that
jurisdiction to decline utilizing it.2"5
The Supreme Court's burial of the non-ouster rule, now recited by rote
in the lower federal courts,20 6 represents some fancy, linguistic mumbo-
jumbo that does violence to a common understanding of the English lan-
guage.20 7 In truth, when a court enforces a forum-selection clause it is in
derogation of its own jurisdiction and deprives that court of its ability to
adjudicate the legal claims of the disputing parties. Since forum-selection
clauses are prima facie valid unless proven otherwise,208 the original fo-
rum has, as a practical matter, no choice but to yield its jurisdiction to
the selected forum. Surely, for those courts that view forum-selection
clauses as jurisdictional with the concomitant remedy of dismissal, this
effectively constitutes an ouster of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has
obviated the derogation effect of forum-selection clauses by the smoke-
screen technique of defining the problem out of existence.
Moreover, courts have failed to distinguish between the derogation ef-
fect on subject matter and personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court's
non-ouster formulation cannot mean to imply that potential litigants
may contract away subject matter jurisdiction.209 Equally troubling is
the failure of the courts to countenance the countervailing principle that
203. Reese, supra note 62, at 187.
204. See supra notes 4, 48 and accompanying text.
205. The Bremen Court stated: "The threshold question is whether that court should
have exercised its jurisdiction to do more than give effect to the legitimate expectations of
the parties, manifested in their freely negotiated agreement, by specifically enforcing the
forum clause." The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972).
206. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
207. See Webster's New World Dictionary of The American Language 1039 (College
ed. 1962) ("Oust: to force out; expel; drive out; dispossess; eject.").
208. See supra note 50.
209. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694, 702 (1982) ("no action of the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdicton upon a
federal court. Thus, the consent of the parties is irrelevant, California v. LaRue, 409 U.S.
109 (1972)... and a party does not waive the requirement by failing to challenge jurisdic-
tion early in the proceedings"); see also U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1), 12(g) and 12(h). In The Bremen, the Supreme Court did not address the issue of
consensual conferral of subject matter jurisdiction, although that is precisely what the
parties did: an American company and a German company contractually conferred sub-
ject matter jurisdiction on the London Court of Justice. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-
Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 2 (1972). Lower federal court cases virtually never discuss the
issue of conferral or derogation of subject matter jurisdiction.
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federal courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation.., to exercise thejurisdiction given them. ' 210 In essence, the Supreme Court's construc-
tion of forum-selection clauses renders them a form of abstention theory;
similar to abstention doctrines, the courts exercise their jurisdiction to
decline it,211 although forum-selection situations involve only a geo-
graphical rather than a subject matter jurisdiction declination. Unfortu-
nately, the federalism concerns that underpin abstention theory bear no
relation to the abdication of jurisdiction pursuant to a forum-selection
clause. At least with abstention doctrines, the sacrifice of individual liti-
gation interests is made for the sake of competing federalism values.2 12
No such weighty constitutional values balance the yielding of jurisdiction
to a contractual forum.21 3
III. ERIE IN WONDERLAND: CONSENSUAL ADJUDICATORY
PROCEDURE AND PROBLEMS OF FEDERALISM
Beyond doubt, the most perplexing issue raised by forum-selection
cases for lower federal courts was the Erie issue presented by diversity
jurisdiction: were forum-selection clauses substantive or procedural for
Erie purposes? Should federal courts look to underlying state law to de-
termine the validity and enforceability of such provisions, or were such
clauses merely a matter of federal procedural law? The Bremen, a federal
question case, did not address the Erie issue at all, and consequently the
federal courts split fairly evenly on the great substance-procedure di-
vide.214 Some courts ignored the issue2" 5 or ruled that The Bremen rep-
210. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
(1976) (citing England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415
(1964); McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 281 (1910); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (dictum)). See generally Mullenix, A Branch Too Far: Pruning
the Abstention Doctrine, 75 Geo. L. J. 99, 102 n.10 (1986) (additional cases cited).
211. See Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959);
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 317-18 (1943); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co.,
312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941). See generally Mullenix, supra note 210, at 102-03 and accom-
panying notes (abstention for reasons of judicial economy and administration); 17A C.
Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 4241-4255 (2d ed. 1988) (discuss-
ing abstention and "Our Federalism" doctrines in relation to state and federal courts).
Enforcement of forum-selection clauses and concomitant declination of jurisdiction most
resembles so-called "fourth-branch" or Colorado River abstention, see supra note 210,
where courts abstain for reasons of judicial economy and wise judicial administration.
Forum-selection clause enforcement, in addition to enhancing these prudential values,
also honors the sanctity of contract law over due process protections.
212. See infra note 409 and accompanying text.
213. See supra Part I A.
214. For cases looking to state law to resolve the Erie issue, see Diaz Contracting, Inc.
v. Nanco Contracting Corp., 817 F.2d 1047, 1050 (3d Cir. 1987) (New York law); Farm-
land Indus., Inc. v. Frazier-Parrott Commodities, Inc., 806 F.2d 848, 850-52 (8th Cir.
1986) (Missouri law); General Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d
352, 356-57 (3d Cir. 1986) (Maryland law); Bryant Elec. Co. v. City of Fredericksburg,
762 F.2d 1192, 1196 (4th Cir. 1985) (Virginia law); Colonial Leasing Co. v. Best, 552 F.
Supp. 605, 606-07 (D. Or. 1982) (Missouri and Oregon law); Richardson Eng'g Co. v.
IBM, 554 F. Supp. 467, 470 (D. Vt. 1981) (prediction that Vermont would follow The
1988] CONSENSUAL ADJUDICATORY PROCEDURE 333
resented federal common law;2 16 others waffled, humbly conceding that
forum-selection clauses implicated both substantive contract law and
procedural venue law.217
The Supreme Court definitively answered the Erie question in
Ricoh,218 where it determined that forum selection was a venue matter
and therefore procedural,2 19 through Hanna v. Plumer220 analysis. In so
Bremen), aff'd, 697 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1982); First Nat'l Monetary Corp. v. Chesney, 514
F. Supp. 649, 655-56 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (Michigan statutory provision); Kolendo v. Jer-
ell, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 983, 985 (S.D. W. Va. 1980) (mem.) (West Virginia law);
Leasewell, Ltd. v. Jake Shelton Ford, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 1011, 1014 (S.D. W. Va. 1976)
(mem.) (West Virginia conflicts rules); Davis v. Pro Basketball, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 1, 3
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (New York law).
For cases construing forum-selection clauses as a matter of federal procedural venue
law see, e.g., Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1067 (11th Cir. 1987) (en
bane) (per curiam), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988); Visicorp v. Software Arts, Inc., 575 F.
Supp. 1528, 1531-32 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Northeast Theatre Corp. v. Edie & Ely Landau,
Inc., 563 F. Supp. 833, 834-35 (D. Mass. 1983); Dick Proctor Imports, Inc. v. Sumitomo
Corp. of Am., 486 F. Supp. 815, 818 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
215. See Andrews v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 771 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 1985) (no Erie
analysis, thus ignored by implication); Carefree Vacations, Inc. v. Brunner, 615 F. Supp.
211 (W.D. Tenn. 1985) (same); Richardson Greenshields Secs., Inc. v. Metz, 566 F.
Supp. 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (same).
216. See Patten Sec. Corp. v. Diamond Greyhound & Genetics, Inc., 819 F.2d 400,
406-07 (3d Cir. 1987); Sun World Lines, Ltd. v. March Shipping Corp., 801 F.2d 1066,
1068-69 (8th Cir. 1986); Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d
190, 201 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983); Hoffman v. Burroughs Corp., 571 F.
Supp. 545, 548 (N.D. Tex. 1982); C. Pappas Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 565 F. Supp.
1015, 1017 (D. Mass. 1983); Kline v. Kawai Am. Corp., 498 F. Supp. 868, 871 (D. Minn.
1980); Taylor v. Titan Midwest Constr. Corp., 474 F. Supp. 145, 147-48 (N.D. Tex.
1979).
217. See, e.g., Nascone v. Spudnuts, Inc., 735 F.2d 763, 773-74 (3d Cir. 1984) (bizarre
Erie argument by plaintiff that in absence of Utah law, court should look to law of Utah's
neighboring states of Missouri and Texas to reject enforceability); Central Contracting
Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 367 F.2d 341, 344 (3d Cir. 1966) (Erie issue not resolved
because federal and state law viewed as the same); Wellmore Coal Corp. v. Gates Learjet
Corp., 475 F. Supp. 1140, 1143 (W.D. Va. 1979) (same); Cruise v. Castleton, Inc., 449 F.
Supp. 564, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (same); Matthiessen v. National Trailer Convoy, Inc.,
294 F. Supp. 1132, 1134 n.3 (D. Minn. 1968) (same); Geiger v. Keilani, 270 F. Supp. 761,
765 (E.D. Mich. 1967) ("While it would probably be possible to write at length about
whether a federal court in a diversity case should apply state law in resolving the question
at hand, such a discussion would be of only academic significance .... "); see also An-
drews v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 771 F.2d 184, 187-88 (7th Cir. 1985) (no Erie analy-
sis); Carefree Vacations, Inc. v. Brunner, 615 F. Supp. 211, 213 (W.D. Tenn. 1985)
(same); Richardson Greenshields Secs., Inc. v. Metz, 566 F. Supp. 131, 133 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (contractual forum clauses upheld "unless they suffer from some sort of contract
invalidity or unless they are unreasonable"). See generally Gruson, supra note 3, at 153-
56 (discussing case law holding that forum selection clauses implicate contract and proce-
dural law); Maier, supra note 20, at 396-98 (all reasonable agreements to arbitrate as well
as selection of forum in international commercial contracts will be enforced in federal
courts); Reese, supra note 5, at 539 (discussing need to deny effect to choice-of-law
clauses when deference to state law is appropriate).
218. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988).
219. See id. at 2243-44; see also Red Bull Assoc. v. Best Western Int'l Inc., 862 F.2d
963, 966-67 (2d Cir. 1988) (broadly interpreting Ricoh as applicable to civil rights cases).
220. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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concluding, the Court altogether missed The Bremen boat. The Court
not only evaded discussion of the validity and enforceability of forum-
selection clauses, but it largely ignored the implications of the choice-of-
law provision. Moreover, the Court left unresolved whether there exists,
under The Bremen, a federal common law of consensual adjudicatory
procedure.
A. Stewart v. Ricoh as the Paradigmatic Forum-Selection Case
The Supreme Court's opinion in Ricoh is disappointing precisely be-
cause it presented to the Court, for the first time, a paradigmatic illustra-
tion of the forum-selection clause cases now so prevalent on lower federal
court dockets. Notwithstanding this excellent factual context, the Court
elected to frame and answer a subtly altered issue of its own choosing.
Framing the issue as a venue-transfer problem clearly answered the Erie
dilemma, because it followed ineluctably that venue would be deemed
procedural for Erie purposes.221
The facts in Ricoh suggest some problems that the Court ignored in
reaching its conclusion. Stewart Organization ("Stewart"), a closely-
held Birmingham, Alabama corporation, negotiated with Ricoh Corpo-
ration ("Ricoh") to become a Ricoh copying machine dealer in central
Alabama. Ricoh is a nationwide manufacturer with headquarters in
New Jersey and substantial corporate operations in New York City. Af-
ter negotiations, Ricoh gave Stewart a printed dealership agreement but
Stewart did not read paragraph 18.1 which contained both a choice-of-
forum and a choice-of-law provision.222 The contract specified that the
agreement would be governed by New York law and that "any appropri-
ate state or federal district court located in the Borough of Manhattan,
New York City" would have exclusive jurisdiction over a case or contro-
versy arising in connection with the contract.223
Business relations between Stewart and Ricoh deteriorated and in Sep-
221. The Court did not view the Ricoh situation as involving a "relatively unguided
Erie choice." Ricoh, 108 S. Ct. at 2242 (quoting Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471). Rather, it
clung to the narrowest possible Erie construct: "Our cases indicate that when the federal
law sought to be applied is a congressional statute, the first and chief question for the
District Court's determination is whether the statute is 'sufficiently broad to control the
issue before the Court.'" Id. at 2242 (citing Burlington Northern R.R. v. Woods, 480
U.S. 1 (1987); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1980)); see Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965). The Court so determined that 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
covered the point in dispute and resolved the case on straightforward Hanna analysis.
See generally J. Friendenthal, M. Kane, & A. Miller, supra note 10, § 4.4, at 208-10
(outlining Hanna analysis for determining applicability of particular federal practice).
222. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 779 F.2d 643, 644-45, vacated, 785 F.2d
896 (1986), rev'd, 810 F.2d 1066 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (en bane) (per curiam), aff'd, 108 S. Ct.
2239 (1988). A slightly different version of the facts is reported in theper curiam rehear-
ing opinion. See 810 F.2d at 1067 (failing to make reference to boilerplate nature of
contract; "take-it-or-leave-it" offer; and failure to notice or read forum and choice-of-law
provisions).
223. Ricoh, 779 F.2d at 645 n.2.
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tember 1984 Stewart filed a complaint in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama, alleging breach of contract, breach
of warranty, fraud and federal antitrust violations.224 The action was
based on both diversity and federal question jurisdiction.22 Ricoh's at-
torneys filed motions to dismiss as well as to transfer, based on improper
venue and inconvenient forum.226 These motions were predicated on the
contract's forum-selection clause.
Ricoh was argued three times before it reached the Supreme Court.227
In the first instance the district court held that state law governed the
validity and enforceability of such clauses, and because Alabama law
deemed such provisions as contrary to public policy, the federal court
could not enforce the forum clause.228 Moreover, since the complaint
raised multiple claims not countenanced by the contract provision, a
court-ordered transfer would sever the case. 229 The Eleventh Circuit re-
versed, holding that the issue involved venue transfer, which was gov-
erned by federal procedural law in a diversity action.23 0 The appellate
court remanded to the district court with the instruction to transfer the
case to the Southern District of New York.231 On a rehearing en banc,
an Eleventh Circuit majority reaffirmed that venue was a matter of fed-
eral procedural law and applied The Bremen standards to conclude that
224. See id. at 645.
225. Diversity of citizenship was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982); federal question
jurisdiction was based on antitrust claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982). Neither the
district court nor the Court of Appeals addressed how the federal question issue would
affect the case. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1067-68 (11th Cir.
1987) (en banc) (per curiam), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988). In its affirmance of Ricoh,
the Supreme Court declared that it would not make a difference:
Our conclusion that federal law governs transfer of this case . makes this
issue academic... because the presence of a federal question could cut only in
favor of the application of federal law. We therefore are not called on to decide,
nor do we decide, whether the existence of federal question as well as diversity
jurisdiction necessarily alters a District Court's analysis of applicable law.
108 S. Ct. at 2242 n.3. The Supreme Court thus evaded the crucial Bremen question,
because The Bremen was based on federal question jurisdiction. This suggests, then, that
The Bremen is federal common law of contract, while forum clauses in diversity cases are
procedurally venue-conferring.
226. See Ricoh, 779 F.2d at 645. For this scatter-shot approach to possible remedies,
see supra Part II B.
227. See Ricoh, No. 84-AR-2460-S (N.D. Ala. Jan. 29, 1985), rev'd, 779 F.2d 643,
vacated, 785 F.2d 896 (1986), rev'd, 810 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1987) (en bane) (per
curiam), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988).
228. See Ricoh, 779 F.2d at 645.
229. See id. The issue of transfer causing severance, central to many forum-selection
clause cases, would disappear in subsequent consideration of the case. It remains an
unresolved and troubling issue, for arguably litigants may not know that such clauses will
also govern non-contract causes of action, nor may they have contemplated this at the
time of negotiation and signing.
230. See Ricoh, 779 F.2d at 648. But see Ricoh, 810 F.2d 1066, 1068 (11th Cir. 1987)
(en banc) (per curiam) ("we hold that venue in a diversity case is manifestly within the
province of federal law"), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988).
231. See Ricoh, 779 F.2d at 651.
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"the choice of forum clause in this contract is in all respects enforceable
generally as a matter of federal law." '32
On the facts, Ricoh entailed many typical features of federal forum-
selection cases. It involved two fairly sophisticated businessmen negoti-
ating a commercial contract. One party was a nationwide manufacturer
and distributor, the other a small, local entrepreneur. Although the
commercial arrangement was negotiated, the weaker party was presented
with an essentially boilerplate contract and the admonishment that the
parent corporation did not permit substantive changes.2 33 The agree-
ment contained both a forum-selection clause and a choice-of-law provi-
sion favorable to the parent corporation. When the disgruntled plaintiff
sought relief in its home federal forum, the defendant sought enforce-
ment of the clause and transfer to its more favorable forum, the contrac-
tual one.
B. Ricoh: The Supreme Court Punts
Notwithstanding this rather forthright presentation of the validity and
enforceability of forum-selection clauses, the Supreme Court evaded the
central contract issue raised by The Bremen and instead chose to recast
the case as a venue transfer problem. The Court did this deliberately,
stating "[a]t the outset we underscore a methodological difference in our
approach to the question from that taken by the Court of Appeals., 234
Rather, the Court framed the issue narrowly as "whether § 1404(a) itself
controls [the defendant's] request to give effect to the parties' contractual
choice of venue and transfer. '2 35
The Court incorrectly cast Ricoh as a venue-transfer problem. Instead
of asking the threshold question, whether the dispute involved contract
law or venue law, the Court instead asked whether a federal statute cov-
ered the point in dispute. The obvious answer to this question-28
U.S.C. section 1404-led to the plodding, unsurprising Erie conclusion
that federal venue law must control in diversity cases.2 36
232. Ricoh, 810 F.2d at 1071.
233. See Ricoh, 779 F.2d at 644-45.
234. Ricoh, 108 S. Ct. at 2243.
235. Id. The Court noted that "[t]he parties do not dispute that the District Court
properly denied the motion to dismiss the case for improper venue under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1406(a) because respondent apparently does business in the Northern District of Ala-
bama." Id. at n.8. Therefore, because Ricoh came to the Court in a 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
posture, the Court also avoided resolving the issue of the appropriate transfer provision in
forum-selection cases where venue is improper, an issue which has generated much heat
but little light among the lower federal courts. See discussion supra Part II B; supra notes
188-92. This represents another missed opportunity by the Court, and has left the issue
unresolved. Needless to say, the Court also failed to comment on resultant choice-of-law
implications.
236. Ricoh, 108 S. Ct. at 2243-45. The Court's narrowest reading of Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460 (1965), moved the Court also to conclude: "Because a validly enacted Act of
Congress controls the issue in dispute, we have no occasion to evaluate the impact of
application of federal judge-made law on the 'twin aims' that animate the Erie doctrine."
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The Court missed a number of nagging problems and side-stepped the
interesting issues raised by concurrent federal question jurisdiction in the
lawsuit. 237 The Court largely ignored contrary Alabama policy with re-
gard to forum-selection clauses, noting that its section 1404 analysis
"makes it unnecessary to address the contours of state law."' z3' The
Court altogether disregarded the simultaneous effect of the choice-of-law
provision and offered no guidance as to controlling law after the ordered
transfer.2 39 The Court made no reference to transferability of the entire
case, including the non-contract claims. 2 ° In addition, the Court made
no attempt at The Bremen analysis, dismissing that case as largely irrele-
vant to its endeavor.241 Instead, it infused section 1404(a) transfer deter-
minations with a patchwork collection of factors sounding in The
Bremen elements, 242 forum non conveniens principles, and federal "dis-
cretionary mode of operation" 243 "in the interest of justice."'z2 "
C. Ricoh: The Weary Erie Aftermath
Justice Scalia, dissenting in Ricoh, correctly identified the heart of the
problem that the Court's majority missed: "[T]he Court's description of
the issue begs the question: what law governs whether the forum-selec-
tion clause is a valid or invalid allocation of any inconvenience between
Ricoh, 108 S. Ct. at 2245 n.11. Justice Scalia attacked this extremely narrow Hanna
approach. See id. at 2245-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
237. See supra note 225.
238. Ricoh, 108 S. Ct. at 2244 n.9. This was the basis for the district court's refusal to
enforce the clause, and is the basis for similar refusal by other courts. For cases applying
state law to determine validity and enforceability under the Erie doctrine, see supra note
214.
239. The Supreme Court simply did not mention this issue. In the first Eleventh Cir-
cuit appeal, the court took notice, but rejected, that the case initially should be deter-
mined by substantive conflicts rules under Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S.
487 (1941). See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 779 F.2d 643, 647 n.8, vacated, 785
F.2d 896 (1986), rev'd, 810 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (per curiam), aff'd, 108
S. Ct. 2239 (1988). The Ricoh court declared that the "issue in this case, however, is not
the legitimacy of a choice of law clause. Both states permit such clauses. Rather we are
asked to enforce a choice of forum clause." Ricoh, 779 F.2d at 647 n.8 (emphasis in
original). Although the Eleventh Circuit and the Supreme Court ignored the choice-of-
law issue, other federal courts have thought Klaxon pertinent. See, e.g., Instrumentation
Assoc., Inc. v. Madsen Elec. Ltd., 859 F.2d 4, 8 (3d Cir. 1988); General Eng'g Corp. v.
Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d 352, 357 n.4 (3d Cir. 1986); Snider v. Lone Star
Art Trading Co., 672 F. Supp. 977, 982 (E.D. Mich. 1987). For a discussion of the
complications arising from concurrent choice-of-law provisions, see infra Part V.
240. See supra note 229.
241. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2239, 2243 (1988). Analysis of
The Bremen factors for validity and enforceability was the centerpiece of Eleventh Circuit
interpretation of the case. See Ricoh, 810 F.2d 1066, 1069-71 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (en banc)
(per curiam), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988). Perhaps the Supreme Court did not wish to
be backed into the corner of acknowledging a federal common law of contract principles
under The Bremen; its narrow § 1404 holding avoids this result.
242. See infra Part I A.
243. Ricoh, 108 S. Ct. at 2244.
244. Id.
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the parties."245 As Justice Scalia ably argued, recasting the initial Erie
question compelled a quite different Erie result.246
The majority opinion in Ricoh leaves a number of distressing problems
and legal anomalies in its aftermath. For example, in diversity jurisdic-
tion cases, the Supreme Court has now suggested that forum-selection
clauses are basically venue matters governed by federal procedural law,
at least when the issue is raised on a section 1404(a) transfer motion. On
the narrowest possible reading of this holding, Ricoh leaves unsettled the
Erie resolution of jurisdictional challenges, section 1406 transfers, Rule
12(b)(6) dismissals, or removal-remand situations.247 On the broadest
possible reading of Ricoh's holding, all forum-selection clause challenges
in diversity cases are procedural, thereby creating a federal common-law
rule on the validity of forum-selection clauses, albeit through back-door
rulemaking.248
Making matters worse, the Court also has engendered further concep-
tual anomalies. In federal-question cases, The Bremen remains a federal
common law rule for the enforceability of forum-selection clauses.2 49 In
this domain, such clauses are viewed primarily as jurisdictional and con-
tractual. Either the clauses are procedurally venue-conferring, or they
are substantively-contractual.
It is unsettling for the Supreme Court to have one conclusion for fed-
eral question cases and another for diversity suits. In addition, the
Supreme Court now has a set of principles that deems forum-selection
clauses procedural, but choice-of-law provisions substantive for Erie
analysis.250 It is hard to imagine that these Erie rules for forum and
choice-of-law provisions are in fact conducive to the values of predict-
ability, certainty, security, stability and simplicity. If lawyers and judges
cannot figure this out, it is unfair to assume that the proverbial sophisti-
245. Id. at 2246 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
246. Justice Scalia argued:
Section 1404(a) is simply a venue provision that nowhere mentions contracts or
agreements, much less that the validity of certain contracts or agreements will
be matters of federal law. It is difficult to believe that state contract law was
meant to be pre-empted by this provision that we have said "should be regarded
as a federal judicial housekeeping measure."
Id. at 2247 (citation omitted).
247. Ricoh only supplies an analysis based on 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) transfer. Yet liti-
gants often challenge the clauses, or seek enforcement, under many other procedural pro-
visions and forms of relief. See supra Parts II A-B.
248. Justice Scalia objected to this creation of a federal common law of contracts:
[W]hatever the scope of the federal courts' authority to create federal common
law in other areas, it is plain that the mere fact that petitioner here brought an
antitrust claim... does not empower the federal courts to make common law
on the question of the validity of the forum-selection clause.
Ricoh, 108 S. Ct. at 2248 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Maier, supra note 20 (generally
favorable to the development of a federal common law of contract principles in this area).
249. See supra Part I A.
250. See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
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cated businessman, let alone the lay amateur, can make an intelligent
waiver of litigation rights.
IV. FURTHER ADVENTURES IN FEDERALISM: CONSENSUAL
ADJUDICATORY PROCEDURE AND REMOVAL DOCTRINE
One of the many peculiarities fostered by an inadequately developed
theory of consensual procedure is the courts' idiosyncratic view of fo-
rum-selection clauses in the federal removal context.251 If litigants ini-
tially sue in federal court and raise a forum-selection clause issue, there is
an exceedingly high probability that the court will validate the contrac-
tual forum provision and grant a dismissal or venue transfer.252 On the
other hand, if litigation is first instituted in state court and the defendant
removes the case to federal court, there is an equally high probability
that the federal court will not enforce the forum clause so as to order a
remand of the litigation to state court.253 Thus, the distinct trend is that
federal courts jealously guard their removal jurisdiction far more than
their original jurisdiction. Moreover, the cases suggest that it is easier for
a litigant to waive federal court jurisdiction and venue than to waive the
removal right.
The removal cases present three interesting theoretical problems that
challenge the received doctrine of consensual procedure. The first is de-
termining what law governs the federal court's construction of a forum-
selection clause on a remand motion. The second is whether a forum-
selection clause provides an independent ground for remand and whether
such a determination is appealable under federal removal provisions. 4
251. Removal to federal court and remand to state court is governed by 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1441, 1445-1447 (1982), as amended by H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 4087, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1988). For a discussion of general principles relating to removal, see J.
Friedenthal, M. Kane & A. Miller, supra note 10, § 2.11; 14A C. Wright & A. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 3721-23 (2d ed. 1985).
252. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
253. See Transure, Inc. v. Marsh & McLennan, Inc., 766 F.2d 1297, 1299 n.1 (9th Cir.
1985) (rejecting remand based on forum-selection clause); Proyecfin de Venezuela, S.A. v.
Banco Industrial de Venezuela, S.A., 760 F.2d 390, 397 (2d Cir. 1985) (forum-selection
clause does not constitute waiver of right to removal from state to federal court); Cutter
v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 510 F. Supp. 905, 909 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (forum-selection clause
designating Ohio not enforced on removal); Lulling v. Barnaby's Family Inns, Inc., 482
F. Supp. 318, 320 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (forum-selection clause not enforced on removal);
International Ass'n of Bridge Workers Local 348 v. Koski Constr. Co., 474 F. Supp. 370,
372 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (mem.) (forum-selection clause not enforced and removal permit-
ted); First Nat'l City Bank v. Nanz, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 184, 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (mem.)
(forum clause construed against drafter to permit removal to federal court); cf. Pelleport
Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres, Inc., 741 F.2d 273, 280-81 (9th Cir. 1984)
(remanded to state court; forum clause enforceable if not violative of public policy); Inter-
mountain Sys. v. Edsall Constr. Co., 575 F. Supp. 1195, 1198 (D. Colo. 1983) (mem.)
(remand to state court to enforce forum clause); Public Water Supply Dist. No. 1 v.
American Ins. Co., 471 F. Supp. 1071, 1072 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (remand to state court to
enforce forum clause in forum in which contract was to be performed).
254. Title 28, § 1447(d) of the United States Code provides: "An order remanding a
case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or other-
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The third concerns how public policy should inform removal jurisdiction
and whether these considerations are any different from the public policy
notions that underlie federal jurisdiction or venue.
A. Forum-Selection Clauses and Applicable Law on a Removal-
Remand Motion
When a defendant removes a lawsuit from state court to federal dis-
trict court, the removal statutes, until recent amendment, specified that
the case may be remanded "[i]f... it appears that the case was removed
improvidently and without jurisdiction." '255 Thus, a petitioner seeking
remand based on forum-selection clause enforcement must fulfill this re-
quirement and wrestle the jurisdictional conundrum. Hence, a plaintiff's
attorney must argue that the federal court had jurisdiction to determine
the enforceability of the forum clause in order to decline its jurisdiction
and remand to state court. This argument has been made successfully
only once.256
This theory is consistent with The Bremen's pronouncement that fo-
rum-selection clauses do not effect an ouster of federal court jurisdic-
tion.257  Yet, without exception, the forum-selection clause cases
removed to federal court are removed there on the basis of diversity juris-
diction.258 In that posture, then, construction of the validity and en-
forceability of the clauses raises an Erie issue: on removal in diversity
cases, are forum-selection clauses substantive or procedural?
One court that grappled with this issue determined that The Bremen
contract principles governed the remand determination. Typical of
many federal courts, the Ninth Circuit in Pelleport Investors v. Budco
wise.... ." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1982). Although remand orders are generally unappeal-
able, a sizable body of case law has developed a "collateral order" exception for forum
clause cases. There is currently a split among the circuit courts concerning reviewability.
The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari to resolve this issue. See Chasser v.
Achille Lauro Lines, 844 F.2d 50 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 217 (1988). For a
discussion of the appealability of remand decisions, see infra Part IV B.
255. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982). The removal statute was recently amended to pro-
vide that the case may be remanded "[i]f. . . it appears that the district court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982), as amended by H.R. Conf. Rep.
No. 4087, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). The cases in this discussion, however, were
decided before deletion of the "removed improvidently" language.
256. See Public Water Supply Dist. No. 1 v. American Ins. Co., 471 F. Supp. 1071,
1072-73 (W.D. Mo. 1979); cf. Pelleport Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres, Inc.,
741 F.2d 273, 278 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Here too, the sole purpose of the remand is to surren-
der jurisdiction to the state court.").
257. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972).
258. See, e.g., Transure, Inc. v. Marsh & McLennan, Inc., 766 F.2d 1297, 1298 (9th
Cir. 1985); Pelleport Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres, Inc., 741 F.2d 273, 275
(9th Cir. 1984); Intermountain Sys. v. Edsall Constr. Co., 575 F. Supp. 1195, 1197 (D.
Colo. 1983) (mem.); Lulling v. Barnaby's Family Inns, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 318, 319 (E.D.
Wis. 1980); Public Water Supply Dist. No. 1 v. American Ins. Co., 471 F. Supp. 1071,
1073 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
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Quality Theatres 59 uncritically opined that it could not see the "reason
why the principles announced in The Bremen are not equally applicable
to the domestic context. ' '2 1 Moreover, the court noted that in order to
reach the contract issue, it had to have subject matter jurisdiction. With
subject matter established on tenuous diversity grounds, 261 the court "or-
dered the case remanded to state court after it found the parties' agree-
ment to litigate in state court enforceable. Not only did the court's
determination that the forum selection clause was valid and enforceable
precede the remand order, it formed the basis of that order. 12 62
Similarly, most federal courts that have construed forum-selection
clauses on a remand motion have applied The Bremen federal common
law contract principles in diversity cases.263 The question, of course, is
how to reconcile this with the Court's pronouncement that venue trans-
fer motions implicating forum-selection clauses are procedural for Erie
purposes. 2" In Ricoh, it seems, the validity of the transfer preceded-if
not precluded-any inquiry regarding validity of the forum-selection
clause.
This analytical inconsistency encourages interesting forum-shopping
possibilities.265 It is most favorable to litigants seeking enforcement of
forum-selection provisions to sue or to be sued initially in federal court
on the basis of a federal question.266 Litigants seeking to avoid the re-
259. 741 F.2d 273 (9th Cir. 1984).
260. Id. at 279.
261. The plaintiff Pelleport based its remand motion, in part, on the theory that the
court lacked proper subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982) (diversity
statute) because of the inclusion of Doe defendants. The court rejected this challenge,
stating the inclusion of Doe defendants did not defeat diversity. See Pelleport, 741 F.2d
at 278-79.
262. See Pelleport, 741 F.2d at 277 (affirming the district court's order of remand).
263. See, e.g., Pelleport Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres, Inc., 741 F.2d 273,
279-81 (9th Cir. 1984); Intermountain Sys. v. Edsall Constr. Co., 575 F. Supp. 1195,
1197-98 (D. Colo. 1983) (mem.); Cutter v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 510 F. Supp. 905, 907-09
(E.D. Wis. 1981); Lulling v. Barnaby's Family Inns, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 318, 320-21 (E.D.
Wis. 1980); Public Water Supply Dist. No. I v. American Ins. Co., 471 F. Supp. 1071,
1072-73 (W.D. Mo. 1979); cf International Ass'n of Bridge Workers Local 348 v. Koski
Constr. Co., 474 F. Supp. 370, 371-72 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (mem.) (acknowledging The
Bremen, but distinguishing mandatory and non-mandatory clauses); First Nat'l City
Bank v. Nanz, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 184, 186-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (mem.) (same).
264. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 (1988); supra Part III
B.
265. "Forum shopping" was one of the evils that the Erie doctrine was supposed to
cure, and under the expanded Hanna v. Plumer analysis, one of the tests for determining
whether to apply federal law. Because the Supreme Court adopted the narrowest possible
Hanna approach, see supra Part III B, it determined that it had no occasion to evaluate
the impact of the application of federal judge-made law on the "twin aims" that animate
the Erie doctrine. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). In Hanna the Court
found that the two policies underlying the Erie doctrine were the "discouragement of
forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws." Id. See gener-
ally 19 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 4503 (1982) (discussing
facts and reasoning in Erie).
266. In this instance the court will most likely apply The Bremen factors for validity
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striction of a forum-selection clause, however, are best advised to sue in
state courts where public policy invalidates such clauses, or to remove
the case to federal court. Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Ricoh,
speculated:
With respect to forum-selection clauses, in a State with law unfavora-
ble to validity, plaintiffs who seek to avoid the effect of a clause will be
encouraged to sue in state court, and non-resident defendants will be
encouraged to shop for more favorable law by removing to federal
CoUrt.
2 67
This assertion assumes that federal courts, on removal, are more likely to
enforce forum-selection clauses. The opposite seems to be the case.
Since most federal courts in removal cases apply either state contract law
or general Bremen contract principles, the removal defendant seeking to
enforce a state-based contract clause runs a greater risk of non-enforce-
ment. 26  Conversely, the removal defendant seeking to evade a forum-
selection clause has a higher probability of success by removing to federal
court.
B. Forum-Selection Clauses as an Independent Ground for Remand
It is a cardinal rule of judicial decision-making that federal courts
under their article III authority do not have the power to make state
law.26 9 Although federal courts do have the authority to fashion proce-
dural rules governing their own affairs, this power does not include the
power to extend or expand the jurisdiction or venue of the federal
courts.270 With specific regard to removal jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court has pronounced that district courts may not remand cases "on
grounds not specified in the statute and not touching the propriety of the
removal." 2 7 ' Finally, federal court remand orders, by statute, are gener-
and enforceability, since The Bremen itself was a federal question case. If the lawsuit is
based on diversity jurisdiction, the court is likely to apply either federal procedural rules
of venue and transfer, or federalized Bremen contract principles. Only in rare instances
will courts look to contrary state contract law to invalidate a clause. See supra Parts I A,
II B-C.
267. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2239, 2249 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
268. See supra notes 253, 263 and accompanying text.
269. The Court in Erie stated the rule:
There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to declare
substantive rules of common law applicable in a State whether they be local in
their nature or "general," be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts.
And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the
federal courts.
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
270. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 82-83; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2072 (1982).
271. Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 352 (1976) (district
court may not remand after removal except for grounds authorized in removal statute;
crowded federal docket not an authorized ground); see also Ryan v. State Bd. of Elec-
tions, 661 F.2d 1130, 1133-34 (7th Cir. 1981) (properly removed case may not be re-
manded as a form of abstention). See generally Mullenix, supra note 210, at 155-56
[Vol. 57
1988] CONSENSUAL ADJUDICATORY PR OCED URE 343
ally not reviewable.2 72
The appealability of remand decisions relating to forum-selection
clauses logically arises either when remand is denied or when remand is
ordered. When remand is denied, courts generally agree that an order
denying a motion to enforce a forum-selection clause is reviewable as a
collateral final order under 28 U.S.C § 129 1.273 When remand is or-
dered, appealability raises an analytical inconsistency since the primary
ground for appeal is lack of jurisdiction.274 Yet the theory of consensual
adjudicatory procedure posits that the forum must have jurisdiction in
order to decline it in preference to the contractual forum. Therefore the
"lack of jurisdiction" ground cannot logically form the basis for appeal
of a remand order.
In order to circumvent this conundrum, the Ninth Circuit reasoned
that "[t]he confusion appears to be generated by the label of remand. '275
Thus, the problem of non-reviewability under section 1447(d) disap-
peared magically: "Once the fact of remand is separated from the reason
for its issuance,... it becomes clear that the district court did not merely
remand this case to the state court; it reached a substantive decision on
the merits apart from any jurisdictional decision. ' 276 Since the district
court had made an essentially substantive determination on the merits of
a contract dispute, the defendant was entitled to a review of this decision.
In avoiding the section 1447(d) prohibition, the Ninth Circuit clearly
cast the forum-selection issue as a matter of substantive contract law,
albeit in a diversity posture.
(remand for abstention after case is properly removed to federal court is not authorized
by removal statutes and undermines basis for removal).
272. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1982).
273. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982) (final decisions of district courts).
274. See Chasser v. Achille Lauro Lines, 844 F.2d 50, 53 (2d Cir.), cert granted, 109 S.
Ct. 217 (1988); Diaz Contracting, Inc. v. Nanco Contracting Corp., 817 F.2d 1047, 1048
(3d Cir. 1987); General Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d 352,
355-56 (3d Cir. 1986); Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d 190,
193-201 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983); cf. Patten Sec. Corp. v. Diamond
Greyhound & Genetics, Inc., 819 F.2d 400, 403-04 (3d Cir. 1987) (order denying motion
to compel discontinuation of arbitration not immediately reviewable). But see Louisiana
Ice Cream Distribs., Inc. v. Carvel Corp., 821 F.2d 1031, 1033 (5th Cir. 1987) (denial of
motion to dismiss for improper venue not immediately appealable); Nascone v. Spudnuts,
Inc., 735 F.2d 763, 764 (3d Cir. 1984) (transfer order based on forum-selection clause not
immediately appealable as collateral final order); Rohrer, Hibler & Replogle, Inc. v. Per-
kins, 728 F.2d 860, 861-62 (7th Cir.) (per curiam) (no immediate appeal of denial of
remand to state court, predicated on forum-selection clause specifying Illinois state
court), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 890 (1984).
275. Pelleport Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres, Inc., 741 F.2d 273, 276 (9th
Cir. 1984) (remand order based on enforceability of forum-selection clause is reviewable
under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) and as a collaterally final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291).
276. Id.
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C. Forum-Selection Clauses and Removal as a Public Policy Exception
to Enforceability
While courts easily subscribe to the doctrine of waiver of personal ju-
risdiction and venue, the courts have been more hesitant to embrace a
notion of removal waiver.177 Oddly, unlike personal jurisdiction and
venue, removal is viewed as a party's right, even though all these proce-
dural functions are statutorily-based. 78 For whatever reasons, courts
have been somewhat more willing to recognize The Bremen's public pol-
icy restriction on forum-clause enforceability2 79 when the issue arises in
the removal context.
Removal jurisdiction represents a congressionally mandated public
policy to insulate non-resident defendants from the potential biases that
might attend state court litigation. s0 Hence, removal effects this public
policy by permitting the defendant to move the lawsuit to a presumably
277. One commentator has stated:
The right of removal may be lost or waived, but the courts are slow to find such
a waiver, even where the defendant had taken action in state court prior to
seeking removal. An old case seemed to say that a contract stipulating that the
parties would not remove cases to federal court would be invalid, but the mod-
em view is that such a contract is a valid waiver of the right to remove unless
the contract is unreasonable or procured by duress.
C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts § 38, at 218-19 (4th ed. 1983) (footnotes omitted); see
id. at nn.55-57 (extensive citation of cases in support). Professor Wright supports his
statement of the modem view with citation to Wm. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish Am.
Line Ltd., 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955). It should be noted
that Muller itself was not a removal case nor did it involve a contract restricting or waiv-
ing the right to removal. In addition, Muller was overruled in Indussa Corp. v. S.S.
Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967). Most commentators generally do mark the Sec-
ond Circuit Muller decision as the beginning of the modem trend, but its Supreme Court
imprimatur is given in The Bremen. Notwithstanding The Bremen and the modem
trend, however, the federal courts do remain hesitant about the ability to waive the re-
moval right as a consequence of a forum-selection clause. See, e.g., Proyecfin de Vene-
zuela, S.A. v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela, S.A., 760 F.2d 390, 396-97 (2d Cir. 1985);
International Ass'n of Bridge Workers Local 348 v. Koski Constr. Co., 474 F. Supp. 370,
372-73 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (mem.); First Nat'l City Bank v. Nanz, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 184,
186 & n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (mem.).
278. Removal jurisdiction is based in 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982 & Supp. 1988), as
amended by H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 4087, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), venue is based in 28
U.S.C. § 1391 (1982 & Supp. 1988), as amended by H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 4087, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), and personal jurisdiction in federal court is established by refer-
ence to state long-arm requirements and the fourteenth or fifth amendment due process
clauses. See Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97 (1987); Arrowsmith
v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963). See generally J. Friedenthal, M. Kane
& A. Miller, supra note 10, § 3.18, at 162-64 (discussing Second Circuit's jurisdictional
analysis in Arrowsmith); 4A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 1112, at 227-34 (2d ed. 1987) (analyzing federal rules dealing with service of process
pursuant to state law).
279. See, e.g., Cutter v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 510 F. Supp. 905 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (Wis-
consin public policy overrides forum-selection clause designating Ohio forum); Lulling v.
Bamaby's Family Inns, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (forum-selection clause
designating Illinois not enforced in action pursuant to Wisconsin franchise investment
law).
280. See J. Friedenthal, M. Kane & A. Miller, supra note 10, § 2.11, at 57.
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less-biased federal forum. Enforcement of a forum-selection clause speci-
fying state court jurisdiction under these circumstances would defeat the
public policy goals of the removal statute.2 81 Although this is a compel-
ling theory, other similar public policy arguments have largely failed in
forum-selection clause cases.28 2 In removal cases, federal courts have re-
tained jurisdiction in any instance where the contract clause was vague,
ambiguous, or provided for potential dual forums.28 3
In one instance a federal court strenuously asserted the public policy
theory of removal jurisdiction as a possible restraint on forum-clause en-
forcement. In Proyecfin de Venezuela, S.A. v. Banco Industrial de Vene-
zuela, S.A.,284 the defendant, a commercial Venezuelan bank, was sued in
New York state court but removed the action to the Southern District of
281. See Proyecfin de Venezuela, S.A. v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela, S.A., 760
F.2d 390, 396-97 (2d Cir. 1985).
282. See Diaz Contracting, Inc. v. Nanco Contracting Corp., 817 F.2d 1047, 1054-55
(3d Cir. 1987) (federal bankruptcy policy argument rejected); Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh
Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1068-70 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (per curiam) (Alabama public
policy inapplicable), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988); Sun World Lines, Ltd. v. March Ship-
ping Corp., 801 F.2d 1066, 1068 (8th Cir. 1986) (Missouri public policy disfavoring
clauses rejected); Lien Ho Hsing Steel Enter. Co. v. Weihtag, 738 F.2d 1455, 1461-62
(9th Cir. 1984) (no state policy on insurance overrides forum-selection clause); In re Fire-
man's Fund Ins. Cos., 588 F.2d 93, 95 (5th Cir. 1979) (no contravening venue policy in
federal Miller Act); Hoffman v. Burroughs Corp., 571 F. Supp. 545, 550 (N.D. Tex.
1982) (rejection of Texas policy disfavoring such clauses); cf. Boyd v. Grand Trunk W.
R.R., 338 U.S. 263, 266 (1949) (venue limiting provision void as in conflict with Federal
Employer's Liability Act); Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Frazier-Parrott Commodities, Inc.,
806 F.2d 848, 852 (8th Cir. 1986) (forum-selection clause forbidden by Missouri public
policy not enforced); Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 699 F.2d 657, 662-
63 (3d Cir. 1983) (forum-selection clause overridden by Algerian declarations and Execu-
tive Order); Aaacon Auto Transport, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 537 F.2d
648, 653-55 (2d Cir. 1976) (compulsory venue provision unenforceable in light of the
Interstate Commerce Act), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977).
An entire cottage industry has developed in relation to enforceability of forum-selec-
tion clauses in view of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA). See Conklin &
Garrett, Ltd. v. M/V Finnrose, 826 F.2d 1441, 1442 (5th Cir. 1987) (forum clause must
yield to federal policy embodied in COGSA); Union Ins. Soc'y of Canton, Ltd. v. S.S.
Elikon, 642 F.2d 721, 724-25 (4th Cir. 1981) (Congressional policy embodied in COGSA
supersedes The Bremen); Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Cos. v. Puerto Rican Forwarding
Co., 492 F.2d 1294, 1296 (1st Cir. 1974) (clause enforced as not violative of COGSA);
Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 300-01 (5th Cir. 1958) (forum
clause not enforced under COGSA), cert. dismissed, 359 U.S. 180 (1959); Zima Corp. v.
M.V. Roman Pazinski, 493 F. Supp. 268, 276 n.14, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (forum clause
enforced; COGSA held inapplicable); Takemura & Co. v. S.S. Tsuneshima Maru, 197 F.
Supp. 909, 912-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (forum clause not unreasonable; no indication Japa-
nese courts would not apply COGSA). See generally Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses,
supra note 3, at 170-73 (if enforcement of forum-selection clause would contravene strong
public policy of excluded forum, clause will not be enforced).
283. See, e.g., Proyecfin de Venezuela, S.A. v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela, S.A.,
760 F.2d 390 (2d Cir. 1985) (reconciliation of two possibly conflicting forum provisions);
International Ass'n of Bridge Workers Local 348 v. Koski Constr. Co., 474 F. Supp. 370
(W.D. Pa. 1979) (mem.) (clause held not mandatory); First Nat'l City Bank v. Nanz,
Inc., 437 F. Supp. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (mem.) (ambiguous forum-selection clause held
not mandatory).
284. 760 F.2d 390 (2d Cir. 1985).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
New York. The plaintiff moved to remand, arguing that the defendant
had consented to litigate in New York pursuant to two contemporaneous
contractual agreements.285 The Second Circuit decided that in signing
the agreements the defendant had not expressly or impliedly waived its
right of removal.2" 6
The court noted that "Congress deliberately sought to channel cases
against foreign sovereigns away from the state courts and into federal
courts. ' 287 As part of this public policy, Congress amended the general
removal statute to include a provision specifying that foreign states could
remove a civil action brought in state court against that foreign state.288
Not only did the court find a congressional intent "to create a broad
removal right," '2 89 but it was aided in its ultimate conclusion by an am-
biguous forum-selection clause.29°
Although the court asserted the public policy argument, it did not re-
ject the possibility of a waiver of removal. Rather, the court narrowly
held "that a forum selection clause that merely puts jurisdiction in either
a federal or state court does not constitute an express or implied waiver
of the sovereign's right to remove under § 1441(d). ' '291
Ultimately, removal litigation suggests perplexing contradictions.
First, removal cases treat forum-selection clauses largely as issues of sub-
stantive contract law, yet Ricoh diversity cases treat forum-selection
clauses as issues of procedural venue law. Second, given that removal
jurisdiction embodies a public policy amounting to a litigation right, it is
curious that personal jurisdiction and venue requirements are treated
differently.
V. COMPLICATING THE CALCULUS WITH CONCURRENT CHOICE-OF-
LAW PROVISIONS
If forum-selection cases are somewhat unsettling in their analytical
methodology, then forum-selection cases complicated by a concurrent
choice-of-law provision are even more daunting. Although some courts
quite sensibly ignore the presence of a concurrent choice-of-law clause,292
other courts have been irresistibly drawn to this "intellectual tar
285. See id. at 391-93.
286. See id. at 397.
287. Id. at 396 (quoting Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 497
(1983)).
288. See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1982 & Supp. 1988).
289. Proyecfin, 760 F.2d at 397.
290. See id. at 395-96. The court stated: "We hold that the two provisions do not
conflict and that paragraph 'Thirty-Fourth' does not bar an action between these parties
in either a federal or a state court in New York." Id. at 396.
291. Id. at 397.
292. See, e.g., Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 57 n.4 (2d Cir. 1986) (agreement com-
bined forum-selection and choice-of-law clauses, but court does not discuss choice-of-law
provision); LFC Lessors, Inc. v. Pacific Sewer Maintenance Corp., 739 F.2d 4, 6-7 (lst
Cir. 1984) (same); Mercury Coal & Coke, Inc. v. Mannesmann Pipe & Steel Corp., 696
F.2d 315, 316 n.1 (4th Cir. 1982) (same).
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baby." 2
93
Choice-of-law clauses that accompany forum-selection clauses raise
four conflict-of-laws questions. First, does the contractual choice-of-law
provision provide the applicable principles for construing the validity of
the forum-selection clause? Second, is a choice-of-law provision a crite-
rion for The Bremen forum-clause reasonableness? Third, how do
choice-of-law provisions relate to public policy constraints? And finally,
what are the requirements of full faith and credit with regard to a sister
state's determination concerning forum-selection and choice-of-law
clauses, and are these decisions open to collateral attack?
A. Which Comes First: Choice-of-Law or Forum Selection?
When confronted with a combined forum-selection and choice-of-lawprovision, most courts construe the forum-selection clause without any
reference to the choice-of-law provision."' This is probably predicated
on the notion that jurisdiction and venue are concerns separate from
choice-of-law, and that determining the former usually precedes deter-
mining the latter.295 A few courts, however, have speculated that the
presence of a contractual choice-of-law provision might alter this conven-
tional course of events.296 Such idle speculation leads courts into predict-
able conflict-of-laws contortions.
An example of the interplay of conflicts principles and forum-selection
clauses occurred in Taylor v. Titan Midwest Construction Corp.,297 a
breach of contract action brought by a Texas plaintiff against a Missouri
corporate defendant in Texas federal district court. The defendant
moved for dismissal or transfer to Missouri, relying on forum-selection
and choice-of-law provisions in the parties' subcontracts.298 Because the
suit was based on federal diversity jurisdiction, the court first endeavored
to resolve the Erie issue by determining that federal law should gov-
ern.299 Not content with this conclusion, however, the court hypothe-
293. This was Judge Johnson's description of the lure of Erie analysis in Stewart Or-
ganization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 779 F.2d 643, 645, vacated, 785 F.2d 896 (1986), rev'd,
810 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (per curiam), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988), but
it captures the flavor of those courts that venture into conflicts analysis, as well. The
Supreme Court will address a contractual choice-of-law problem this upcoming term.
See Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Volt Information Sciences, 195
Cal. App. 3d 349, 240 Cal. Rptr. 558 (1987) (choice-of-law clause in contract containing
an arbitration clause upheld; no forum-selection clause involved), aff'd, 57 U.S.L.W.
4295 (U.S. Mar. 6, 1989).
294. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
295. See Felix, supra note 24, at 207; Gilbert, supra note 4, at 43-45; supra note 30 and
accompanying text.
296. See Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note 3, at 185-92; Gruson, Governing
Law Clauses, supra note 5, at 209-16; Reese, supra note 5, at 537; Reese, A Proposed
Uniform Choice-of-Forum Act, supra note 69, at 196; Note, Conflict of Laws: "Party Au-
tonomy" in Contracts, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 553, 573 (1957).
297. 474 F. Supp. 145 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
298. See id. at 146.
299. See id. at 147.
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sized the possible ramifications of applying Texas state law:
If this court were to apply state law, it would first apply the conflict of
laws rules of Texas, which would in all likelihood result in the applica-
tion of Texas law to the question of venue, since venue is considered by
Texas law as a matter of procedure to be determined by the law of the
300forum.
Thus, had conflicts rules been applied first, then "[u]nder Texas law, the
contractual venue provision would not be enforceable. ' 30 1 On the other
hand, uncertain of this conflicts analysis, the court further ventured that
"[ilt is possible that a Texas court would honor the choice-of-law provi-
sion in the contracts and apply Missouri law. The result that would ob-
tain under Missouri law is unclear., 30 2
Having raised the choice-of-law problem, the court was sucked further
into the conflicts maelstrom, stating:
To a certain extent, resolution of the conflict of laws questions turns on
how the issue presented here-the enforceability of the forum-selection
clause-is characterized. If it is characterized as primarily a matter of
contract law, then arguably the Erie doctrine should apply and state
law should determine the enforceability of the clause. Which state's
law should apply would then be a problem, in view of the clause in the
contract designating Missouri law as governing the contract. This
court would have to determine whether under Texas conflicts law, this
dispute is a matter of venue or a matter of contract law. If the former,
Texas choice-of-law rules would dictate application of the law of the
forum state, i.e., Texas. If under Texas conflicts law this were viewed
as primarily a question of contract law, then arguably a Texas court
would apply Missouri law to its resolution, in view of the contractual
choice-of-law provision.30 3
This tortuous analysis arises because a variety of conflicts questions
remain unresolved by federal courts. In large measure, the scope of
choice-of-law clauses combined with forum-selection clauses has not
been examined in any meaningful fashion. In particular, it is unclear
whether contractually-stipulated law governs the validity and interpreta-
tion of the contract, including the forum-selection clause. 3° Whether
300. Id. at 147 n.l.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 147-48 n.2 (emphasis in original).
304. See National Iranian Oil Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 817 F.2d 326, 334 (5th Cir.)
(stipulation of Iranian law), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 329 (1987); Jackam v. Hospital Corp.
of Am. Mideast, 800 F.2d 1577, 1581-82 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (possible choice of Saudi Ara-
bian law with respect to construction of contract); Yarn Indus., Inc. v. Krupp Int'l, Inc.,
736 F.2d 125, 126 (4th Cir. 1984) (remand to take evidence with regard to parties' intent
on choice-of-law provision); Dracos v. Hellenic Lines Ltd., 705 F.2d 1392, 1395 (4th Cir.
1983) (Greek law governs), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 945 (1985); Bense v. Interstate Battery
Sys. of Am., 683 F.2d 718, 722 (2d Cir. 1982) (Texas venue law not applied to validity of
forum-selection clause); Polar Shipping Ltd. v. Oriental Shipping Corp., 680 F.2d 627,
632-33 (9th Cir. 1982) (English conflicts principles utilized to determine clause enforce-
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choice-of-law provisions refer to the substantive law or to the whole law
of the designated forum, is yet another open question. 5 Moreover, none
of the forum-selection cases ordering transfer to effectuate a forum-selec-
tion clause have commented on the choice-of-law issue upon transfer.
Does the choice-of-law clause override the mandate of Van Dusen v. Bar-
rack 30 6 that the law of the transferor court applies on a section 1404(a)
transfer? Should the original forum, in construing the choice-of-law
clause in diversity cases, look to the original forum's conflict-of-laws
rules pursuant to Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co. ?3o
Or should the federal court apply the conflict-of-laws rules of the juris-
diction designated in a governing-law clause and then apply the substan-
ability); Carefree Vacations, Inc. v. Brunner, 615 F. Supp. 211, 214-16 (W.D. Tenn.
1985) (Texas choice-of-law provision unenforceable); D'Antuono v. CCH Computax
Sys., 570 F. Supp. 708, 712 (D.R.I. 1983) ("By the terms of the agreements... California
law will govern the construction and interpretation of the contract provisions.") (footnote
omitted); Colonial Leasing Co. of New England v. Best, 552 F. Supp. 605, 606 (D. Or.
1982) (clause would be invalidated under either Missouri or Oregon law, so no "true
conflict" exists); Kolendo v. Jerell, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 983, 984-87 (S.D. W. Va. 1980)
(mem.) (choice-of-law analysis to invalidate Texas choice of forum and law); Hoes of
Am., Inc. v. Hoes, 493 F. Supp. 1205, 1207 (C.D. Ill. 1979) (German law utilized to
determine validity of clause); Wellmore Coal Corp. v. Gates Learjet Corp., 475 F. Supp.
1140, 1143-44 (W.D. Va. 1979) (apply Virginia choice-of-law rules to determine nature
and validity of clause); Cruise v. Castleton, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 564, 568 & n.5 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (appliction of New York choice-of-law rules to determine validity); Leasewell, Ltd.
v. Jake Shelton Ford., Inc., 423 F. Supp. 1011, 1014 (S.D. W. Va. 1976) (mer.) (apply
West Virginia conflicts rules to determine validity of clause).
305. Thus, if the clauses refer only to the chosen forum's substantive law, that forum's
contract principles would govern questions of construction and interpretation. However,
if the clauses implicate the chosen forum's "whole law," this would include the desig-
nated forum's choice of law provisions as well. Application of the chosen forum's choice-
of-law provisions conceivably could refer the issues of validity, enforceability, and inter-
pretation back to the original non-selected forum under renvoi principles. For a discus-
sion of the general concept of renvoi, see E. Scoles & P. Hay, Conflict of Laws §§ 3.13-
3.14, at 67-72 (1982); see also Gruson, Governing-Law Clauses, supra note 3, at 222-24.
At least some federal courts have agreed that federal courts sitting in diversity cases must
apply the selected forum's choice-of-law rules under Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg.
Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). See Wellmore Coal Corp. v. Gates Learjet Corp., 475 F. Supp.
1140, 1143 (W.D. Va. 1979); Cruise v. Castleton, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 564, 568 n.5
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); Leasewell, Ltd. v. Jake Shelton Ford, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 1011, 1014
(S.D. W. Va. 1976) (mem.).
306. 376 U.S. 612 (1964). See generally E. Scoles & P. Hay, supra note 305, § 3.46, at
125-27 (describing Van Dusen's holding and rationale).
307. 313 U.S. 487 (1941). See supra note 305. Professors Scoles and Hay suggest:
Short of amounting to forum non conveniens, however, the § 1404(a) transfer
... may also involve a case where the action itself is more closely related to the
transferee forum. By selecting the initial forum, the plaintiff has selected the
law. This type of forum-shopping, however, does not differ from that generally
available to plaintiffs when, in the interstate setting, multiple fora have jurisdic-
tion to entertain the action: it is not an Erie problem (that state substantive law
be applied), but a Klaxon problem (that state conflicts law be applied).
E. Scoles & P. Hay, supra note 305, § 3.46, at 127; cf Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.,
779 F.2d 643, 647 n.8 (Klaxon not implicated to determine forum-selection clause valid-
ity), vacated, 785 F.2d 896 (1986), rev'd, 810 F.2d 1066 (1987) (en banc) (per curiam),
aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988).
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tive law of the jurisdiction selected under the choice-of-law analysis?3" 8
Courts have circumvented the choice-of-law issues present in these
cases by focusing exclusively on the contractual-forum provision. This
view is bolstered by the traditional separation of jurisdictional and
choice-of-law inquiries. The problem with this analytical approach is
that it evades the possibility that the original forum may be required to
transfer or remand a case to a selected forum where enforcement of the
contract provision offends the law or public policy of the original forum.
Conversely, non-enforcement of a forum-selection clause can obviate ap-
plication of a governing-law clause, or alternatively permit application of
contractual law, suggesting yet another round of anomalous conflicts
issues.3 °9
B. Choice-of-Law Clauses as a Bremen "Reasonableness" Factor
When a forum-selection clause comes into play, the choice-of-law tail
can wag the jurisdictional dog.3 0 Long-standing federal jurisdiction the-
ory persistently separates jurisdictional and choice-of-law analysis,3 I
although in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,31 2 the Supreme Court sug-
gested that the presence of a choice-of-law provision in a contract could
be weighed in the analysis of a defendant's contacts with a forum.313
The forum-selection cases also view a choice-of-law provision as a rele-
vant determinant of the reasonableness of a contractual forum. Choice-
of-law considerations have crept into forum-selection analysis through a
gloss on The Bremen's pronouncement that forum-selection clauses "are
prima facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by
the resisting party to be 'unreasonable' under the circumstances. ' 31 4 The
308. For the potential renvoi effect of choice-of-law determinations, see supra note 305.
309. See Taylor v. Titan Midwest Constr. Corp., 474 F. Supp. 145, 147-48 nn.1-2
(N.D. Tex. 1979). If the court in Taylor had carried out one of its many hypothesized
conflicts analyses, it might have applied Texas conflicts law to invalidate the forum clause
pursuant to Texas's antipathy to such clauses, or Missouri's antipathy, for that matter (a
false conflict!). Fortunately, the court was blessed by the lack of a concomitant choice-of-
law provision. It is highly unclear what the status of the choice-of-law provision would
be under the circumstances, but it most likely would be independently enforced. See
generally E. Scoles & P. Hay, supra note 305, §§ 18.1-18.12, at 632-52 (general overview
of principle guiding forum-selection clauses and limitations on party autonomy).
310. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
311. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
312. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
313. See id. at 481-82. But see Sternberg v. O'Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1113 (Del. 1988)
(en banc) (absent minimum contacts, due process is satisfied by express consent to general
jurisdiction). For a recent symposium discussion of the relationship of choice-of-law
analysis to jurisdictional inquiry, see Hay, Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Con-
stitutional Limitations, 59 U. Colo. L. Rev. 9 (1988); Peterson, Jurisdiction and Choice of
Law Revisited, 59 U. Colo. L. Rev. 37 (1988); Rosenberg, Foreword to the Colorado Sym-
posium, 59 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1 (1988); Weinberg, The Place of Trial and the Law Applied:
Overhauling Constitutional Theory, 59 U. Colo. L. Rev. 67 (1988).
314. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972) (emphasis added).
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applicable law of the stipulated forum and traditional conflicts considera-
tions infuse many forum-selection clause determinations.
In D'Antuono v. CCH Computax Systems 315 a Rhode Island federal
district court exhibited this approach through a list of "synthesized"
post-Bremen reasonableness factors.316 The first four factors were: "(1)
[t]he identity of the law which governs the construction of the contract;
(2) [t]he place of execution of the contract[s;] (3) [t]he place where the
transactions have been or are to be performed[; and] (4) [t]he availability
of remedies in the designated forum." '3 17 The court recognized that this
quartet of factors was "cast in a traditional contract mold," and in apply-
ing them utilized straightforward conflicts analysis to assess the contrac-
tual choice-of-law. 318  Although the court acknowledged that
California's contacts with the parties and their transactions were not "as
direct, substantial or significant as those enjoyed by Rhode Island, '319 it
nonetheless upheld both a California-designating forum clause and a Cal-
ifornia choice-of-law provision.
On the contrary, perhaps with an eye toward the due process con-
straints on choice-of-law determinations, 320 the court somewhat defen-
sively noted that "[tlhere is nothing to indicate that California's
relationship to the transaction is so peripheral, contrived or remote as to
render nugatory the parties' choice of law."' 321 The court conceded that
on the facts there was no perfect solution short of trying the case in Kan-
sas, and that "[lt is simply a question of whose ox is to be gored. 322
Choice-of-law, either by contractual stipulation or judicial construc-
tion, seems firmly implanted as an element of The Bremen reasonable-
ness. Thus, in a backdoor fashion, choice-of-law determinants, contract
principles and administrative efficiency often supplant traditional juris-
dictional considerations. Moreover, the due process constraints that nor-
mally inform choice-of-law decisions are absent when transposed into
forum-selection clause analysis. This raises the related issues of the va-
lidity of choice-of-law that is antagonistic to state public policy, and
whether choice-of-law is a waivable litigation right.
315. 570 F. Supp. 708 (D.R.I. 1983).
316. See id. at 712.
317. Id. (citing Furbee v. Vantage Press, Inc., 464 F.2d 835, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Hoffman v. Burroughs Corp., 571 F. Supp. 545, 548-49 (N.D. Tex. 1982); Kline v. Kawai
Am. Corp., 498 F. Supp. 868, 872 (D. Minn. 1980); Full-Sight Contact Lens Corp. v. Soft
Lenses, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 71, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Leasewell, Ltd. v. Jake Shelton Ford,
Inc., 423 F. Supp. 1011, 1015-16 (S.D. W. Va. 1976) (mem.)).
318. See D'Antuono, 570 F. Supp. at 712.
319. Id. at 712-13.
320. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 407 (1930); cf. Allstate Ins. v. Hague,
449 U.S. 302 (1981) (discussing due process constraints on choice of law determinations
outside the contractual context). See generally E. Scoles & P. Hay, supra note 305,
§§ 3.21-3.23, at 81-89 (general development of due process analysis after Home Ins. Co.).
321. D'Antuono v. CCH Computax Sys., 570 F. Supp. 708, 712 n.5 (D.R.I. 1983).
322. Id. at 714. The court further suggested that "it is precisely in this sort of situation
that a forum selection clause can and should tip the scales." Id.
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C. Public Policy Constraints on Contractual Choice-of-Law
Both the Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws323 ("Restate-
ment") and the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.")32 4 recognize con-
tractual choice-of-law provisions as enforceable. Similar to The Bremen,
the Restatement would enforce governing-law provisions unless the con-
sent of one of the parties "was obtained by improper means, such as by
misrepresentation, duress, or undue influence, or by mistake." '325 The
U.C.C. approves consensual governing law agreements provided that the
commercial transaction bears a reasonable relationship to the designated
forum.
326
Although the law generally favors choice-of-law provisions, lurking
due process concerns and public policy considerations cloud the analysis
of combined forum-selection and choice-of-law clauses. Due process re-
quires that governing law have at least a minimal connection with the
forum and the underlying claims.327 Further, "[c]omity does not require
the application of another state's substantive law if it is contrary to the
public policy of the forum state. '32
The intersection of forum-selection and choice-of-law provisions there-
fore raises the question whether these consensual clauses obviate tradi-
tional due process or public policy constraints. This problem has been
aptly stated by one commentator:
[T]he court being asked to exercise its discretion and dismiss the action
should not permit the choice of forum to designate the applicable law
where it would not allow an express choice of law to do so .... The
general view is that the state whose law is chosen must have a reason-
able relationship to the transaction.329
In a similar vein, a combined forum-selection and choice-of-law provi-
sion should not circumvent the non-selected state's public policy
concerns:
Furthermore, if the rule to be applied by the chosen jurisdiction is con-
trary to a strong underlying policy of the rule of the nonchosen forum,
the latter may refuse to give effect to the choice on public policy
grounds regardless of whether the chosen forum is disinterested or not,
or whether it would consider the interests of concerned states. Again,
this is an application of the rule that the court should not permit the
323. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 80, 187 comment b (1971).
324. U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (1987).
325. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 comment b (1971).
326. The U.C.C. provides that "when a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this
state and also to another state or nation the parties may agree that the law either of this
state or of such other state or nation shall govern their rights and duties." U.C.C. § 1-
105(1) (1987).
327. See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
328. Willard v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 213 Va. 481, 483, 193 S.E.2d 776, 778
(1973); see Gilbert, supra note 4, at 38-42, 43-45, 49-66; Gruson, Governing Law Clauses,
supra note 3, at 220-22; Reese, supra note 5, at 537-39.
329. Gilbert, supra note 4, at 39.
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choice of forum provision to do what it would not let a choice of law
clause do. Thus, if the court would not give effect to choice of a cer-
tain state's law on public policy grounds, it should not enforce a choice
of forum which would accomplish the same thing.
330
A Tennessee district court appreciated these critiques in its construc-
tion of a combined forum-selection and choice-of-law provision. 33a The
court held that in a multi-state commercial transaction involving Tennes-
see, Illinois and Texas, contractual clauses specifying a Texas forum and
Texas law were unreasonable and unenforceable.332 After conducting an
obstensible Bremen analysis (sounding much like International Shoe min-
imum contacts jurisprudence 333), the court concluded that Texas did not
have a reasonable relationship to the transaction,334 thus invalidating the
choice-of-law provision. Since the choice-of-law provision was unen-
forceable, the court looked to Tennessee state law, the law of the non-
contractual forum, to determine choice-of-law.335
Ironically, Tennessee conflicts rules required that the substantive
rights of contracting parties be governed by the law intended by the par-
ties. That was the stipulated Texas law, but the court reasoned that since
the choice-of-law provision was unenforceable and inapplicable, it would
instead look to the place of the contract's making.336
Although it arrived at its conclusion by circuitous means, the Tennes-
see opinion illustrates an instance where consensual forum and choice-of-
law provisions did not trump traditional due process or public policy
analysis associated with jurisdiction or governing law. However ineptly,
the court viewed these concerns as paramount in its evaluation.
330. Id. at 39-40.
331. See Carefree Vacations, Inc. v. Brunner, 615 F. Supp. 211 (W.D. Tenn. 1985).
332. Id. at 214-15.
333. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
334. See Carefree Vacations, 615 F. Supp. at 214. The court considered the factors
that none of the parties lived or did business in Texas, the contract was executed in
Illinois and Tennessee, and only one witness was from Texas. The court also rejected the
idea that "the fact that payments were wired through Texas enroute to Illinois gives
Texas the requisite relationship." Id.
335. See id. at 214-15. In determining the validity of the choice-of-law provision, the
court observed: "In a multi-state transaction, the contracting parties' choice-of-law pro-
vision is valid absent contravention of public policy of the forum state or a showing that
the selected forum does not bear a reasonable relationship to the transaction." Id. at 215
(citing Woods-Tucker Leasing Corp. v. Hutcheson-Ingram Dev. Co., 642 F.2d 744, 749-
53 (5th Cir. Apr. 1981), and relying on the "substantial relation" standard from the
U.C.C. provisions of Texas, Tennessee and Illinois).
336. See Carefree Vacations, 615 F. Supp. at 215-16. Carefree Vacations serves as an-
other illustration of hopelessly confused conflicts analysis that is neither predictable nor
certain for the parties to the agreement. For a lengthy and thoughtful public policy and
due process-centered approach to forum-selection and choice-of-law provisions, see Gil-
bert, supra note 4, at 43-72. Other commentators, however, see such efforts to infuse
reasonable relation tests as misguided and highly detrimental to the primary value of
party autonomy. See Gruson, Governing Law Clauses, supra note 3, at 216; E. Scoles &
P. Hay, supra note 305, § 18.8, at 647-48.
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D. Full Faith and Credit to Consensual Adjudicatory Decisions
The construction of forum-selection clauses by a non-selected forum
implicates full faith and credit issues,3 3 7 including subsequent collateral
attack. In particular, if forum-selection clauses are viewed as jurisdic-
tional, then various conflicts principles govern interstate recognition of a
sister state's determination.
A determination of good subject matter jurisdiction generally is not
open to collateral attack if that issue was fully and fairly litigated in the
first forum.3 3 s Further, collateral attack based on a lack of personal ju-
risdiction in the first forum is always unavailing. If a defendant appears
but does not raise a defense of lack of personal jurisdiction, this consti-
tutes a waiver of that jurisdictional defect.339 If the defendant appears
and contests personal jurisdiction but loses, this precludes relitigation in
a second forum. 34
Against this backdrop, the Fourth Circuit ruled that a South Carolina
district court was not collaterally estopped from relitigating the validity
of a forum-selection clause where a New York federal court had found
proper venue. 34' Reconsideration of the clause was not precluded be-
cause the New York court finding was based on a venue interpretation:
"Once that was determined, the issue of whether the... choice-of-forum
clause was valid was of no consequence. '342 Thus, because the New
York court arrived only at a venue conclusion, the validity of the clause
could be determined in a subsequent suit between the parties.
A West Virginia district court denied full faith and credit to a New
York default judgment predicated on a forum-selection clause.343 Con-
struing the contractual provision as jurisdiction-conferring, the court
stated that the validity of the clause was open to collateral attack. Since
337. See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1 (among states of the union, each state must give "Full
Faith and Credit... to the ... Judicial Proceedings of every other State"); see also E.
Scoles & P. Hay, supra note 305, §§ 3.24-3.25, 3.30, §§ 24.1-24.48.
338. See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter
State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940). But see Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 438 (1940)(subject matter jurisdiction may be open to collateral attack if state court makes errone-
ous conclusion over exclusive federal court jurisdiction).
339. See J. Friedenthal, M. Kane & A. Miller, supra note 10, § 3.26, at 182.
340. See Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931).
341. See Yarn Indus., Inc. v. Krupp Int'l, Inc., 736 F.2d 125, 128-29 (4th Cir. 1984).
342. Id. at 129. The Fourth Circuit noted that neither the district court nor the Sec-
ond Circuit had ever ruled on the efficacy of the forum-selection clause: "Neither court
discussed the validity of the clause or its reasonableness, but rather agreed that under any
interpretation of the clause venue for any action arising under the contract between Yarn
and Krupp could only be in Delaware or South Carolina, not in New York." Id. The
court viewed the case as presenting a problem of issue preclusion under Parklane Hosiery
Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). See Yarn Indus., Inc., 736 F.2d at 128.
343. The court noted, "[w]ere it not for that contract provision, New York would lack
both jurisdiction and venue. The only issue in this proceeding, therefore, is whether or
not the contract provision providing for the acquisition of jurisdiction was valid."
Leasewell, Ltd. v. Jake Shelton Ford, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 1011, 1013 (S.D. W. Va. 1976)
(mem.).
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the defendant had not appeared and contested jurisdiction in New York,
West Virginia could construe the clause. Moreover, in construing the
validity of the clause the court ignored the New York choice-of-law pro-
vision, arguing that "[tio do otherwise would be to permit the clause to
'pull itself up by its own bootstraps.' "344 Under West Virginia law345 the
court held the clauses unjust, unreasonable, and unenforceable and there-
fore refused to give full faith and credit to the judgment based on juris-
diction conferred by the clauses.3 46
A number of potential full faith and credit issues remain to be explored
by the courts. In instances where the clauses are not viewed as jurisdic-
tional, will this effectively preclude re-examination of the validity deter-
mination in the second forum? 347 A more interesting question is whether
a second forum could refuse to give full faith and credit to the valid
judgment of a first forum because the judgment was based on a combined
forum-selection and choice-of-law provision that violates the public pol-
icy of the second forum. 348 Although The Bremen speaks generally
about non-enforcement where clauses contravene public policy, 349 that
stricture rarely prevails and has not yet been tested in a full faith and
credit challenge.
344. Id. at 1014. The court relied on Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Associa-
tion, 283 U.S. 522, 525 (1931), for the proposition that a jurisdictional issue may be raised
on collateral attack if a foreign corporation did not appear to challenge jurisdiction and
therefore "never ... had its day in court with respect to jurisdiction." See Leasewell,
Ltd., 423 F. Supp. at 1014 (quoting Baldwin, 283 U.S. at 525).
345. Leasewell, Ltd., 423 F. Supp. at 1014. The court first applied the conflicts rules of
West Virginia under the mandate of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.,
313 U.S. 487 (1941). See supra notes 305-07 and accompanying text.
346. See Leasewell Ltd., 423 F. Supp. at 1015-17. The court stated that it "refuse[d] to
extend full faith and credit to the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of New
York.... ." Id. at 1017.
347. See E. Scoles & P. Hay, supra note 305, § 24.15, at 938 (1982) (noting disparate
treatment of default judgments based on warrant of attorney or cognovit notes). The
authors believe that various state refusals of recognition of judgments in these instances
are based on reasons that are "inappropriate." Moreover, the authors believe that full-
faith-and-credit is due since the Supreme Court's holding in D.H. Overmyer Co., Inc. v.
Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187 (1972) (cognovit clause consenting to judgment without
notice or hearing not unconstitutional per se and not in violation of fourteenth amend-
ment rights).
348. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 103 (1971) (a state need not ac-
cord interstate recognition to a judgment if it "is not required by the national policy of
full faith and credit because it would involve an improper interference with important
interests of the sister State"). Professors Scoles and Hay argue that § 103 "does not
identify areas where local public policy may serve as a basis for the refusal to accord
recognition to a sister-state judgment when such recognition is otherwise mandated under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution." E. Scoles & P. Hay, supra note
305, § 24.21, at 946.
349. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972). The "public
policy" exception to The Bremen is generally a difficult argument on which to prevail in
urging non-enforcement of a clause. See supra note 282 and accompanying text.
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VI. CONTRACTUAL SUPREMACY OVER FORUM-SELECTION AND
GOVERNING LAW
When The Bremen asserted that a forum-selection clause was prima
facie valid and should control absent a strong showing that it should be
set aside,3 °5 the Supreme Court set the stage for the wholesale importa-
tion of contract principles into traditional jurisdiction and venue analy-
sis. Although the Court attempted to temper the concept of a
contractual forum with a countervailing consideration of "reasonable-
ness,"3 51 the Court instead allowed the lower federal courts to create a
new hodgepodge test for forum access.
The federal courts now apply a test that is a pastiche of principles
imported from jurisdiction, venue, forum non conveniens and choice-of-
law rules. The major ingredients, however, are contract principles. Con-
tract principles dominate interpretation of the validity and scope of fo-
rum-selection provisions. Because of this, the due process concerns that
typically predominate forum access either recede in importance or disap-
pear altogether. In addition, the courts have failed to supply any mean-
ingful content to the concept of waiver in the civil litigation context.
A. The Bremen Test for Forum-Selection Clauses
As is true for many landmark Supreme Court cases, The Bremen of-
fered only broad limitations on forum-selection clause applicability.
Thus, such clauses were generally enforceable and the resisting party car-
ried the burden to "clearly show that enforcement would be unreasona-
ble and unjust, or that the clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud or
overreaching. 3 52 Moreover, an allegation that the contractual forum
was inconvenient was insufficient, unless the opposing party could
demonstrate that "trial in the contractual forum will be so gravely diffi-
cult and inconvenient that he will for all practical purposes be deprived
of his day in court. 353
These very generalized strictures have generated a proliferation of tests
and factors. One district court noted that the Supreme Court cited, with-
350. See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10.
351. Id. The Court in The Bremen relied on a series of lower federal and state cases
that had already made some concept of "reasonableness" the benchmark for forum-selec-
tion clause enforceability. See Central Contracting Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 367
F.2d 341, 345 (3d Cir. 1966); Anastasiadis v. S.S. Little John, 346 F.2d 281, 284 (5th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 920 (1966); Wm. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish Am. Line Ltd.,
224 F.2d 806, 808 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955); Cerro de Pasco Copper
Corp. v. Knut Knutsen, O.A.S., 187 F.2d 990, 991 (2d Cir. 1951); Central Contracting
Co. v. C.E. Youngdahl & Co., 418 Pa. 122, 132-34, 209 A.2d 810, 816 (1965). The Court
also noted that Muller was overruled in Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200,
203-04 (2d Cir. 1967), as in conflict with COGSA, thereby anticipating The Bremen's
"public policy" exception. See supra note 282 and accompanying text.
352. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972).
353. Id. at 18. For a discussion of these factors in the literature, see Gilbert, supra note
4, at 32-42; Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note 3, at 163-92.
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out indicating their sufficiency or exclusivity, only four mitigating fac-
tors: inconvenience to the parties; fraud; undue influence; or
overweening bargaining power.354 Another district court read The
Bremen as promulgating a two-pronged test. The first prong rested on
contract principles to show the forum-clause void or voidable and there-
fore unenforceable. 355 The contract approach derived from the "fraud or
overreaching" factors, and implicated the standard contract doctrines of
mistake, coercion, lack of consideration, unconscionability and adhe-
sion.35 6 The court termed this approach the "invalidity test. ' 35 7 The
second prong involved demonstrating that the contractual forum was un-
reasonable or unjust, an inquiry related to The Bremen's inconvenience
dicta.358 This second prong, in turn, involved an evaluation of seven fac-
tors "flowing from the Bremen decision": (1) inequality of bargaining
power; (2) public policy; (3) injustice; (4) availability of remedies in the
chosen forum; (5) the governing law; (6) inconvenience; and (7) conduct
of the parties.359
This two-pronged test has been largely ignored in favor of freelance
judicial buccaneering. The two-pronged approach suggested conceptual
difficulties; some reasonableness factors were elements of contract valid-
ity. Moreover, most courts have been unwilling--consciously or uncon-
sciously-to draw firm analytical distinctions among concepts of
contract validity, forum convenience, justice and reasonableness. 360
Rather, courts typically resort to an ever-growing hybrid list to guide the
determination of enforceability.
This trend toward further expansion of The Bremen elements reached
its apotheosis in D'Antuono v. CCH Computax Systems, 361 where a
Rhode Island district court undertook to definitively articulate The
Bremen test. The court dismissed the "inconvenience" prong of The
Bremen by asserting that "by consenting to the inclusion of a forum
designation in the contracts, the plaintiff, to the extent that such a cove-
354. See Kolendo v. Jerell, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 983, 985 (S.D. W. Va. 1980) (mem.).
The Kolendo court noted that other courts recognized the additional factors of applicable
governing law and place of execution or performance of the contract. See id. at 985(citations omitted); Furbee v. Vantage Press, Inc., 464 F.2d 835, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
355. See Gaskin v. Stumm Handel GmbH, 390 F. Supp. 361, 364-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).




360. See generally cases cited supra note 3. The Gaskin court anticipated much of this
analytical soup when it attempted to clarify some of these elements: "[T]he question is
not whether the agreement is, as a matter of law, vitiated by the lack of equality, but
rather whether justice requires that a distinction be drawn between freely negotiated con-
tracts and standard form contracts, particularly where there is a lack of equality." Gas-
kin, 390 F. Supp. at 365 n.5. Similarly, the court noted: "[C]onduct which does not rise
to the level of unconscionability as a matter of contract law may well warrant considera-
tion under the 'inequality' or 'overweening bargaining power' element of the reasonable-
ness test." Id. at 365 n.6.
361. 570 F. Supp. 708 (D.R.I. 1983).
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nant is valid in a particular case, has waived any consideration of his
convenience." ' 62 The court then observed that numerous federal courts
had synthesized and refined The Bremen factors to provide a "yardstick
of reasonableness." These include the following:
(1) The identity of the law which goveins construction of the
contract.363
(2) The place of execution of the contract(s). 3 4
(3) The place where the transactions have been or are to be
performed.365
(4) The availability of remedies in the designated forum.366
(5) The public policy of the initial forum state .... 367
(6) The location of the parties, the convenience of prospective wit-
nesses, and the accessibility of evidence.368
(7) The relative bargainingpower of the parties and the circumstances
surrounding their dealings.
69
(8) The presence or absence of fraud, undue influence or other extenu-
ating (or exacerbating) circumstances. 370
(9) The conduct of the parties.371
The court also assayed the related issues of relevance and weight of these
elements: "While each of these factors has some degree of relevance and
some claim to weight, there are no hard-and-fast rules, no precise formu-
lae. The totality of the circumstances, measured in the interests of jus-
tice, will-and should-ultimately control. '372
Although D'Antuono articulated the most comprehensive Bremen test,
courts have nonetheless been inventive in adding additional elements to
the list, such as residence of the parties and witnesses.3 73 The problem,
however, is that the "totality of the circumstances" mentality has ena-
362. Id. at 710 (emphasis in original).
363. Id. at 712 (citing Furbee v. Vantage Press, Inc., 464 F.2d 835, 837 (D.C. Cir.
1972)).
364. Id. (citing Leasewell, Ltd. v. Jake Shelton Ford, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 1011, 1015-16
(S.D. W. Va. 1976) (mem.)).
365. Id. (citing Kline v. Kawai Am. Corp., 498 F. Supp. 868, 872 (D. Minn. 1980)).
366. Id. (citing Hoffman v. Burroughs Corp., 571 F. Supp. 545, 549 (N.D. Tex. 1982);
Full-Sight Contact Lens Corp. v. Soft Lenses, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 71, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
367. Id. (citing Hoffman, 571 F. Supp. at 549; Cutter v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 510 F.
Supp. 905, 908 (E.D. Wis. 1981)).
368. Id. (citing Anastasi Bros. Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F. Supp.
862, 864 (E.D. Pa. 1981)).
369. Id. (citing Plum Tree, Inc. v. Stockment, 488 F.2d 754, 757 (3d Cir. 1973)).
370. Id. (citing Cutter v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 510 F. Supp. 905, 907 (E.D. Wis. 1981)).
371. Id. (citing Full-Sight Contact Lens Corp. v. Soft-Lens, Inc., 466 F. Supp. at 73;
Gaskin v. Stumm Handel GmbH, 390 F. Supp. 361, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)).
372. Id.
373. See Carefree Vacations, Inc. v. Brunner, 615 F. Supp. 211, 214 (W.D. Tenn.
1985). The court adhered to its own version of a two-pronged test, id. at 213, and derived
its factors from Taylor v. Titan Midwest Construction Corp., 474 F. Supp. 145, 149
(N.D. Tex. 1979); Furbee v. Vantage Press, Inc., 464 F.2d 835, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1972); and
Gaskin v. Stumm Handel GmbH, 390 F. Supp. 361, 368-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See Care-
free Vacations, 615 F. Supp. at 214.
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bled courts to pick and choose among possible determinants. Some
courts focus on contractual factors; 374 others on convenience con-
cerns; 375 and others on vague reasonableness theories.3 76  Given the
374. See Conklin & Garrett, Ltd. v. M/V Finnrose, 826 F.2d 1441, 1443-44 (5th Cir.
1987) (discussion of inequality of bargaining power); Hunt Wesson Foods, Inc. v.
Supreme Oil Co., 817 F.2d 75, 77 (9th Cir. 1987) (straight contract interpretation);
Farmland Indus. Inc. v. Frazier-Parrott Commodities, Inc., 806 F.2d 848, 852 (8th Cir.
1986) (contract tainted by fraud allegation); Sun World Lines, Ltd. v. March Shipping
Corp., 801 F.2d 1066, 1068 (8th Cir. 1986) (no unequal bargaining power found); Gen-
eral Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d 352, 360 (3d Cir. 1986) (no
evidence of coercion in contract); Bryant Elec. Co. v. City of Fredericksburg, 762 F.2d
1192, 1196-97 (4th Cir. 1985) (rejects unequal bargaining power argument in context of
municipal contract bidding process); AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Inv. Partnership,
740 F.2d 148, 155-59 (2d Cir. 1984) (discussion of fraud basis of claim and connection to
contract clause); Lien Ho Hsing Steel Enter. Co. v. Weihtag, 738 F.2d 1455, 1458-60 (9th
Cir. 1984) (no overweening bargaining power in non-negotiated insurance policy due to
party's representation by broker); Colonial Leasing Co. v. Pugh Bros. Garage, 735 F.2d
380, 382-83 (9th Cir. 1984) (no negotiation in fine print contract for take-it-or-leave-it
clause; clause not enforced); Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709
F.2d 190, 202 (3d Cir.) (no overreaching on contract negotiations), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
938 (1983); Crown Beverage Co. v. Cerveceria Moctezuma, S.A., 663 F.2d 886, 888 (9th
Cir. 1981) (no fraud or overreaching); Aaacon Auto Transport, Inc. v. State Farm Mu-
tual Auto Ins. Co., 537 F.2d 648, 661 (2d Cir. 1976) (court does not reach contract of
adhesion arguments), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977); see also Janko v. Outboard
Marine Corp., 605 F. Supp. 51, 52 (W.D. Okla. 1985) (claim of boilerplate contract does
not preclude enforcement of clause); LFC Lessors, Inc. v. Pearson, 585 F. Supp. 1362,
1364-65 (D. Mass. 1984) (focus on contract negotiations, lack of sophistication and legal
advice, contract of adhesion); Richardson Greenshields Secs., Inc. v. Metz, 566 F. Supp.
131, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (no overreaching even though party alleges no contract negoti-
ations); Hoffman v. Burroughs Corp., 571 F. Supp. 545, 549 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (no over-
reaching, but parties did not discuss boilerplate contract); Richardson Eng'g Co. v. IBM,
554 F. Supp. 467, 470 (D. Vt. 1981) (rejects contract of adhesion argument), aff'd, 697
F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1982); First Nat'l Monetary Corp. v. Chesney, 514 F. Supp. 649, 656
(E.D. Mich. 1980) (brokerage agreement clause held to be contract of adhesion); Kolendo
v. Jerell, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 983, 986 (S.D. W. Va. 1980) (mem.) (clause not enforced in
part on ground of overweening bargaining power); Taylor v. Titan Midwest Constr.
Corp., 474 F. Supp. 145, 149 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (enforcement of boilerplate clauses limited
to facts of case); Cruise v. Castleton, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 564, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(straight contract analysis; no finding of contract of adhesion); Gaskin v. Stumm Handel
GmbH, 390 F. Supp. 361, 365-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (no unfairness or injustice where Ger-
man contract not translated into English); cf Plum Tree, Inc. v. Stockment, 488 F.2d 754
(3d Cir. 1973) (district court held clause invalid on face of contract and without any
evidence).
375. It is virtually impossible to successfully challenge validity and enforceability of a
forum-selection clause on the ground of "inconvenience." See, e.g., Sun World Lines,
Ltd. v. March Shipping Corp., 801 F.2d 1066, 1068 (8th Cir. 1986) (no inconvenience
found; witnesses can be deposed); General Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc.,
783 F.2d 352, 359 (3d Cir. 1986) (same); Mercury Coal & Coke, Inc. v. Mannesmann
Pipe & Steel Corp., 696 F.2d 315, 318 (4th Cir. 1982) (same); Furry v. First Nat'l Mone-
tary Corp., 602 F. Supp. 6, 10 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (same); LFC Lessors, Inc. v. Pearson,
585 F. Supp. 1362, 1365 (D. Mass. 1984) (same); Intermountain Sys. v. Edsall Constr.
Co., 575 F. Supp. 1195, 1198 (D. Colo. 1983) (mem.) (same); Richardson Greenshields
Secs., Inc. v. Metz, 566 F. Supp. 131, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (same); Richardson Eng'g Co.
v. IBM, 554 F. Supp. 467, 469 (D. Vt. 1981) (same), aff'd, 697 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1982);
Gordonsville Indus., Inc. v. American Artos Corp., 549 F. Supp. 200, 205-06 (W.D. Va.
1982) (rejects inconvenience argument despite having to litigate in Germany); Anastasi
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broad spectrum of elements that bear on enforceability, litigants have
little clue as to which tack any particular court may take in construing a
forum-selection clause. This reality surely does not serve the values of
certainty and predictability that supposedly underlie contractual forum
provisions.
Moreover, this expanding laundry list of post-Bremen factors is noth-
ing more than a patchwork of concepts drawn from jurisdiction, venue,
forum non conveniens and contract law.37 7 It is as if the courts, vaguely
mindful that consensual procedure involves a waiver of carefully-
wrought litigation protections, 378 have reintroduced due process con-
cerns through additional relevant elements. Due process ignored is in
effect due process denied, so courts have serviced due process through
the back door. Even though post-Bremen analysis may be viewed as
moving more toward fairness concerns, contract analysis still predomi-
nates. And in this manner forum-selection decisions threaten litigation
rights.
B. Applied Contract Law in the Realms of Jurisdiction, Venue and
Forum Non Conveniens
Many federal courts have clung to a narrow contractual interpretation
of forum-selection clauses.379 In these instances contract law has proven
Bros. Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F. Supp. 862, 864 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (no
unreasonable inconvenience shown); Full-Sight Contact Lens Corp. v. Soft Lenses, Inc.,
466 F. Supp. 71, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (same); Brown v. Gingiss Int'l, Inc., 360 F. Supp.
1042, 1044 (E.D. Wis. 1973) ("net inconvenience" not significant). But see McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 758 F.2d 341, 346 (8th Cir.) (judicial notice of
impracticality and impossibility of litigating in Iran), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985);
Union Ins. Soc'y of Canton, Ltd. v. S.S. Elikon, 642 F.2d 721, 724-25 (4th Cir. 1981)
(alternative forum non conveniens argument); Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Broetje, 545 F.
Supp. 362, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (same); Randolph Eng'g Co. v. Fredenhagen Kom-
mandit-Gesellschaft, 476 F. Supp. 1355, 1359-60 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (mem.) (clause not
enforced; extensive inconvenience discussion).
376. See Diaz Contracting, Inc. v. Nanco Contracting Corp., 817 F.2d 1047, 1052 (3d
Cir. 1987) (discussion of evidence required by Bremen unreasonableness test); National
Iranian Oil Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 817 F.2d 326, 332-33 (5th Cir.) (discussing impossi-
bility and impracticability), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 329 (1987); Luce v. Edelstein, 802
F.2d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 1986) (clauses not disfavored and would be unreasonable not to
enforce); Furbee v. Vantage Press, Inc., 464 F.2d 835, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (list of factors
of reasonableness); Colonial Leasing Co. v. Best, 552 F. Supp. 605, 607-08 (D. Or. 1982)
(standard of unreasonableness for forum-selection clause easier to satisfy than defense of
duress for contract of adhesion); Kline v. Kawai Am. Corp., 498 F. Supp. 868, 871-72
(D. Minn. 1980) (lengthy discussion of reasonableness factors); Hoes of Am., Inc. v.
Hoes, 493 F. Supp. 1205, 1208-09 (C.D. Ill. 1979) (not unreasonable or unjust to apply
German law; stay to determine if German court procedures adequate); Dick Proctor Im-
ports, Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp. of Am., 486 F. Supp. 815, 818-19 (E.D. Mo. 1980) (clause
not unreasonable, unjust, or unconscionable); cf. Takemura & Co. v. S.S. Tsuneshima
Maru, 197 F. Supp. 909, 912-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (pre-Bremen case testing reasonableness
by forum non conveniens factors).
377. See cases cited supra notes 374-76.
378. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
379. See supra note 374 and accompanying text.
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to be a difficult taskmaster, with harsh results. Contract principles have
been applied to basic issues of language construction, as well as to
broader issues of adhesion and unconscionability. In almost all instances
the courts have unsympathetically posited the reasonable businessman
predicate, noting in one instance that "[i]t is not unlawful for a business
person to drive a hard bargain so as to attain for himself the best possible
deal."38 And in almost all instances, this unremitting, stringent applica-
tion of contract rules has not been tempered by broader justice concerns.
Contract principles have played a large role in determining forum-
clause enforceability where the language of the provision is ambiguous,
or where the agreement incorporates more than one such clause. In
these situations courts have invoked various contract rules, including the
"plain meaning" rule wherein "[t]he common or normal meaning of lan-
guage will be given to the words of a contract unless circumstances show
that in a particular case a special meaning should be attached to it." 381
Although many courts have taken an expansive view of forum provi-
sions, 382 parties challenging ambiguous clauses have successfully invoked
the rule of contract interpretation construing the language against the
drafter. 3  Also, courts will attempt to reconcile and give effect to con-
flicting provisions when it can reasonably be done.38 4
On the contrary, challenges based on ignorance of the clauses have
proven consistently unavailing. Courts repeatedly lecture that a party's
knowledge of contract provisions is presumed by the party's signature,385
and that ignorance due to a failure to read is no defense in contract
law.386 Despite this harsh rule, a few courts have liberally construed the
380. LFC Lessors, Inc. v. Pearson, 585 F. Supp. 1362, 1364 (D. Mass. 1984).
381. Hunt Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Supreme Oil Co., 817 F.2d 75, 77 (9th Cir. 1987)
(quoting 4 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 618 (3d ed. 1961)).
382. See supra note 3.
383. See, eg., Hunt Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Supreme Oil Co., 817 F.2d 75, 78 (9th Cir.
1987); Zapata Marine Serv. v. O/Y Finnlines, Ltd., 571 F.2d 208, 209 (5th Cir. 1978)(per curiam); City of New York v. Pullman Inc., 477 F. Supp. 438, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
First Nat'l City Bank v. Nanz, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 184, 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (mem.).
384. See Proyecfin de Venezuela, S.A. v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela, S.A., 760
F.2d 390, 395-97 (2d Cir. 1985).
385. See, e.g., Central Contracting Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 367 F.2d 341, 345-
46 (3d Cir. 1966) (discussion of contract principles relating to duty to read); Richardson
Greenshields Secs., Inc. v. Metz, 566 F. Supp. 131, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (citing J.
Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts §§ 9-41 to -46 (2d ed. 1977) on duty to read,
among other contract principles); Richardson Eng'g Co. v. IBM, 554 F. Supp. 467, 469(D. Vt. 1981) (contract signifies agreement not to plead unfamiliarity with contract provi-
sions), aff'd, 697 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1982); Cruise v. Castleton, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 564, 570
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (members' knowledge of association constitution and by-laws, contain-
ing forum-selection clause, is presumed).
386. See Central Contracting Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 367 F.2d 341, 345-46 (3d
Cir. 1966); Richardson Greenshields Sees., Inc. v. Metz, 566 F. Supp. 131, 133 (S.D.N.Y.
1983); Richardson Eng'g Co. v. IBM, 554 F. Supp. 467, 469 (D. Vt. 1981), aff'd, 697
F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1982); Cruise v. Castleton, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 564, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
see also Mercury Coal & Coke, Inc. v. Mannesmann Pipe & Steel Corp., 696 F.2d 315,
318 (4th Cir. 1982) ("Additionally, Mercury avers that the forum choice never became a
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parol evidence rule to permit a challenging party to establish allegations
of fraud, mistake or other equitable reasons for relief,387 but no one ever
wins on these grounds.
In The Bremen, enforceability was predicated on a freely negotiated
private international agreement unaffected by fraud, undue influence or
overweening bargaining power."' This has impelled courts to assess
whether contractual forum provisions are adhesive or unconscionable.
In general, courts recite by rote the talismanic phrases "fraud," "undue
influence" and "overweening bargaining power" and conclude that these
factors did not taint the clause.38 9 The courts rarely distinguish between
the concepts of adhesion and unconscionability, roaming rather freely
over this aspect of contract law.39 °
In almost every instance, without regard to the comparative size,
skills, sophistication or assets of the parties, .the courts find fair bargain-
ing.39 1 In reaching this conclusion the courts rely on another contract
presumption, that the party opposing the forum-clause received consider-
ation or a contractual concession in return for the provision.392 In other
part of the contract because Fortney was unable to read the clause when he signed.
Nonetheless, ignorance due to failure to read is no excuse in West Virginia or New
York.").
387. See Jackam v. Hospital Corp. of Am. Mideast, 800 F.2d 1577, 1582 (11th Cir.
1986) (parol evidence allowed to determine whether Saudi or U.S. law should apply to
employee claim where contract was ambiguous); Yam Indus., Inc. v. Krupp Int'l, Inc.,
736 F.2d 125, 129 (4th Cir. 1984) (parol evidence allowed for mutual mistake).
388. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 n.14, 13-14, 17 (1972).
389. See cases cited supra note 374.
390. See, eg., Intermountain Sys. v. Edsall Constr. Co., 575 F. Supp. 1195, 1198 (D.
Colo. 1983) (mem.) (commingling concepts of adhesion, fraud, and overreaching); Rich-
ardson Greenshields Secs., Inc. v. Metz, 566 F. Supp. 131, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (conflates
concepts of fraud, overreaching, and unconscionability); Richardson Eng'g Co. v. IBM,
554 F. Supp. 467, 469 (D. Vt. 1981) (commingling contract of adhesion and overweening
bargaining power arguments), aff'd, 697 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1982); Colonial Leasing Co. v.
Best, 552 F. Supp. 605, 607-08 (D. Or. 1982) (maintaining that the "unfair or unreasona-
ble" test for forum-clause validity easier to satisfy than defenses of duress or unconscio-
nability as to substantive terms of a contract of adhesion) (emphasis in original); Kolendo
v. Jerell, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 983, 985 (S.D. W. Va. 1980) (mem.) (factors against honoring
forum-selection clause include: fraud, overreaching and unreasonableness in application
to facts at hand); Cruise v. Castleton, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 564, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (same);
cf. Gaskin v. Stumm Handel GmbH, 390 F. Supp. 361, 365 nn.5-6 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (dis-
tinguishing concepts of adhesion contracts, unconscionability, inequality and overween-
ing bargaining power). See generally J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 9-
40, at 406-09 (3d ed. 1987) (unconscionability); Leff, Unconscionability and The Code-
The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485 (1967) (extensive discussion of U.C.C.
§ 2-302 unconscionability); U.C.C. § 2-302 (1987) (unconscionable contract or clause).
391. See cases cited supra note 374. But see Colonial Leasing Co. v. Pugh Bros. Ga-
rage, 735 F.2d 380, 382 (9th Cir. 1984) (no bargaining on "take-it-or-leave-it"; clause
held unreasonable and unenforceable); Colonial Leasing Co. v. Best, 552 F. Supp. 605,
607 (D. Or. 1982) ("The defendant had no knowledge of the meaning of the ['take-it-or-
leave-it'] clause.").
392. See, e.g., General Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d 352,
360 (3d Cir. 1986) ("Both parties here are sophisticated business entities capable of un-
derstanding and adjusting for the risks associated with a forum selection clause."); Inter-
mountain Sys. v. Edsall Constr. Co., 575 F. Supp. 1195, 1198 (D. Colo. 1983) (mem.)
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words, the courts presume a fair bargain. And despite the many in-
stances of boilerplate contract clauses, the courts rarely invalidate a fo-
rum-selection clause on the grounds of adhesion or unconscionability.3 93
Since outright fraud never forms the basis for a forum-selection clause, it
is virtually impossible to challenge a clearly drafted provision.
Finally, in construing contract validity the federal courts have in effect
created a federal common law of contract interpretation. Although a few
courts look to underlying state principles in diversity cases,3 94 many
courts derive contract rules from general sources of law.395 This is cer-
tainly true in federal question cases.396 Yet nothing authorizes the fed-
("[The defendant] is presumed to have received appropriate consideration, in the form of
a lower price, for the venue selection clause."); D'Antuono v. CCH Computax Sys., 570
F. Supp. 708, 713 (D.R.I. 1983) ("The better-reasoned view is that the plaintiff, by con-
senting to inclusion of the forum designation in the agreements, has in effect subordinated
his convenience to the bargain.").
393. See Lien Ho Hsing Steel Enter. Co. v. Weihtag, 738 F.2d 1455, 1458 (9th Cir.
1984) (forum clause in non-negotiated insurance policy upheld); Janko v. Outboard
Marine Corp., 605 F. Supp. 51, 52 (W.D. Okla. 1985) (claim of boilerplate contract does
not preclude enforcement of clause); LFC Lessors, Inc. v. Pearson, 585 F. Supp. 1362,
1364-65 (D. Mass. 1984) (clause enforced despite allegations of contract of adhesion, lack
of business sophistication and legal advice); Hoffman v. Burroughs Corp., 571 F. Supp.
545 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (no discussion of boilerplate challenge to clause due to sophistica-
tion of parties); Richardson Eng'g Co. v. IBM, 554 F. Supp. 467, 469 (D. Vt. 1981)
(rejection of unfamiliarity with contract provisions argument), aff'd, 697 F.2d 296 (2d
Cir. 1982); Cruise v. Castleton, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 564, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (rejection of
contract of adhesion argument). But see First Nat'l Monetary Corp. v. Chesney, 514 F.
Supp. 649, 656 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (brokerage agreement clause found to be unenforceable
contract of adhesion); Cutter v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 510 F. Supp. 905, 908 (E.D. Wis.
1981) (clause not enforced where, among other things, no evidence of negotiation or bar-
gaining on provision); cf. Taylor v. Titan Midwest Constr. Corp., 474 F. Supp. 145, 149
(N.D. Tex. 1979) (reservation in regard to boilerplate contracts; agreeing with Szukhent
dissent).
394. See, e.g., Jackam v. Hospital Corp. of Am. Mideast, 800 F.2d 1577, 1582 (1lth
Cir. 1986) (Georgia contract law); Yam Indus. v. Krupp Int'l, Inc., 736 F.2d 125, 129
(4th Cir. 1984) (South Carolina contract principles); Mercury Coal & Coke, Inc. v. Man-
nesmann Pipe & Steel Corp., 696 F.2d 315, 318 (4th Cir. 1982) (West Virginia and New
York contract principles); Central Contracting Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 367 F.2d
341, 345-46 (3d Cir. 1966) (Pennsylvania contract principles); Carefree Vacations, Inc. v.
Brunner, 615 F. Supp. 211, 215 (W.D. Tenn. 1985) (Tennessee contract principles); Rich-
ardson Eng'g Co. v. IBM, 554 F. Supp. 467, 470 (D. Vt. 1981) (Vermont contract law),
aff'd, 697 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1982); Colonial Leasing Co. v. Best, 552 F. Supp. 605, 607
(D. Or. 1982) (Oregon contract principles); City of New York v. Pullman, Inc., 477 F.
Supp. 438, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (New York contract principles).
395. See, e.g., Hunt Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Supreme Oil Co., 817 F.2d 75, 77 (9th Cir.
1987) (reliance on S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts (3d ed. 1961)); Rich-
ardson Greenshields Sees., Inc. v. Metz, 566 F. Supp. 131, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (reliance
on J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts (2d ed. 1977)); Gaskin v. Stumm
Handel GmbH, 390 F. Supp. 361, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (reliance on New York law, as
well as S. Williston, Law of Contracts (3d ed. 1970)); A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts
(1961 & Supp. 1971); Calamari, Duty to Read-A Changing Concept, 43 Fordham L.
Rev. 341 (1974)).
396. See cases cited supra note 374; see, e.g., Intermountain Sys. v. Edsall Constr. Co.,
575 F. Supp. 1195, 1197-98 (D. Colo. 1983) (mem.) (relying on general principles from
The Bremen and post-Bremen federal cases); D'Antuono v. CCH Computax Sys., 570 F.
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eral courts to create federal common law contract principles to govern
the essentially private contractual relationship between private citi-
zens. 397 This is a return to pre-Erie federal court rulemaking.
C. The Civil Litigation Concept of Waiver
In Szukhent, the Supreme Court case that undergirded the entire sub-
sequent doctrine of consensual adjudicatory procedure, Justice Black
based his dissent on the boilerplate contract provisions that the
Szukhents unwittingly subscribed to in order to obtain their rental farm
equipment. 39 From Justice Black's perspective, the majority treated the
contractual provision as a waiver of the Szukhents' objection to personal
jurisdiction-a waiver Justice Black characterized as a "constitutional
right not to be compelled to go to a New York court to defend them-
selves against the company's claims."3 99 Justice Black protested that it
strained and exhausted credulity to suggest that a Michigan farmer or
layman "reading these legalistic words" would know or even suspect that
the service of process clause subjected them to suit in New York.400
Most offensive, however, was the majority's cavalier treatment of the
concept of waiver. Justice Black explained, "[w]aivers of constitutional
Supp. 708, 711-12 (D.R.I. 1983) (same); Cruise v. Castleton, 449 F. Supp. 564, 568-70
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (same); see also General Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc.,
783 F.2d 352, 356 n.2 (3d Cir. 1986) (list of federal Bremen cases).
397. One court recognized the need for special circumstances to exist in order to create
federal common law:
We must correct the assumption that federal courts are bound as a matter of
federal common law to apply The Bremen standard to forum selection clauses.
The construction of contracts is usually a matter of state, not federal, common
law. Federal courts are able to create federal common law only in those areas
where Congress or the Constitution has given the courts the authority to de-
velop substantive law, as in labor and admiralty, or where strong federal inter-
ests are involved, as in cases concerning the rights and obligations of the United
States. Only rarely will federal common law displace state law in a suit between
private parties.
The interpretation of forum selection clauses in commercial contracts is not
an area of law that ordinarily requires federal courts to create substantive
law.... Thus, the Court has used a federal standard only where the Constitu-
tion or Congress has recognized, either expressly or implicitly, the authority of
federal courts to create substantive law. This is not such a suit.
General Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d 352, 356-57 (3d Cir.
1986) (citations omitted); see also Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630,
640-43 (1981) (court has limited power to create federal common law when "necessary to
protect uniquely federal interests" and where Congress has given the power to create
substantive law) (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426
(1964)); Miree v. DeKalb County, Georgia, 433 U.S. 25, 31-32 (1977) (federal common
law should be fashioned when there is significant conflict between federal interests and
the use of state law) (citing Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)).
398. See National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 324-29 (1964)
(Black, J., dissenting).
399. Id. at 332.
400. Id. at 332-33.
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rights to be effective, this Court has said, must be deliberately and under-
standingly made and can be established only by clear, unequivocal, and
unambiguous language.""
Justice Black's point has gone unheeded in forum-selection cases.
Throughout dozens of opinions, courts have failed to give much concep-
tual clarity to waiver in civil litigation. Only two circuit courts have
given passing recognition to the propositions that "a waiver is a volun-
tary relinquishment of a known right," 2 and "[a] party signing a waiver
must know what rights it is waiving. ,1 3 Nonetheless, without further
evidentiary basis, those courts found effective waiver.' One lone federal
district court has raised the spectre of a possible Johnson v. Zerbst waiver
standard," 5 but that court retreated from the suggestion by noting that it
did not have to pass on the waiver standard to decide the enforceability
of the forum-selection clause. °6
The large number of boilerplate contractual provisions that form the
basis of these cases call for a more finely-developed concept of civil
waiver, and certainly one that is not grounded in contract law. The ap-
plication of contract principles has simply failed to balance competing
constitutional concerns. This is especially ominous, since contractual
challenges to forum-selection rarely succeed. In enforcing the contrac-
tual basis of forum-selection clauses, courts have ignored the implications
for surrender of constitutional rights. It is essential, therefore, that
courts develop a concept of civil waiver that counters the rigid, formulaic
application of contract law.
401. Id. at 332 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) and a string of other
waiver cases in the criminal law area). For a discussion of the parallel but dissimilar
development of the concept of waiver in the criminal and civil law, see Rubin, supra note
6 passim; infra Part VII B.
402. National Iranian Oil Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 817 F.2d 326, 331-32 (5th Cir.)
(citing Watkins v. Fly, 136 F.2d 578, 580 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 769 (1943);
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 84, comment b (1981)), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 329
(1987).
403. Patten Sees. Corp. v. Diamond Greyhound & Genetics, Inc., 819 F.2d 400, 407
(3d Cir. 1987) (citing Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 333 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1964)).
404. See Patten Secs. Corp., 819 F.2d at 407; National Iranian Oil Co. v. Ashland Oil,
Inc., 817 F.2d 326, 332 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 329 (1987).
405. See Leasewell, Ltd. v. Jake Shelton Ford, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 1011, 1016-17 (S.D.
W. Va. 1976) (mem.) (extensive citation to Justice Black's dissenting opinion in
Szukhent).
406. See id. at 1017. The court held the forum-selection clause unjust and unreasona-
ble under Bremen standards, which it expected West Virginia would and should adopt as
the modern view. See id. at 1015. It also avoided addressing the issue of unequal bar-
gaining power. See id. at 1016-17; see also Gilbert, supra note 4, at 72 ("Even outside the
contract of adhesion field, abuse of such clauses is widespread .... In today's economy,
equal bargaining power cannot be 'presumed.' Zapata will render a disservice to sound
development of the law if it leads to a choice-of-court-clauses epidemic.") (quoting
Nadelman, supra note 49, at 134).
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A MEANINGFUL DOCTRINE OF
CONSENSUAL ADJUDICATORY PROCEDURE
To describe the judicial mediation of consensual adjudicatory proce-
dure is also to explicate its many doctrinal weaknesses. Among these are
the serious defects of inadequate theoretical justification and confused
characterization. The inconsistent treatment of federalism problems is
disturbing, as is the vexation of a choice-of-law overlay onto the choice-
of-forum issue. Finally, the rote application of black letter contract prin-
ciples, in the absence of a balanced theory of civil waiver, serves to vitiate
important procedural rights.
At a minimum, courts should do a better job of characterizing the
issues and justifying their decisions. Beyond this, a principled doctrine of
consensual procedure should incorporate appropriate regard for the due
process considerations implicated in forum access and governing law.
Additionally, courts ought to develop a constructive standard of waiver
for civil litigation rights.
A. Restoring Due Process and Reasonable Relationship Concepts
Characterization problems lie at the heart of a principled theory of
consensual adjudicatory procedure. The generally accepted view of fo-
rum-selection clauses as venue-conferring contributes directly to the de-
valuation of competing fundamental litigation rights. The venue
characterization covers a wealth of procedural sins and allows courts
easy justifications for bad rulings. Moreover, the venue characterization
has permitted the Supreme Court to evade the central Erie issue of fed-
eral common law rulemaking in the area of contract law.
The first step toward a principled theory of consensual adjudicatory
procedure is recognizing that forum-selection clauses are jurisdictional
and not merely matters of venue. It is judicial sleight-of-hand to pro-
nounce that forum-selection clauses do not oust a court of jurisdiction
when, as a matter of theoretical and practical effect, such provisions do
rob a particular court of its ability to adjudicate the substantive merits of
a lawsuit. When a court is asked to abdicate its jurisdiction, whether the
abdication is merely geographical or substantive, its starting proposition
should be the principle that "[w]hen a federal court is properly appealed
to in a case over which it has by law jurisdiction, it is its duty to take
such jurisdiction." 7 Further, as the abstention cases teach," 8 the fed-
eral courts should have exceptional or extraordinary reasons for yielding
their properly conferred jurisdiction." 9
407. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964)
(quoting Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909)).
408. See, e.g., Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959);
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
496 (1941).
409. See Louisiana Power & Light Co., 360 U.S. at 29 (state court determinations of
decisive issue of state law); Burford, 319 U.S. at 327-34 (state regulatory agency subject to
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The most immediate effect of construing forum-selection clauses as ju-
risdictional is to obviate the need for the post-Bremen litany of reasona-
bleness factors. The subsequent history of The Bremen demonstrates
how doctrinal laxity spawns a mishmash of legal tests and standards.
Forum-selection clauses are now measured by reasonableness criteria de-
rived from venue, forum non conveniens and contract principles. Clause
enforceability in large measure depends on the particular spin a judge
chooses to impose on the facts. Moreover, the reasonableness concerns
that inform venue, forum non conveniens, and contract law are qualita-
tively different from the reasonableness considerations of jurisdictional
analysis.410
In addition to characterizing forum-selection clauses as jurisdictional,
courts should engage in thoughtful distinction between derogation and
prorogation concepts.41 On the derogation side, it should be emphati-
cally recognized that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be consensually
yielded by prospective litigants. It should also be recognized that per-
sonal jurisdiction cannot simply be waived without some consideration of
the due process protections implicated in that concept. On the proroga-
tion side, analogous scrutiny should be afforded to the nature of the con-
sent of the parties. Consent should not be refracted through contractual
principles, but rather through a standard of informed civil waiver.
The federal courts have labored for more than forty years elaborating
highly technical requirements for due process fairness in relation to per-
sonal jurisdiction,412 only to collapse in the face of forum-selection
clauses. It is ironic that the law steadfastly protects a defendant from
litigation in an unreasonable forum when that defendant knows nothing
at all about subject matter or personal jurisdiction, yet the law does not
supply the same due process protection if the defendant signs a boiler-
plate agreement. In the latter instance the law simply imputes
knowledge.
Moreover, it is troubling that a Supreme Court that has so carefully
crafted jurisdictional prerequisites blindly accedes to the notion that par-
de novo review should be respected and federal courts should stay their hands to prevent
confusing interpretation of state law); Pullman, 312 U.S. at 496 (federal judicial resources
should not be wasted to make determinations of state regulatory law when effective state
tribunal exists to protect constitutional claims).
410. This critique is developed generally by Professor Gilbert. See supra note 4, at 43-
67. Also, the due process concerns and reasonableness tests underlying personal jurisdic-
tion and choice-of-law analysis are similar, but not co-extensive. See authorities cited
supra note 313.
411. For a discussion of derogation and prorogation clauses, see supra note 17.
412. For the development of the due process constitutional protections in regard to
personal jurisdiction, see Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987);
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See generally J. Friedenthal,
M. Kane, & A. Miller, supra note 10, §§ 3.10-3.17, at 123-61 (discussing development of
fairness requirement in personal jurisdiction); E. Scoles & P. Hay, supra note 305,
§§ 8.25-8.30, at 292-307 (jurisdiction based on defendant's economic activities within the
state).
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ties, in advance of litigation, can designate an appropriate forum. This
proposition is antithetical to the well-articulated principle that legal
claims should have some reasonable relationship to the forum in which
the claims are adjudicated.413 How can parties consent, in advance of
their litigation, to such an appropriate forum?414 Moreover, it is well-
established that if a contractual dispute triggers application of a forum-
selection clause, all the non-contractual claims travel to the selected fo-
rum.411 Can it reasonably be maintained that when the forum-selection
clause was negotiated, the parties also contemplated adjudication of non-
contract claims in the selected forum?4" 6 These same issues are impli-
cated in choice-of-law provisions that prospectively designate governing
law without regard to the nature or situs of the underlying claims.
Viewing forum-selection clauses as jurisdictional also serves to counter
potential inequities raised by offensive and defensive assertion of a forum-
selection clause. Courts have devoted virtually no analytical scrutiny to
which party invokes the clause or challenges its enforceability.417 When
a plaintiff seeks to enforce a forum-selection clause against a defendant,
413. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick,
281 U.S. 397, 408 (1930); cf. Carefree Vacations, Inc. v. Brunner, 615 F. Supp. 211, 215
(W.D. Tenn. 1985) ("In a multi-state transaction, the contracting parties' choice-of-law
provision is valid absent contravention of public policy of the forum state or a showing
that the selected forum does not bear a reasonable relationship to the transaction.").
Both the U.C.C. and the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws require some kind of
"reasonable relation" or "substantial relationship" to the forum in order to validate a
choice-of-forum or choice-of-law clause. See U.C.C. § 1-105 (1987); Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Conflict of Laws § 187(2)(a) (1971).
414. See Gilbert, supra note 4, at 56-57 (discussing due process implications of foresee-
ability and requirement of predicting appropriate forum and applicable law).
415. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 779 F.2d 643, 650-51, vacated, 785 F.2d
896 (1986), rev'd, 810 F.2d 1066 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (per curiam), aff'd, 108 S. Ct.
2239 (1988); cf Stewart Org. Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 (1988) (non-
contractual claims travel to selected forum by implication, since court did not discuss
issue of severability raised in the lower court opinions).
416. The Eleventh Circuit in Ricoh thought this possibility had in fact been considered.
In determining the scope of the forum-selection clause to include non-contractual claims,
the court stated:
It is clear from the language of the agreement that it anticipated that any
dispute arising out of or in connection with the dealer-manufacturer relation-
ship was to be governed by the clause. Of necessity this includes causes of ac-
tion arising directly from the contract and those causes concomitant. There is
no logical reason not to give these parties the benefit of their bargain.
Ricoh, 779 F.2d at 650 (emphasis in original) (relying on Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys.
of Am., 683 F.2d 718, 720 (2d Cir. 1982)). See also Ricoh, 810 F.2d at 1069-70 (same).
The concurring opinion also noted that the fact that the parties entered into a valid con-
tract creates a conclusive presumption "that Ricoh has already compensated Stewart,
through lowered costs or some other method, for any inconvenience that Stewart or its
witnesses might suffer by trying this case in New York." Ricoh, 810 F.2d at 1075
(Tjoflat, J., concurring).
417. See Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses, supra note 3, at 200. Both plaintiffs and
defendants have challenged forum-selection clauses, or asserted their enforcement, in the
variety of procedural postures in which these cases arise: state court, federal court and
removal jurisdiction.
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proper regard should be given to the defendant's due process rights to be
sued in a particular forum. Conversely, when a defendant challenges or
invokes a forum-selection clause to the detriment of the plaintiff, the
courts should accord at least some traditional deference to the plaintiff's
choice-of-forum.
In summary, traditional jurisdictional principles relating to forum ac-
cess should govern forum-selection clause enforceability. Litigants may
choose their forum and governing law so long as the choices comport
with articulated notions of justice and fair play. The concept of reasona-
bleness should derive from jurisdiction and choice-of-law canons, not
venue or contract law.
While there is no law against making a bad bargain,4" 8 there is a long-
standing American tradition that "[w]aivers of constitutional rights...
must be deliberately and understandingly made."4 19 Even the Supreme
Court has acknowledged that personal jurisdiction represents an individ-
ual liberty interest grounded in fourteenth amendment due process con-
cerns, 42 0 and that this substantial right should not so freely and
uncritically be bartered away.
B. Contractual Waiver of Civil Litigation Rights
The waiver of rights in criminal and civil law has developed in analo-
gous but not identical fashion.421 The central requirements for a waiver
in criminal law, knowledge and voluntariness, are derived from the 1938
Supreme Court case Johnson v. Zerbst,42 which defined waiver as "an
intentional relinquishment.., of a known right or privilege." '423 In civil
law cases, on the other hand, contract principles and terminology gener-
ally govern the validity of waivers.424 Nevertheless, criminal and civil
waivers are united in the common but elusive notion of consent.425
Both criminal and civil waivers have developed different standards in
relation to different rights. For example, in criminal law, the strictest
Johnson standard of knowing and voluntary waiver has been applied to
the right to counsel, formal indictment before trial, the right to trial it-
self, and trial by jury.426 A lesser standard of waiver has been applied to
the right to be tried in the district where the offense was committed, to be
418. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 390, § 10-1, at 429-30 (consumer
protection).
419. National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 332 (1964) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
420. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694, 702-03 (1982); see also supra note 412 and accompanying text.
421. See generally Rubin, supra note 6 (discussing lack of clear definition of waiver in
both civil and criminal contexts).
422. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
423. Id. at 464.
424. See Rubin, supra note 6, at 491, 512-28.
425. See id. at 529.
426. See id. at 494-95 nn.76-79 (denoted as the "strict standard" of waiver).
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present at one's trial, to raise defenses and objections and to avoid self-
incrimination.427 The waiver of these rights must be voluntary but need
not be made knowingly.428 On the civil side, consent judgments and set-
tlements that are tantamount to a waiver of the right to trial are judged
by principles of contract law,429 while waiver of defenses and objections
generally are not evaluated by contract principles or Johnson standards,
but by the principle of "stage" preclusion.430
As one commentator suggests, "the law of waiver, when viewed as a
totality, is presently in disarray,"431 and conceptual problems are pa-
tently manifest in the case law. Although many different standards for
waiver exist in both criminal and civil cases, "no court has articulated a
general rule for determining the category in which a particular waiver
belongs." '432 This same commentator notes that different types of rights
exist that require different waiver standards, yet the cases do not distin-
guish these rights in any meaningful fashion.433 Therefore, even rights
viewed as "fundamental rights" can nonetheless be subjected to a lesser
standard of waiver.434
Waiver theory is also plagued by linguistic and analytical difficulties.
Concepts such as knowledge, intention, voluntariness and consent neces-
sarily entail ventures into philosophy and psychology, generating at
times "a unique level of obscurity." '435 On the civil side, waiver excep-
427. See id. at 496-97 & nn.87-91.
428. See id. at 496. Rubin makes the point that these rights may be waived by omis-
sion or inconsistent action, such as going to trial in another district, absenting one's self
from the courtroom, failing to raise an objection, defense or appeal at an appropriate
time, or by willingly testifying about an incriminating matter. This is true for many civil
litigation rights as well. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h).
429. See Rubin, supra note 6, at 512-13 & nn.188-92.
430. Rubin notes:
This principle [of stage preclusion] demands that a right be asserted during the
stage of trial to which it is most relevant. Thus, a party who fails to assert his
right at the proper time or takes an action inconsistent with assertion of the
right will be held to have waived it ....
Id. at 515.
431. Id. at 480.
432. Id. at 498. Rubin makes this statement with regard to waiver of criminal rights,
but it applies equally well to the situation of civil law waivers.
433. See id. Again, this comment is with regard to criminal waivers, but it is even
more pertinent on the civil law side, where courts have eschewed any Johnson waiver
standards. In the civil law area, contract principles have failed to distinguish between
types of rights involved and have thus resulted in the wholesale disregard of the due
process implications of choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses.
434. See id. at 498 n.98. Rubin points out that in the criminal law area, many of the
rights subject to both the strict and lesser waiver standards implicate rights guaranteed by
the fourth, sixth and fourteenth amendments.
435. Id. at 498. Rubin notes:
Judicial definitions of voluntariness include such mysterious terms as "free will"
or "free choice," terms that have been sources of debate for several milennia.
Efforts to avoid such philosophical issues necessarily lead to the equally uncer-
tain field of psychology. As Justice Frankfurter wrote, the question of volition
"invites psychological judgment-a psychological judgment that reflects deep,
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tions based in public policy also provide elusive, mysterious
determinants.436
Moreover, the concept of waiver strikes an uneasy balance between
values enhanced and dangers inherent in recognition of the waiver. In
criminal law, the application of a strict waiver standard counters the
dangers, but inadequately accounts for countervailing values.437 In con-
trast, the application of contractual principles in civil law favors the
value-enhancing aspect of waivers at the expense of potential and actual
dangers:
By permitting parties to waive their legal rights through private agree-
ments, this framework allows the value of waivers to be realized, but
offers little protection against their dangers. Since the general civil law
policy is to enforce private agreements, it is rare that a waiver will be
invalidated on the contract law grounds of fraud, duress or
illegality.4 38
Finally, application of contract principles in civil law to determine the
validity of waiver strains notions of consent and voluntariness. It is
ironic that courts in forum-selection cases enforce such provisions over
the strenuous objection of one of the "consenting" parties.4 39  That
courts do so is more a tribute to the sanctity of contract than a recogni-
tion of competing rights.
Thus the ultimate inquiry must be whether the application of contract
principles to civil law waivers adequately balances the dangers of waiver
with the value-enhancing dimension of consent. The cases suggest that it
does not. If a waiver represents an "alternative, informal interaction that
the state encourages by its enforcement of the waiver,"'  then it is in-
cumbent that "courts should strive to translate the fairness of the plenary
interaction into the informal setting of the abbreviated one."" 1 There-
fore, a party waiving a right should be assured the functional equivalent
of that right in the setting in which the right is foregone. As a practical
matter, it is the court's task to "determine the nature of the right that has
been waived, identify the kind of protection that the right provides, and
then require that an informal version of those same protections be
provided."" 2
even if inarticulate, feelings of our society." It seems unlikely that any court
could respond to this invitation with a set of clear legal rules.
Id. at 529-30 (citations omitted).
436. See id. at 531 (unclear what "public policy" consists of); supra notes 282, 349 and
accompanying text.
437. See Rubin, supra note 6, at 488-91, 533-34.
438. Id. at 534.
439. It is almost painfully obvious that "[ijn such a situation, it does not make sense to
argue that enforcing the waiver fulfills the first party's desires. Perhaps he was willing to
part with his right at one time, but now he is no longer so inclined; otherwise there would
be no dispute." Id.




This equivalence principle supplies a useful framework for determining
the validity of forum-selection clauses. Under this view the most impor-
tant rights, those affecting judicial adjudication, are governed by the due
process clause:
For all these adjudication-related waivers, therefore, courts should re-
quire that the functional equivalent of due process protection be pro-
vided in the interaction between parties. A due process standard
would protect against the dangers of waivers; under a rigorous applica-
tion of such a standard, a waiver would be no more likely to produce
injustice than would a full-scale procedure." 3
Forum-selection and choice-of-law provisions should not be viewed as
mere creatures of contract law. These provisions must be viewed as in-
volving serious due process rights in relation to forum-access and gov-
erning law. Although contractual principles may supply some guidance
for contract interpretation, contract law should not subvert due process
inquiries into the fundamental rights at stake. The due process concerns
of jurisdiction and choice-of-law must prevail as the central referents for
validity and enforceability of such consensual arrangements. Contract
rules "cannot be used to justify those waivers that involve constitutional
rights since such rights necessarily take precedence over the contract pol-
icy of honoring private agreements."' 4
CONCLUSION
The doctrine of consensual adjudicatory procedure manifested
through forum-selection and choice-of-law provisions is now a fixed fea-
ture of the adjective law. Traditional rejection of such mechanisms has
yielded to wholesale, largely uncritical enforcement. Because of the
favorable reception that courts accord forum-selection and choice-of-law
provisions, these stipulations are becoming increasingly prevalent in all
aspects of commercial and non-commercial dealings.
The task of the courts is to supply more conceptual clarity to the doc-
trine of consensual adjudicatory procedure. This entails acknowledging
forum-selection clauses as jurisdiction-ousting or jurisdiction-conferring.
This entails recognizing that the supremacy of contract principles in civil
law waiver has sacrificed fundamental litigation rights. Due process con-
cerns must be restored as the centerpiece of judicial scrutiny.
The values enhanced by consensual agreements are not to be trivial-
ized in the context of contemporary complex litigation. Among these
values are predictability, certainty, security, stability and simplicity.
443. Id. at 538; see also Gilbert, supra note 4, at 40, 43-66 (placing the forum in an
uninterested state implicates due process concerns). But see E. Scoles & P. Hay, supra
note 305, §§ 8.13-8.19, at 275-84 (discussing jurisdiction based on consent); id. §§ 18.1-
18.13, at 632-53 (discussing party autonomy in choice of forum law); Gruson, Governing
Law Clauses, supra note 3, at 216-17 (1982) (voiding the forum selection clause nullifies
the parties' freedom of contract).
444. Rubin, supra note 6, at 545.
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Other values are cost minimization, time efficiency and flexibility. Yet
the courts have not inquired whether contractual provisions have actu-
ally enhanced these values. Indeed, it is patently ironic that proliferating
litigation over forum-selection and governing-law clauses is counter-
productive to the very values that these devices supposedly enhance.
Finally, courts must acknowledge that "[w]aivers can be dangerous for
precisely the same reason that they can be valuable: they constitute al-
teratives to the protections provided by the plenary assertion of one's
rights."" 5 Therefore, a principled theory of consensual adjudicatory
procedure will strike a fair balance between the values of such waivers
and the dangers inherent in yielding fundamental rights. That balance
must be mediated by the due process priciples that traditionally have
guided jurisdictional and choice-of-law determinations.
445. Id. at 489.

